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West Europe Report



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15 November 1985

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POLITICAL

CYPRUS

GREECE'S ECONOMIC TROUBLES, NATIONAL REPERCUSSIONS BEMOANED

NC231158 Nicosia I SIMERINI in Greek 23 Oct 85 p 1

[Editorial: "The Green Chaos"]

[Text] Half the Greeks in Greece blame Andreas Papandreou for the economic collapse and the other half applaud him, because he will save the economy with his new measures. The facts are painful for both sides and this is why all Greeks are going on strike. The Greek economy is having difficulties and Papandreou's "socialist" government policy does not bear sole responsibility for the green [PASOK's color] chaos. All previous governments share the blame.

Any attempt to tell Greece how to solve its economic problems would be futile because there are no easy solutions, Greece's economic problems are numerous and complicated, and we, in Cyprus, are faced with far worse economic deadlocks. Yet, every problem that faces Greece, also becomes our problem. This is what defines our own interest in current events in Greece.

While in opposition, Papandreou proposed solutions to all problems. There were no promises left unmade. Papandreou promised all productive and unproductive classes in Greece a better life and more fortunate future. However, after 5 years, all the Greeks are going on strike; they are all striking in protest. Instead of a more fortunate future, they are faced with economic uncertainty.

One of the basic factors for Greece's economic difficulties is the political mentality of mainland Greek political parties. Everyone promises the impossible but, in the end, no one is able to produce even what is feasible! Perhaps customary petty politicking would not have dire results for the country; however economic petty politicking is not a laughing matter. It will have tragic consequences for the people and be reflected in their misfortune or prosperity.

Bureaucracy is another endemic reason for Greece's economic weakness. Outdated decisionmaking structures and procedures are slow, expensive, and counterproductive. In fact, all Greeks admit that bureaucracy is the greatest obstruction to any attempt at economic progress.

Amateurism is a third reason. This is expressed in the notorious mentality that has been characteristic of Greeks for decades: "We will cope...." He means today, not tomorrow; right at this moment without short- or long-term planning, we will cope now, without delay. This attitude, combined with the rebellious and undisciplined mentality of the Greeks, causes Greece to lag behind economically. Membership in the EC is not merely a pastime for whiling away idle hours; it is an arena of murderous competition, and without the ability to compete effectively Greece will economically wither....

We Cypriots think that an economically strong Greece can always be a security factor for Cyprus, not only for the politically prodigal Cyprus but also for the thriftless and immoderate Cyprus. Therefore, it is with additional sorrow that we view the economic deadlocks in Greece and the economic problems of Cyprus compounding all the other problems.

The year 1986 will be complicated and difficult. Everyone in Cyprus should very carefully consider the problems both inside and outside our country. These problems must be placed in the proper perspective. Hasty party confrontations are caused by the president's egocentricity, which is responsible for this state of affairs; everyone must set aside these confrontations to search for a collective solution. Without any further delay the country must complete the various elections and finalize Kiprianou's fall from power because there are very difficult national, political, and economic problems which only a government of national unity under Glavkos Kliridhis can handle. We have been advocating this for the past 10 years because nothing is going well and the Turks most certainly know it; they are prepared and waiting.

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CSO: 3521/21

POLITICAL

FINLAND

GOVERNMENT, INDUSTRY AGREE ON SOUTH AFRICA TRADE SANCTIONS

Helsinki UUSI SUOMI in Finnish 28 Aug 85 p 8

[Article: "Imports from South Africa Will Be Limited; No Agreement Reached on Reduction of Exports"]

[Text] Steps are being taken to cut down on imports from South Africa to Finland. On Tuesday, key organizations of commerce, industry, and government reached an agreement that the importation of fresh fruits, canned fruit, and basic metals from the country which adheres to an apartheid policy is terminated immediately except for deals already made. Ending the importation of these products reduces by roughly 80 percent total imports, which amount to a good 120 million marks.

On the other hand, no mutual understanding on a reduction of exports was reached in the negotiations among Foreign Trade Minister Jermu Laine (Social Democratic Party), the Central Federation of Industry, the Central Federation of the Metal Industry, the Trade Council, the Central Federation of Technical Wholesale Trade, and the Finnish Shipping Association.

The largest exporter, the forest industry, announced last week that it was reluctant to end its trade with the country.

Minister Laine said on Tuesday that the government was ready to consider enactment of a law, if the forest industry remains firm in its stand and does not assume a favorable attitude toward the government's appeals.

Imports Are Restricted Voluntarily

According to the agreement, the E Cooperative Association EKA, the Central Organization of Finnish Cooperative Stores, and the Federation of Finnish Industrial Officials will end the importation of fresh and canned fruit from South Africa. An understanding was reached with the Central Federation of Industry and the Central Federation of the Metal Industry to investigate the possibilities of finding imports elsewhere to replace the raw materials, mostly basic metals.

Foreign Affairs Ministry and Archbishop at Loggerheads

The Foreign Affairs Ministry wants to correct Archbishop John Vikstrom's appraisal of economic relations between Finland and South Africa. At the main Namibia-Day festivities in Helsinki on Monday, Vikstrom accused the Finnish government of having a hypocritical attitude toward South Africa.

In Vikstrom's opinion, it is hypocritical to make preparations for a law which forbids Finnish investments in South Africa--Finland does not invest anything there--and at the same time allows the state's own enterprises to continue their trade with South Africa.

According to a statement issued by the Foreign Affairs Ministry on Tuesday, Finland has pledged to prevent investments in South Africa since 1978. There have not been any investments in South Africa, however, and for that reason no law on the matter has been enacted.

The South Africa law is pending for other reasons, announces the Foreign Affairs Ministry. To provide for the future, an investment ban--but also much more--is included in it.

Archbishop John Vikstrom heard the statement of the Foreign Affairs Ministry on Tuesday and made his own view more precise.

"It is hypocritical if, at the same time that a South Africa law is being planned, there is no interference with trade which the state, too, participates in. I do not consider enactment of the law hypocritical, but continuation of the state's own trade, I do indeed.

"A certain kind of national selfishness shows itself if no one interferes with trade. And this sort of national selfishness easily turns into national immorality," warns the archbishop.

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POLITICAL

FINLAND

STALINIST ORGAN VOWS MINORITY WING WANTS TO REMAIN IN CP

Helsinki TIEDONANTAJA in Finnish 10 Oct 85 p 2

[Editorial: "We Are Not Going Anywhere from The Finnish Communist Party"]

[Text] According to an explanation of the disruptive leadership faction in the SKP [Finnish Communist Party], the "Tiedonantaja faction" itself wants to leave the SKP and is on the verge of establishing "its own party". Thus supposedly the SKP Central Committee will have no other alternative next Sunday except to recognize the fact that eight district organizations have "of their own volition resigned" from the SKP.

The purpose of such an explanation is to lead party members and the working class astray and to soften the blame placed on the shoulders of the real disrupters. The SKP's eight district organizations represent the SKP, carry out its regulations and collective decisions, and are not in the process of going anywhere from the SKP. A refusal to submit to decisions that are disruptive and contrary to the regulations is not only the right of every Communist but even an obligation.

It is completely absurd that the leadership faction, which acquired power in a manner contrary to the regulations, is breaking the regulations, and is carrying out a most obvious separatist action with respect to the party, is now suspending eight district organizations and others who are coming out on behalf of the party.

The Aalto-Vainionpaa leadership faction does not have any real authority to dissolve the party, but only the authority given by raw force. It is indicative that the intent is to dissolve the party completely behind the back of the membership and even the district organizations considered to be in the camp of the leadership. There is no desire or courage to allow the membership, party organizations, or even the district organizations to deliberate what is possibly the most important party issue, whose national and international consequences are serious from the point of view of the working class and progressiveness. In addition to everything else, such a deception of the membership is a declaration of the moral bankruptcy of the present leadership.

Another path is available, the path of negotiations to be initiated on the basis of the constructive proposals of the eight district organizations being subjected to the threat of expulsion. But grasping this opportunity requires courage and a sense of responsibility, and this the leadership faction, which fears the party rank and file, does not have, at least based on present experience.

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CSO: 3617/14

POLITICAL

FRANCE

ROCARD VIEWS, POPULARITY, ROLE IN ELECTIONS EXAMINED

Polls Examined

Paris L'EVENEMENT DU JEUDI in French 3-9 Oct 85 pp 32-33

[Article by Liliane Sichler]

[Text] This is what stands between orthodox socialists and their sleep: first of all, the increase in the number of Rocard supporters among party members and then our poll, which proves that the PS [Socialist Party] must take care of its "scamp." If not, then---

He is the preferred candidate of 30 percent of the members. He'll get the others. In the federal branches of the Socialist Party the party members voted with an eye on the forthcoming congress in Toulouse, and it turned out that the results were like the winds of a cyclone. Rocard, representing a flaming minority, against Jospin, representing a right thinking majority! That is when we rediscovered the eternal Rocard, his hair still black, his twisted smile, and the endless remarks to his subordinates. That is why concern has been felt about the sudden fog which enveloped Jospin's supporters. In 54 federal branches of the party Rocard supporters improved their standing. In the Department of Pas de Calais they doubled their support. In the Nord Department, they tripled their support.

It is difficult to stop the epidemic a few days before the congress opens. It is difficult to draw any comfort from counting the remaining 70 percent of the members as hard core supporters of Jospin. The socialists are citizens like many others. As a whole, they say, "let's clear things up!" Clear up unemployment, the mess, the uncertainty, the nostalgia for the ideal, the France which is in trouble. And even though this is unfair, this feeling is of benefit to Michel Rocard. Bertrand Delanoe, a victim in the Department of the Vaucluse of a bad reception to his having been forced down the throats of local socialists by Socialist Party headquarters in Paris, said with exasperation: "I saw a party member vote for the Rocard motion because his purchasing power has not increased!" Jean Gatel reportedly had half of his section vote for the Rocard motion out of pure malice.

There are votes and various tendencies to be seen. Nevertheless, what is certain is that Rocard is on his way back, with his cape and his big hat. He is coyly silent and innocent about the Greenpeace affair. He was lucky to have left the government last April. Today he won't make the mistake of getting mixed up in this bumpy espionage novel. He and his friends look at this affair with ostensibly detached serenity, which makes all of the others angry. In Parliament on 4 October Rocard and his supporters were the only ones following in an absorbed fashion the efforts of Andre Billardon, the leader of the Socialist Party group, to backpedal on jobs, the status of state-owned companies, or unemployment. The other deputies walked out of the assembly to stroll through the corridors, asking the journalists about the latest rumors regarding the Greenpeace affair. Some deputies were ppeased about the forthcoming establishment of a committee of inquiry. Others, like Claude Estier, expressed concern about "information leaks" which might follow. Rocard supporters, for their part, went about with angelic expressions on their faces.

Regarding the French people as a whole, they continue to find an infinite kind of charm in this Michel Rocard, with the eternal sulkiness of a young man. They like him so much (see our poll) that they would vote even more definitely for him if he presented his own party list in the May 1986 legislative elections. "Get thee behind me, Satan!" For Rocard there is a great temptation to quit the Socialist Party as he quit the government. Several advisers were urging their hero to take this step until the last few weeks. However, his sharp increase in popularity within the PS has changed this.

For Rocard, at least for the time being, there is no longer a question of leaving the party but rather of gaining control of it. When he is placed against Pierre Mauroy, Lionel Jospin, or Jean-Pierre Chevenement, he constitutes the largest minority which the party has ever known. For months he has been saying that he will be a candidate in the next presidential elections. And he is the only one to be able to say this loud and clear, without being uncomfortable about it, like the supporters of President Mitterrand. As long as Francois Mitterrand has not officially raised the question of who will succeed him, the other potential candidates will only be able to mark points by using clandestine means. Even Laurent Fabius, the semi-official successor to Mitterrand, cannot say openly that he will be a candidate. As Bernard Tapie was saying the other evening, speaking as a businessman: "Rocard is clever: by starting his campaign first, he has every chance chance of being the candidate of the PS."

Thinner as a result of following his recent low calorie diet, Lionel Jospin looked more dreary than ever on television, flanked by his pretty wife, a sociologist, when he said: "Rocard may well be the candidate of the PS in the presidential elections." He even commented ironically: "I am not a socialist who says: I am a socialist but I take care of myself." Jospin knows that the whole party is looking for a kind of shock treatment at present.

The supporters of Laurent Fabius seriously annoyed Jospin with their republican and modernist speeches. Jospin used all of his resources in his

quarrel with the prime minister, who is accused of seeking to "reorient" the PS toward the center. Jospin immediately suspected the clubs established on the sidelines of the PS of the worst. He was right. There are more and more of them, and those most recently established all support Rocard. PS headquarters is no longer calling the shots, and the office on the Rue de Solferino no longer satisfies party members. This is a Fabius trick, they said a few months ago. This is just skill on the part of Rocard, they will say today to explain, for example, the development of the concept of a social republic, the club of Jean Pelletier, former parliamentary adviser of Edgar Pisani. Jean Pelletier explained: "The proposal by Michel Rocard is a challenge to the whole Left. We are going through a dramatic process of ideological decay, and Michel can be modern and constructive without selling off our values." The bell is even tolling in the Club Espace 89, which strongly supports Fabius. It is stated at every meeting of the club: "The PS has forgotten its long-term objectives." Even Jean Poperen, the second ranking PS official, who was tearing his hair, said: "There is no longer any ideological life in the party. Rocard has slipped back there as if he were in butter!"

Michel Rocard has not forgotten anything. He has not forgotten the party congress in Metz, where he confronted Francois Mitterrand and where he refused a chance of becoming his heir apparent, "but an heir apparent under control," as he said pleasantly. He has not forgotten his failed candidacy for the presidency on that unfortunate day when, at Conflans-Ste-Honorine, he declared himself a candidate and committed the crime of opposing Mitterrand. He knows that he has no other choice now. He faces the old guard of the PS which, like Jean Poperen, advocates a return to the past and rebuilding its stock of anticlerical institutions looking like the good old days. He faces Laurent Fabius, who has done him the disservice of being younger than he is and is applying the economic policy which Rocard advocated. He faces a tired party, whose officials have been absorbed by the staffs of cabinet ministers, plagued by the anticipation of a forthcoming defeat in 1986. Rocard should say now, in a thousand ways: with me the Left will be more militant, more effective, more modern.

Voting Intentions in the Legislative Elections

Party Groups	Without Rocard Lists (BVA-PARIS MATCH)	With Rocard Lists (BVA-L'EVENEMENT DU JEUDI)
Extreme Left and PSU [Unified Socialist Party]	1.5	1
Communist Party	10.5	10
Socialist Party and MRG [Republican Left Movement]	21.5	14
	TOTAL: 37	TOTAL: 43
Lists Presented by Michel Rocard	---	16
Other Lists of the Left	3.5	2
Ecological Lists	5.5	6
UDF [French Democratic Union]	18.0	18
RPR [Rally for the Republic]	24.5	20
	TOTAL: 57.5	TOTAL: 51
Other Lists of the Right	7.0	5
Front National [National Front]	8.0	8
No Opinion		23 percent

BVA-PARIS-MATCH Poll Taken from 1-5 and 15-20 September (2,752 persons polled)
BVA-L'EVENEMENT DU JEUDI Poll Taken from 1-5 September (1,799 persons polled)

Where Do the Pro-Rocard Voters Come From?

Out of 100 voters who, faced with a single socialist list, voted for:	PS	32	They voted for the Rocard lists in case of separate lists.
	PC	7	
	Miscellaneous	50	
	Left Parties		
	Ecologists	10	
	UDF	8	
	RPR	4	
	Miscellaneous	17	
	Right Parties		
	Front National	5	

Who Are the Pro-Rocard Voters?

Out of 100 voters for the Rocard lists

Out of 100 voters for the socialist lists

49	Men	52
51	Women	48
<hr/>		
10	Under 25	13
24	25-34	24
31	35-49	26
19	50-64	18
16	65 and Over	19
<hr/>		
2	Farmers	4
13	Proprietors and Senior Officials	8
4	Skilled Workers and Businessmen	3
31	White Collar and Foremen	29
26	Manual Workers	28
24	Not Gainfully Employed	28
<hr/>		

The Rocard lists would receive more votes than the official socialist lists. That is the most spectacular lesson from the BVA-L'EVENEMENT DU JEUDI poll. The presence of the Rocard lists would reduce the difference between Right and Left from 20 to 8 percent. One-third of the socialist voters would vote for the Rocard lists, as would half of the miscellaneous Left parties. The remainder of the pro-Rocard votes come, in decreasing order of importance, from the miscellaneous Right parties, the ecologists, the UDF, and the PC. The strongest points of the Rocard lists are in the 35-49 age group, among proprietors, senior officials, and foremen. On the following pages is a simulation in terms of the seats elected on the basis of this poll.

Rocard Interview.

Paris L'EVENEMENT DU JEUDI in French 3-9 Oct 85 pp 34-35

[Interview with Michel Rocard by Liliane Sichler and Albert du Roy; date and place not given]

[Text] Rocard: "A general knows before other people that he is going to win."

[Question] What do you think of the results of this poll which we have arranged to have taken?

[Answer] I won't tell you that this result surprises me. However, the probability that the situation will turn out like that is almost non-existent. This poll is based on the assumption that the Socialist Party will break apart. You will agree that this is hardly the situation at a time when the PS is taking more and more into account the ideas which I set forth in the context of the party congress in Toulouse. And I would like to recall that you need nearly 20 to 30 years to build a balanced and stable party which has good relations between the national leadership and the locally elected officials. Even Charles de Gaulle had to try twice to make his party a success, and this was only after he had become president of France. Let's be serious. Furthermore, this is not only a matter of winning votes but also seats in the National Assembly. Now, proportional representation, on the basis of the largest average vote, gives a considerable advantage to the big party lists. Finally, and this is the major argument, within the Socialist Party we have reached—not without difficulty—an electoral agreement on the lists of candidates. If this agreement is carried out—and that will be difficult under present circumstances—it will protect us against what I continue to consider an extreme risk.

The only note which goes in the opposite direction is that there still are, in the official apparatus of the party, people who would be prepared to throw us out on their own initiative, even though they are less and less numerous.

[Question] Could you name names?

[Answer] Everyone knows them! I also want to comment that the problem of a split in the party is much less serious among the socialists than in the UDF.

[Question] For what reasons do you feel that there are people who would like to throw you out of the PS?

[Answer] With what is going on at present, the way in which the party congress and the electoral agreement were announced—this wasn't on the agenda. However, your poll will have the advantage of making the socialists reflect on the electoral impact which we represent, on the importance of intelligently dealing with this situation, and on the risks that will emerge if this is not taken into consideration.

[Question] What should the Socialist Party do, with you as a member, and perhaps as its leader?

[Answer] Why not?

[Question] To take advantage of your popularity?

[Answer] Understanding the reasons for this, digesting them, and making them part of the party program.

[Question] What reasons?

[Answer] Perhaps a certain attachment to the truth in recognizing the harshness of facts, a propensity to things all the more quickly when they are difficult to say, and this is not absolutely limited to the economic field. And the search for precision in economic thought.

[Question] You are still a champion of "telling the truth."

[Answer] That has become very fashionable. However, for a government party it is the relationship between words and actions which should be respected. Telling the truth is still necessary, but that is no longer enough.

[Question] The votes which you are attracting do not come only from the Socialist Party?

[Answer] They also come from those disappointed after their hopes were aroused in 1981 and from those who are now considering voting for the parties of the Right.

[Question] Can't you be accused of being a kind of "vacuum cleaner" because of a certain haziness of view?

[Answer] That comment could only be made by those who have an inclination toward defeat. You don't win unless you rally a great number of votes! Masochism exists, but I am not like that.

[Question] The accusation of haziness was made when there was a question of your candidacy for the presidency.

[Answer] Why do you speak in the past tense?

[Question] I am speaking of 1980.

[Answer] Since then I have expressed myself, and my views are known.

[Question] What is your calendar?

[Answer] First of all there is the party congress, where the essential problem is that it should seriously consider the problems facing the country. After that, we'll see.

[Question] Are you a candidate for the socialist nomination for the presidency or are you already a candidate for the presidency?

[Answer] I don't answer questions until they are seriously raised. But I don't know of any candidacy for the presidency on the Left which has been seriously pursued without a nomination by a party, even if it was rather hurried, as was the case with the candidacy of Francois Mitterrand in 1965.

[Question] Is a victory by the Right in 1986 inevitable?

[Answer] I have never thought so. However, it's getting later and later. And I don't have a position of sufficient influence to have the responsibility of making a victory by the Right avoidable, which it still is.

[Question] Do recent events make things more difficult in this regard?

[Answer] No comment.

[Question] What is the major difference between the Left and the Right?

[Answer] Basically, it is no doubt somewhat irrational. However, it is true nonetheless that in the temperament of the Right there is an idea according to which society is difficult to manage and culture is difficult to make available to the people. The Right therefore thinks it is necessary to preserve, first of all for an elite group, the best conditions of access to knowledge, culture, and power. Whereas the characteristic of those of the Left is to be, nearly at any cost, hostile to arbitrary action, even if it is enlightened action, hostile to social injustice, even for economic reasons.

[Question] Two temperaments, therefore, rather than two ideologies.

[Answer] Two temperaments which have made their mark on history and which continue to mark it. Each of these two poles of thought, before they are political coalitions, provide a rationalized apparatus for speaking to society. On the one hand, there is a form of socialism which sees in the state and single instrument for the implementation of its desire for social justice. Facing it is a kind of liberalism: the less you have of a state, the better things are. Both of these two rationalizations seem to me equally mistaken. We are beginning to realize that, once it is clear that the state does not exist to produce goods and services, it is necessary, on the other hand, for the state to set down the rules of the game. The great victory in the rejection of liberalism is the agreement by the five ministers of finance in New York. That is a victory for intelligent pragmatism in terms of government intervention in economic affairs.

[Question] Sometimes the confrontation between Right and Left is clearer than that.

[Answer] Historically, that is true, on issues where there is a real block in the way of action: the development of the French Republic, the development of a pluralist kind of democracy, the defense of human rights, the development of a system of social security, the right to work. When the program of the Left is a program for all of society, in general the Left will win. It is when the Left only speaks for itself and is on the defensive that it is only a minority.

And then there are moments, which are not so tension-filled, when the problem is to digest the progress that has been made. It is during such phases--as is the case now--that we can feel that, for the moment, the difference between Right and Left no longer has any meaning.

[Question] However, at present there are very serious problems.

[Answer] Absolutely! The existence of two extreme positions, unemployment, rigidities in the productive machinery, the challenge to make diverse communities live together. However, in those areas the margins for freedom of maneuver are not very large, and the solutions are not radically opposed to each other. On the other hand, when it is a matter of finding a new balance in our system of social security, the cleavage between Right and Left will no doubt reappear. Taking into account, or not taking into account the protection of the most disadvantaged elements among our people is one of the most serious problems facing French society. Regarding the requirements of proper management, there are many points in common between Right and Left, but we are often paralyzed by the verbal and politically-motivated violence of the clash between Right and Left.

[Question] Is there, between Right and Left, a difference in terms of moral requirements?

[Answer] You cannot say that the people of the Right are not concerned about morality. The simple fact is that their morality is not the same. There is a social and elitist kind of morality on the Right. I condemn this. Regarding private morality, it would be improper for anyone to pretend that he has a monopoly over it. However, those whose morality is aimed at achieving equity must be even more demanding in terms of morality in the way public power is used.

[Question] The problem for the Left is to translate that into a political program.

[Answer] The Right is more concerned about preserving what exists. The left is concerned about a hope for the future. The Left therefore has more difficulty in finding the right language which expressed this hope. It is so difficult to reach agreement on language that as a result, when you have

reached such an agreement, you don't want to touch it very soon. However, facts change quickly.

[Question] How do you explain your popularity?

[Answer] That's up to the political commentators.

[Question] You don't ask yourself that question?

[Answer] I often asked myself this when, after entering the government, I accepted a vow of 4 years of silence. You can ask yourself if you can continue to keep silent. But in the middle of a battle you don't ask a general if he thinks he is going to win! He knows, before anyone else, that he is going to win!

Legislative Elections

Paris L'EVENEMENT DU JEUDI in French 3-9 Oct 85 pp 37

[Article by Frederic Bon]

[Text] The analysis undertaken in this simulation of National Assembly seats clarifies and introduces shades of difference in the conclusions drawn from the assumed voting returns. These conclusions lead us to make four remarks:

(1) The presentation of pro-Rocard lists would clearly increase the number of socialists elected. They would obtain 192 seats (87 for the orthodox PS [Socialist Party] and 105 for the Rocard supporters). This is 37 more than under the assumption of a "single list" (one PS list for each department). This result seems to raise a question as to whether proportional representation using the largest average provides an advantage to assembling combined voting lists. This contradiction is explained by the overall improvement in the anticipated socialist vote. Separate socialist voting lists will attract 30 percent of the voters, compared to 21.5 percent for a single socialist list.

On the assumption--now improbable--that the single list would receive 30 percent of the votes, it would obtain 223 seats. In other words increasing its vote from 21.5 to 30 percent would make it possible to pick up a further 68 seats (increasing from 155 to 223 seats). On the other hand, a division of socialist lists would "cost" 31 seats. Overall, the net results of this tactic, which would make it possible to make a broad sweep of the electorate, are positive, given the present state of voting preferences.

(2) The improvement in the performance of the pro-socialist groups would be to the detriment of the miscellaneous parties of the Right and of the RPR [Rally for the Republic]. The reduction in the number of members of the National Assembly from miscellaneous parties of the Right (down from 14 to 3) would result from the legal minimum of 5 percent of the vote which a given party list must obtain to participate in the division of seats. By falling from 7

to 5 percent on a nation-wide basis, the lists of the miscellaneous parties of the Right would fall below the legal minimum in most departments. Thus, by losing less than one-third of their voters, they would lose three-fourths of their seats. The decline in the vote of the RPR, on the other hand, is the logical and proportional consequence of its loss of popularity. On the assumption that pro-Rocard lists are presented to the voters, the RPR would lose one-fifth of its voters (4.5 percent less than its anticipated share of 24.5 percent of the total vote) and of its seats (a loss of 38 out of 188 seats).

(3) The pro-Rocard lists (which would obtain 105 seats and 16 percent of the total vote) would come in ahead of the PS lists (87 seats and 14 percent of the total vote). However, this advantage is relatively fragile. It would be enough for 1 percent of the voters to change their votes for the results to be the reverse of this. If the balance of 16 to 14 in favor of the pro-Rocard lists should change to 15, the pro-Rocard lists would fall to 86 seats, and the PS lists would rise to 106. In other words the internal distribution of socialist votes, as recorded by the BVA-L'EVENEMENT DU JEUDI poll, is close to the limit where slight changes in the voting pattern would result in major changes in the distribution of seats.

(4) Separate socialist lists are more vulnerable to combined lists by the Right wing opposition. On the assumption of a single list presented by the UDF [French Democratic Union] and RPR, separate socialist lists would lose 24 seats (down from 192 to 168 seats). Single socialist lists would fare better against single opposition lists, limiting the loss to 16 seats (down from 155 to 139 seats).

Simulation of 555 Seats in Metropolitan France

	Pro-Rocard Lists			
	With	Without		
Extreme Left and PSU [Unified Socialist Party]	0	0		
Communist Party	43	46		
PS and MRG [Left Republican Movement]	155	87	TOTAL: 198	TOTAL: 238
Pro-Rocard Lists	---	105		
Other Left Lists	0	0		
<hr/>				
Ecologists	10	10		
<hr/>				
UDF	118	124		
RPR	188	150		
Other Right Lists	14	3	TOTAL: 347	TOTAL: 307
National Front	27	30		

The simulation for the distribution of seats was prepared, using the model developed by Frederic Bon, a professor at the Institut d'Etudes

Politiques [Institute of Political Studies] of Grenoble, in the course of work done by the socio-political data bank of the CNRS [National Center for Scientific Research].

Preparing an analysis, taking into separate account the pro-Rocard current of opinion, presents special problems. In effect, it is difficult to prepare an analysis of electoral strength for a new political tendency. The assumption of an equal division of votes among the various socialist tendencies will hardly bear analysis. However, two indicators can be used:

(1) The changes in the group of socialist and radical voters between 1973 and 1978. This reconstruction of the group of socialist voters was carried out, covering two stages: from 1971 to 1974, in terms of an assumed "positive attachment to parties of the Left," as symbolized by the signature of the Common Program. The second stage covers the period from 1974 to 1981, characterized by the emergence of the modernist current of socialism. Voters in the National Assembly elections of 1973 and 1978 found themselves in the middle of each of these two periods. It is probable that the receptivity of socialist voters to pro-Rocard themes was more extensive in those departments where the movement toward a pro-Rocard position was the strongest.

(2) The size of the electorate favoring Michel Rocard within the non-communist electorate of the Left in the presidential election of 1969. Despite the difference of size--reduced to its simplest expression, the non-communist Left in 1969 accounted for less than 10 percent of the votes cast--and in the political situation, the following two indications point in the same direction: they generally include the same departments in the same political categories. It is therefore reasonable to make the following assumption: The increase in the pro-Rocard lists as a proportion of the socialist voters will be stronger in those departments where the socialists made a breakthrough in 1978 and weaker in departments where the increase in the number of socialist voters in 1978 was more modest. These geographical considerations constitute a handicap for the pro-Rocard lists, because their strongest areas are those where the increase in the number of voters of the Right is the most sensitive.

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CSO: 3519/8

POLITICAL

GREECE

PAPANDREOU INCREASES NUMBER OF SPECIAL ADVISORS

Athens PONDIKI in Greek 20 Sep 85 p 15

[Text] A week ago (11 September), KATHIMERINI made a leading issue of its information that Papandreou intends to decree a "board of advisors" (this was the title), "downgrading the responsibilities and prerogatives of his ministers" and "transferring to Kastri the entire mechanism for taking decisions."

The government spokesman's answer was: "There is not going to be any change in the make-up, arrangement and function heretofore of the advisors."

Regardless of the newspaper's interpretations, it is a fact that recently the prime minister has doubled the number of his advisors.

Presently, there are four special offices, and a number of advisors, under Papandreou:

1. The political office. The director is Andonis Livanis. Also in this office are Angela Kokkola, manager of Papandreou's private office, and (the lately much-discussed) Mikhalis Ziangas, the prime minister's private secretary.
2. The diplomatic office, headed by Khristos Makhairitsas.
3. The legal office, headed by Giorgos Kasimatas.
4. The economic office, headed by Giannis Papanikolaou.

Also working close to these are the prime minister's special advisors, Andonis Stratis (on political relations issues), Giorgos Terpeklis (on special issues) and Lambis Nikolaou (technical advisor).

Added recently to the group of special advisors are:

1. Sotiris Kostopoulos, former general press secretary, on issues involving communication with the public.
2. Giannis Matzouranis, former secretary of the Council of Ministers, of the Ministry to the Prime Minister, etc., on public administration issues.
3. Doctor Themis Lambrinopoulos, on health issues.

4. The journalist, Giannis Roumbatis, on foreign press issues.

Perhaps there are other additions...(Editor's Note: Since Sunday, ELEVETHEROTYPIA has been running "Andreas' Men," beginning with Kasimatis--the facts are also from there.)

9247

CSO: 3521/1

POLITICAL

GREECE

COMMENTS ON RECENT CHANGES IN EXECUTIVE BUREAU

Athens I KATHIMERINI in Greek 29-30 Sep 85 pp 1,14

[Article by Andreas Zoulas]

[Text] A plummet in the prime minister's prestige among party cadres, which presages an analogous reduction in his political strength, and also inner-party frictions and compromises, is revealed by the restructuring of the PASOK Executive Office [EG] and the result of the voting to elect its new members. Political observers, as well as factors from the governing party, note that the voting last Friday, 27 September, in the PASOK Central Committee [KE] had the worst possible outcome for Papandreou, whose main aim was for his proposal to become accepted by a majority equal to that in the election of Executive Office members a year ago. Instead of this, the voting showed that, on the average, one out of three Central Committee members does not consider the new EG members qualified to participate in this highest executive organ of PASOK. This development is considered the first great inner-party confrontation between cadres and Papandreou; it proves that, among party cadres, it is a very widespread opinion that the incredible downgrading of the PASOK Executive Office is a maneuver by the prime minister which aims more at projecting himself as the only omnipotent factor within PASOK than at the harmonious functioning and maintenance of equilibriums in the "government-party" schema.

And while Papandreou's pre-eminence versus any other cadre can in no way be questioned, nevertheless, the rejection of his idea of "founder-supreme power" in relation to the entire party machine is an element which holds interest for further developments in the governing party.

The restructuring of the Executive Office was announced immediately after the last elections by Papandreou, committing himself to the promise that government members would not participate in at least this party organ. The separation of government and party was promoted as grounds for this position.

In all these statements made over time by Papandreou, he let it be understood that the people who would maintain a double capacity would number three to four (he always spoke about a majority of non-government members in the EG). Now, with the restructuring on 27 September, the only EG member also participating in the government is Tsokhatzopoulos.

It is believed the extent of this restructuring approaches the limits of downgrading the Executive Office or, more simply, transferring the party to the government!

According to the PASOK by-laws, the EG is the "highest executive organ," which:

"Monitors and controls the course of implementing Central Committee decisions and deals with all the party's current political and organizational problems, always in the frameworks of the general political and ideological positions designated by the KE."

"The EG establishes operating regulations for the movement's organizations and organs, and its committees, which are approved by the KE. Connections between the government and movement are the responsibility of the president and Central Committee Executive Office."

The Questions

The questions raised with the EG's restructuring are many and concern the operation of both the party and government:

The first question to emerge is related to the new people in the EG, and their "party weight" in relation to the people they replaced and also to the work the EG normally performs.

It is distinctive in this case that important PASOK cadres literally do not know most of the newly-elected EG members. Even more distinctive, however, is the measure of the KE members' "acceptance and rejection" of the new EG members. This is deduced from a comparison of the results of the 27 September voting to the results of the voting for the outgoing EG in May 1984 at the PASOK congress.

Acceptance and Rejection Indicators

At that time, the two people tying for first place, Avgerinos and Kharalambopoulos, had collected 134 votes out of a total of 140. That is, only six KE members had not voted for the two front-runners. The person with the least number of votes, Mrs. V. Papandreou, had received 112 votes; that is, 28 members had not voted for her. On the average, the measure of "acceptance and rejection" was 129 to 11.

In the voting day before yesterday, the front-runner, Papoutsis, received 108 votes out of a total of 135; that is, 27 did not vote for him. The person in last place, Khatzopoulos, received only 73 votes; that is, 62 KE members did not vote for him. The "acceptance-rejection" relation of, on an average, 90 to 45 is an unprecedented event for an election of a PASOK party organ.

"Second-Class People"

It is obvious that the new Executive Office is downgraded in terms of prestige; this is because its former cadres always deemed worthy in the PASOK area (Laliotis, Gennimatas, Kharalambopoulos, Simitis, Avgerinos, Moralis, V. Papandreou and Rokkos) are being replaced by "second-line" cadres whose power within the party does not compare with that of the outgoing members.

No one seriously believes that the Executive Office, in its new form, will "give a line" to the "political and organizational problems of the movement" which happens to be found in the government in which the outgoing "leading" party cadres participate as primary officials.

The question which arises concerns why the prime minister and president of PASOK proceeded to such a broad restructuring of the EG.

The first impression produced by the breadth of the EG's restructuring is that Papandreou was able to put eight primary PASOK cadres out of this critical party organ. This aspect is echoed by related publications in the pro-government press, even if only with hints. If such a thing is really happening, in the opinion of political observers, Papandreou will have to "decapitate" in terms of the party his most important government cadres--an act which can only be interpreted as a gradual weakening of PASOK's "first-line" cadres.

Weakening

The cases of Simitis, Gennimatas and Laliotis are cited as very characteristic examples. The first has shouldered the greatest part of the responsibility for a "new policy" which, from their side, both ND and the KKE call a policy of one-sided frugality. But it is also a policy which PASOK trade-union cadres are not willing to accept, cadres who, on the other hand, were the core of the opposition to the proposal for restructuring the PASOK Executive Office.

Gennimatas has undertaken the broadest section of the government's social policy, his spearhead being the National Health System, whose implementation in practice is not keeping pace with the announced rates.

Laliotis has involved himself in the role proven most difficult, that of government spokesman; already, as informed sources report, in the manner in which he exercises his government duties, he has provoked, in certain cases, the prime minister's intense impatience.

Based on this deductive reasoning, the next step in the "gradual weakening" can only be replacement from the government position also.

Despite the fact that PASOK's previous government experience and practice makes even this interpretation possible, political observers believe that Papandreou's maneuver in restructuring the EG does not mean "making mincemeat" of the oppositions. This is because Papandreou has no more time for an alternative policy in case the policy the government will announce completed next month fails, but also he has no other cadres to implement it.

9247

CSO: 3521/1

POLITICAL

GREECE

SUSPECTED SPY WORKED IN SENSITIVE OFFICE

Athens I KATHIMERINI in Greek 20 Sep 85 pp 1,3

[Text] The investigation of Lieutenant Vas. Serepisios, who is being held in the Avlona prisons, continues for the eighth day today under the supervision of a major-general from Military Justice, but it is not expected to be finished soon because of the seriousness of the case.

As has become known, navy officers and other persons continue to be called steadily for depositions since Serepisios continues to deny everything, obviously hoping (since he was not caught in the act) there will be no other evidence against him except the camera found in his house on Sunday night.

Alternate Minister of National Defense Drosogiannis stated on 18 September, however, that there are data supporting Serepisios' guilt "which are a catapult." Drosogiannis, who refused to name the foreign power to which the lieutenant leaked information, cancelled his meeting today with military editors, using the morning session of the Council of Ministers as an excuse. Thus, the complete lack of official data about this case, which possibly concerns the country's national security, will continue.

One of the marks of the case's seriousness is the fact that Serepisios was in a key position, beginning on 1 June 1983, for many months. More specifically, at that time he took over the job of computer-system management officer and security officer.

His Competencies

Among his competencies, according to the GEN [Naval General Staff] order, were the following:

Development of specific new applications, suggestion for taking necessary measures for operation of electronic data-processing systems, security from accidental "entry into the system" and records, control of incoming and outgoing personnel in the Mechanography Center and of distributed material, use of classified records and access to these only by "designated personnel."

With another GEN order, Lieutenant Serepisios' work area was designated private; entry was allowed only to him and one other officer, as well as two other civilian employees of the navy. Other people were able to go into this area only in special circumstances and with a special permit from the director.

The Connections

The investigation is turned, however, basically to other matters beyond those relating to Serepisios' competencies in the Mechanography Directorate. More specifically, the possibility that the lieutenant has communicated various other information or data concerning critical sectors of our national defense is being looked into.

In particular, the investigation is examining Serepisios' connections with other officers, but also with personnel at the Soviet Embassy in Athens, as well as the way in which Serepisios transmitted the information.

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POLITICAL

GREECE

WEEKLY REPORTS PASOK'S ALLEGED 'COVER-UP'

Athens I VRADYNI in Greek 26 Sep 85 p 3

[Text] Information with numerous "digs" against PASOK people is being published in a weekly confidential bulletin, the "Letter," regarding spy and terrorist activities in our country and the PASOK government's "cover-up" machinations.

In particular, the "Letter" notes: "Most diplomatic observers in Greece are thunderstruck as they watch the Greek government's efforts not to uncover and shed light on what goes on inside the country as regards terrorism and the leakage of technological information in the direction of communist countries, but rather mainly not to displease the Soviet Union. "

Foreign observers are also struck by the government's studiousness in ruling out any possible connection of the arrested terrorists with the PASOK.

Nevertheless, at this point two tendencies prevail within Mr. A. Papandreou's movement. One of the tendencies is in favor of emphasizing the terrorists' leftist character and the Soviet penetration in Greece, so as to make easier and more credible the PASOK's conversion to the Right now that the opposition is in a state of aphasia. While the second tendency stresses that under no circumstance must there be a cooling of the PASOK's relations with the Soviet Union.

Subsequently the "Letter" reveals that: "According to the evaluations of foreign diplomatic circles in Athens, the sudden arrest of terrorists two days prior to disclosing the existence of a network of spies working for the Soviet Union is nothing but a gross attempt on the government's part to play down Soviet penetration of the Greek army and to keep intact the image of the USSR in public opinion. Therefore, with the sole aim of downplaying this significant issue for the security of Greece and the West, the pro-Soviet wing of the ruling party activated an odd mechanism and contrived the Krystallis case. At the same time, the PASOK's pro-Soviet elements launched a furious attack against the KYP [Central Intelligence Service] with the ultimate aim of dismembering this service and putting it under the control of people favorably inclined toward the Soviet Union and the ideology of totalitarianism. According to the foreign observers, the unleashing of the foregoing scheme, and the Soviet presence in general in Greek political life, have turned Greece into (only) a conventional and insolvent member of the Atlantic

Alliance, whose future in the bosom of the West is problematic. According to our information, as it is, Greece will have the greatest difficulty from now on in obtaining military technology, while its being kept away from NATO's significant decision-making centers is viewed as certain.

Finally we underline the fact that, according to reliable circles of the diplomatic milieu, high ranking officials of the PASOK are the perpetrators of the whole attempt we have described above."

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CSO: 2521/12

POLITICAL

PORTUGAL

ORIGINS OF, REASONS FOR EANISM DISCUSSED

Lisbon EXPRESSO in Portuguese 19 Oct 85 p 3

[Article by Jose Antonia Saraiva: "Eanes: A New Costa Gomes?"]

[Text] Beyond some more or less lucid political analyses, the question of the moment is this: will Gen Eanes be a new Gen Costa Gomes, and will the PRD [Democratic Renewal Party] be an MDP [Portuguese Democratic Movement] with a new face?

In other words: will Eanes end up, sooner or later, just like Costa Gomes, a prisoner of the communists, and will the PRD have no alternative but to join forces with the Communist Party? The reply is negative.

It is well known that the PCP has attempted, since 1976, to cling to Gen Eanes, in an effort to attract his sympathy. But it is no less certain that at no time did Eanes act in such a way as to create the impression that he wished to please the communists through his decisions.

In fact the opposite is true.

The history of these last 10 years shows a president of the Republic, constantly praised by the PCP and permanently attacked by the right and by Mario Soares, who had to resort to a high-wire act in order not to become dependent on Alvaro Cunhal's party.

This is the incontrovertible truth.

And when Gen Eanes enjoys the availability of a party with 18 percent of the vote, why should one think that he would have no solution but to surrender himself, like Costa Gomes, to the PCP's care?

One must say that the right has always acted in a less than clever way vis-a-vis Ramalho Eanes, while the opposite is true of the PCP.

And it has always hurt itself.

In 1980, Francisco Sa Carneiro thought that he could defeat Eanes with a general that jumped out of his pocket, and he lost.

Between 1981 and 1983, Francisco Pinto Balsemao attempted to pick up the flag of the anti-Eanist struggle: he did not even succeed in keeping his party united around him.

The right never realized that the struggle against Eanes always resulted in more losses than gains.

And it did not realize that this struggle brought about this surprising consequence: the more he was attacked, the more the president saw his prestige rise.

It is interesting to investigate the reasons for this state of affairs.

The answer does not seem overly difficult: as the attacks of the political parties against the president of the Republic multiplied themselves, the country was increasingly tempted to see in the chief of state the alternative to the parties; and as the Portuguese people's opinion of the politicians and the parties became more and more unfavorable, Eanes' popularity rose every day.

Considering all this, it is to be expected that the right and Mario Soares will not commit the same errors in relation to Eanes that they did in the past.

It is to be expected that instead of waving the "specter of Eanism"--which, as was demonstrated, did not scare the Portuguese people--the right and Mario Soares will reflect on the reasons for which, following 5 years of attacks against Eanes, the Eanist Party succeeded in attracting so many voters.

Above all, it is to be expected that they will realize, once and for all, that Eanism was created more by them than by Eanes, who, it must be acknowledged, did little for it with his taste for silence.

It should be noted that Eansim began the moment the Portuguese people evidenced impatience with the way the parties conducted politics.

Afterwards, Eanism grew when party leaders, by making Eanes their principal enemy, led the country to believe that the president was against parties.

Finally, Eansim consolidated itself when party of the country concluded that, if the president of the Republic was indeed against parties, he therefore was the sole hope for change.

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CSO: 3542/14

POLITICAL

SPAIN

PAPERS CRITICIZE STATE OF NATION SPEECH

PM 281553 [Editorial Report] Spanish newspapers published 16 October 1985 carry editorials on Spanish Prime Minister Felipe Gonzalez' 15 October speech in the Congress of Deputies debate on the state of the nation, which are generally critical of its tone and contents.

Barcelona LA VANGUARDIA asserts on page 5 that the first session of the debate "produced no surprises, but Prime Minister Gonzalez' speech also brought few novelties. Since it was the last session of this kind before the general election, there was obvious concern throughout the speech to present the situation in rosy terms, with sights set on the electorate. It was unspecific, and the thorniest issues were carefully glossed over."

Commenting on particular aspects of the speech, it concedes that "it may be acknowledged that the policy of containing inflation and of flexibility adopted by the economic ministers were positive factors when taking stock. But this has been achieved by finding inspiration in liberal systems and casting aside socialist programs. All this confirms the idea which the centrist politicians had that the preparation of better conditions for an effective employment policy necessarily entailed economic reorganization, in the same way that entry into the EC also entailed cooperation with the collective security system. The one thing went with the other."

"And this is what Prime Minister Gonzalez has finally had to acknowledge. In the last analysis he has ended up agreeing with the government which preceded him and with the opinion of lifelong pro-European and Western politicians. This is perhaps the most novel aspect of the speech on the state of the nation."

Madrid EL PAIS maintains on page 10 that "the speech delivered by Felipe Gonzalez to the Congress yesterday -- a self-satisfied stocktaking of the work performed by his government during the current legislative term -- confirms the Socialist leader's loss of political sensitivity and ability to communicate since 10 million votes entrusted government responsibility to him. The talent displayed by the PSOE secretary general as leader of the opposition in arousing the hopes and mobilizing the energies of Spanish society was scarcely recognizable in the leaden tone of his speech as prime minister in yesterday's debate."

And EL PAIS contends:

"Felipe Gonzalez' speech operated in that no-man's-land where generalizations coexist with trivial facts. Taking his words literally, the Spanish people are living not only under the care of the only government compatible with respect for freedoms but also in the best of possible worlds. The achievements attained by the Socialist government's economic policy of adjustment left in soft shadows both the high social costs which have made them possible (especially, the growth of unemployment) and also the acts of selfishness and waste detectable in sections of the new ruling class, which are no less significant for being in a minority. The triumphalist picture of the situation painted by Prime Minister Gonzalez eliminated the irksome images, the unkept promises, and any uncontentious reference to other alternative courses. This one-dimensional view of reality can lead only to resignation and an invitation to citizens to hand over to their benevolent political administrators the monopoly over information, ideas, and responsibilities."

Madrid ABC asserts on page 27: "The most noteworthy aspect of Felipe Gonzalez' speech in his parliamentary intervention yesterday was his ability to speak for 105 minutes while saying hardly anything, even if he was skillful in the subsequent debate. Far from lending itself to irony, what happened was clearly a grave matter. For a year the Spanish people have been witnessing the fading of the Socialist leader: His inability to express a single interesting proposal, a single original idea, a single sentence in the face of the audience's somnolence is the most visible vacuum suffered by Spanish politics today. The nation's problems are pressing. The opportunities, in a historic stage of recovery, are obvious. That is why the kind of creeping paralysis which has finally immobilized the head of government seems pathetic."

Madrid YA points out on page 9 various "omissions" in the speech, expressing doubts as to whether Spain is more democratic as a result of the PSOE government or better able to face the challenge of the EEC, and concludes:

"We respect that not everything has stopped at intentions. We have mentioned the success of entry into the Common Market, although so little has been done to prepare Spanish society. Another plus is the government's laborious struggle to surmount its huge initial mistake over NATO. The prime minister has clearly explained the need to remain in that organization for international and domestic reasons. Here, too, the lack is felt of an information effort to acquaint the Spanish people with what is at stake and to dispel the most glaring errors."

"In conclusion: A punctilious debate in which fruitful comparisons were made and which needed only somewhat greater humility on the part of a government which has done more than is acknowledged but has much to be forgiven for and perhaps needs that greater humility if it wishes to inspire confidence in the future to which it naturally aspires."

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CSO: 3548/15

POLITICAL

SPAIN

OPINION POLL HELD ON NATO REFERENDUM INTENTIONS

PM251226 [Editorial Report] Madrid CAMBIO 16 in Spanish 21 October 1985 publishes on pages 18-22 a Luis Peiro and Caridad Plaza report on the questions concerning the impending referendum on Spain and NATO contained in an opinion poll conducted for CAMBIO 16 by the ECO Institute 30 September-3 October among a nationwide sample of 5,058 people over the age of 18.

Out of the interviewees, 52 percent said that they would certainly vote in the referendum, 20 percent probably, 14 percent certainly not, and 11 percent probably not, while 3 percent did not know or did not reply.

In response to a hypothetical referendum question "that Spain should remain in NATO without joining the military structure, and that the U.S. military presence in Spain should be reduced," 30 percent of the interviewees declared themselves in favor and 34 percent against, while 28 percent did not know or reply. Among those who said that they would certainly or probably vote in the referendum. 44 percent were in favor of remaining in NATO and 38 percent opposed, with 18 percent not knowing or replying.

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CSO: 3548/15

POLITICAL

SPAIN

PCE, SKP ISSUE JOINT COMMUNIQUE

PM021005 Madrid MUNDO OBRERO in Spanish 26 Sep-2 Oct 85 p 41

[PCE-FINNISH Communist Party joint communique]

[Text] A bilateral meeting between a PCE delegation and a Finnish Communist Party [SKP] delegation took place Friday, 20 September, at PCE Central Committee headquarters.

The PCE delegation was headed by Party Secretary General Gerardo Iglesias, and including Simon Sanchez Montero, secretariat member and international relations chief, Andrew, Claret, secretariat member and news media chief, and Miguel Moran, Central Committee and International Committee member.

The SKP delegation was headed by party chairman Comrade Arvo Aalto, accompanied by Comrade Irina Lindeberg of the International Committee.

The meeting, at the PCE's invitation, is the first to be held at this level between the two parties, and it took place in an atmosphere of comradeship, cordiality, and understanding. It has created the conditions for the subsequent development of the friendship and cooperation between the two parties.

The two sides agreed that the struggle for peace is the most important issue for the whole of mankind today, and consequently the foremost and most important task for the two parties. They also believe that the uninterrupted arms race and the dynamic of the military blocs, caused by the world imperialist policy of the military-industrial complex which predominates in the United States and which led to the setting up of NATO, constitute the greatest danger to peace and to the struggle for the Third World people's national liberation. They condemn President Reagan's plans for going ahead with the SDI or Star Wars project, which would mean an extremely grave qualitative leap forward in the arms race and support the USSR's proposals for the peaceful use of space by all countries, as well as the suspension of nuclear tests by the USSR during this year and its proposal that they be suspended indefinitely if the same decision is taken by the United States and the other nuclear powers.

The PCE reported at length on its struggle for a policy of peace and neutrality by Spain, for holding the referendum and Spain's leaving NATO, for the dismantling of the U.S. bases in Spain, and for the denuclearization of the whole Mediterranean area, as well as against the government's economic policy and for the defense of political freedoms.

For its part, the SKP delegation reported on its activity in support of Finland's foreign policy of peace, which is based on the agreement on Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance between Finland and the USSR, and to ensure that Finland, as a state, and the Finnish people, as a mass movement, make an active contribution to the struggle for world peace. In the struggle for peace today, the SKP regards as a very important task the battle for the creation of a nuclear-free zone in northern Europe; an initiative which enjoys the support of the people's masses in the Nordic countries.

The two parties were in agreement that the peoples of Europe should play an important role in the struggle for peace and to secure greater autonomy for Europe. In order to achieve the two aims, the military blocs and foreign military bases must disappear, and this requires unity among all left-wing and democratic forces and all those who love peace in Europe. This will make it possible to achieve at the same time a new relationship with the Third World countries in order to struggle for a new international economic order, and enable Europe's workers and peoples to secure a democratic solution to the crisis and to combat effectively the unemployment existing in all the European capitalist countries.

The PCE and the SKP vigorously condemn the South African racist government's policy of apartheid and savage repression, and demand an end to the repression, the release of leader Mandela and of all South Africa's political prisoners, and full recognition of rights and political freedoms for all South Africa's black citizens.

The two parties condemn with the same vigor Reagan's aggressive escalation against Nicaragua and El Salvador and his imperialist policy against the peoples of Latin America, and express their solidarity with the heroic people of Chile, who are struggling for their freedom against Pinochet's dictatorship, and with all peoples struggling for their national liberation, such as the Saharan people, the Palestinian people, and so forth.

The PCE and the SKP state that the principles which should govern relations among communist parties, approved by the international communist movement, remain valid and should be respected: Total independence and sovereignty of each party, which is solely responsible for the formulation of its own political line on the basis of the situation in its country and of its own analyses; noninterference in another party's internal life; and a search for cooperation among parties despite the disagreements which may exist.

The PCE and the SKP are convinced that the defense of their political independence highlights their nature as national political forces, the aim of whose struggle is the defense of the interests of the workers and of their respective peoples, and that this struggle will increase their influence in their own countries and the strength of the international communist movement.

The two delegations express their satisfaction at the outcome of the talks and are convinced that the development of the friendship and cooperation between the PCE and the SKP will serve to strengthen the struggle for peace and democracy, progress, and socialism.

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CSO: 3548/15

POLITICAL

SPAIN

PCE'S SANCHEZ MONTERO VIEWS CPSU-PCF STATEMENT

PM231403 Madrid MUNDO OBRERO in Spanish 3-9 Oct 85 p 46

[Commentary by PCE international relations chief Simon Sanchez Montero:
"The Gorbachev-Marchais Statement"]

[Text] A bilateral meeting between the CPSU and the PCF was held in Moscow 2 September. At it a joint statement signed by Gorbachev and by [PCF Secretary General] Marchais, representing their respective parties, was approved. It is an important statement in itself, because of what it says, but even more significant taking into account the fact that it is the first document of this kind signed by Gorbachev as CPSU general secretary.

Comrade Gorbachev's election aroused expectation and hope both inside and outside the USSR. He was expected to effect the radical change hoped for and needed by Soviet society in both domestic and foreign policy in order to surmount the grave problems which it has today and to achieve its full development as a socialist society. That excited hope of the Soviet people is shared by all the USSR's friends in the world, among whom we count ourselves. The imperialists and reactionaries would like a change for the worse, or at least the avoidance of positive change.

The brief time which has elapsed since Gorbachev's election gives grounds for optimism. In fact important and positive measures have been adopted both in the state and in the party, in connection with domestic policy and foreign policy. Let us recall the struggle against corruption and alcoholism and for the revival of the whole economy by means of scientific and technical progress and the policy of material encouragement of those who work hardest, greater decentralization and responsibility and initiative for enterprises, increased workers participation and self-management, and, especially, the improvement of the Soviet people's living conditions. And in foreign policy, decisions such as the decision to suspend all nuclear testing this year -- and for good if the United States and the other nuclear powers adopt the same decision -- and the proposal to the UN General Assembly concerning the peaceful use of space by all countries and against Reagan's SDI or Star Wars, are very important and beneficial for peace. These are measures which we have praised and still praise.

These political measures have been accompanied by important changes in the leadership of party and state and of their principal institutions. The new leaders appointed are younger not only in age but in ideas and spirit. They understand better the present-day world's problems and their resolution. There is a new, more open style: "We still have sufficient strength and resolve in order, relying on the people's invigorating work and consolidating the marriage of science and work, to ensure that words do not differ from deeds. And this is what is essential in politics and life." These are remarks by Gorbachev in his 11 June report to the CPSU Central Committee on "the fundamental issue of the party's economic policy."

Let us return to the Gorbachev-Marchais statement. Important things are stated in it -- new at least in the way in which they are put. For instance, when it is stated how socialist society should be:

"...That is why socialist society can live only by the freedom of its members, their creativity, their responsibility and their enterprise. Its evolution creates the demand for increasing self-management of communities and of workers themselves..."

Referring to relations among communist parties, the statement says:

"Each communist party determines its analyses, its policy, and its way of building a socialist society in complete independence and on the basis of the situation in its own country."

"Each communist party acts under different conditions. This diversity of situations is constantly growing; it leads to different approaches to and stances on certain issues, and sometimes to disagreements."

"The CPSU and the PCF believe that this fact should under no circumstances run counter to relations, cooperation, and solidarity among communist parties."

We agree with these words, and we believe that, as comrade Gorbachev himself says, words should not differ from deeds, or -- which is the same thing -- that deeds should be in keeping with words.

But in the specific field of relations among communist parties, the opposite sometimes happens. The principles repeatedly approved by the international communist movement -- independence and sovereignty of each party, noninterference in another party's life, mutual respect, and so forth -- are said to be respected. But in practice what is done is very different: There is interference in other parties' internal life, attempts to split them are promoted and encouraged, and an attempt is made to set up parties which would be docile instruments, even though that very policy prevents them from having any real influence in their own country. And this is currently happening with several European parties, including the PCE. It has been done previously, or attempted with other parties.

We are convinced that attitudes which were always negative but which are intolerable today will change in this area of relations among communist parties too,

In any event, the PCE will defend its independence with the same vigor as hitherto against any attempt to interfere in our party's life and to tell us what we must do, from whatever quarter. This defense of our independence is not contrary to the spirit of internationalism and solidarity with all communist parties -- and in the first place with the CPSU -- with all the revolutionary and democratic forces in the world, and with all peoples struggling for their liberation against imperialism. On the contrary. One can only be really internationalist on the basis of independence and one's own responsibility. The alternative is no more than a servile spirit (even if it is honestly inspired by simple faith), unbecoming to communists and revolutionaries, whose critical spirit should be constant and inherent in them. Our independent policy and our status as the PCE, whose task is to defend the interests of our working class and our people, are fully in keeping with the ideas of Marx, Engels, and Lenin. But they are utterly at odds with the practices introduced by Stalin and, contrary to the ideas of the great masters of socialism, which still have tenacious roots and enthusiastic supporters.

Our policy of maintaining our party's independence against any attempt at external interference is a democratic, revolutionary, and communist policy. It is the only policy that Spain's working class and peoples can accept. We will continue to work for it, convinced that it is the way to consolidate and develop democracy and to build a socialist society in Spain. And on that basis, surmounting incorrect stances which we have sometimes maintained in the past and which our 11th congress criticized, and having for all parties the same respect which we ask for our own, the PCE is prepared to maintain and develop friendship and cooperation with all communist parties.

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CSO; 3548/15

POLITICAL

SWEDEN

LIBERAL DAILY ASSESSES CABINET RESHUFFLE

PM181039 Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 15 Oct 85 p 2

[Editorial: "How Palme Wants It"]

[Text] Nine ministerial appointments in 2 weeks must be something of a record. Of the ministers who took office in October 1982 fewer than half are left in the posts they had then. The changes go much further than a natural, gradual renewal of the government and do not provide evidence of political health and harmony.

Many ministers have to accept changes that they themselves did not want. Olof Palme has made no attempt to set up a smoke screen as far as Lennart Bodstrom is concerned. The post of foreign minister is normally the culmination of a career and it has never happened before that a foreign minister has moved to another post in the same government. But as foreign minister, Bodstrom has become a burden on the government and has to step down.

Lena Hjelm-Wallen will take over a small part of Bodstrom's former territory, while he takes over the whole of hers. Like Bo Holmberg and Svante Lundkvist, who are both being deprived of their politically most important tasks, she is among the losers.

Was there not good reason to reach more radical conclusions in at least some of these cases? A minister who is demoted within his government finds it difficult to assert himself subsequently. If a minister does not have a strong position within the circle of government, it is also impossible for him or her to put government policy to the outside world with force and conviction.

Olof Palme made a mistake that is difficult to explain when he placed Lennart Bodstrom in the Foreign Ministry. Bodstrom had a knowledge of languages, a confidence in his behavior and a certain amount of international experience from his work with the free trade union international. At the same time he lacked the political experience and a firm foothold in political life. Life could also be stormy in the Central Organization of Salaried Employees, but there Bodstrom had become accustomed to acting from an unassailable position and over the years he developed a nonchalance born of superiority and an insensitivity for the opinions of others and this turned out to be fatal when he became foreign minister.

The world of the trade union is a sheltered workshop compared with the world of politics. Despite all the debates at trade union congresses and all the criticism in the media it is seldom that any trade union leader has to pay for his mistakes. This could explain why so few trade unionists have had success as politicians. Really it is only Gunnar Strang who is an example of the opposite.

Few social democrats have annoyed and provoked the nonsocialists as much as Sten Andersson. He is a born demagogue. But his elevation to foreign minister will probably be welcomed nevertheless by his political opponents and be taken as a sign that the government wishes to restore confidence in foreign policy. Sten Andersson has the right political touch and will not surprise us with bizarre ideas or passing fancies which are then elevated into foreign policy doctrines.

Roine Carlsson as defense minister is an appointment that is more difficult to assess, and there is the worry that it will remain so. For him, as for Bodstrom, the transition from the world of the trade union to that of politics was something of a culture shock which he overcame through an already legendary silence. Nothing is known about his knowledge of defense and security questions. Presumably he will concentrate on the Armed Forces' organization and resources issues prior to the 1987 defense planning bill. From now on the risk that the foreign and defense ministries will spread conflicting messages about security policy is probably small.

The appointment of Bengt Lindqvist as assistant social affairs minister is evidence of political imagination in the best sense of the term. That a man with a serious visual handicap can be a minister falls outside the framework of our habitual assumptions. Suddenly we discover a prejudice we have been nurturing and new self-confidence and courage is kindled in many people with handicaps. It is a fine decision Olof Palme had made and there is nothing wrong with the fact that he has at the same time strengthened his party's standing with a large group of the electorate.

The post of communications ministers has always been considered to be suitable for beginners in government. To this post Palme has appointed Sven Hultstrom who has been a local politician in Goteborg since 1971 and who was elected to the Riksdag in the recent election. In his home town he is thought to have firm ties with Volvo, Goteborg's and Sweden's biggest company which has enormous interests in the transport sector. One of the issues with which Hultstrom will have to deal in the government is Scandinavian Link [not further explained]. It would be wise if Environment Minister Ingvar Carlsson were to keep a special eye on the Communications Ministry.

Olof Palme has seized the opportunity after the election to correct some of his mistakes. The cabinet reshuffle is completely his work. The concentration of power in the hands of the prime minister has seldom been so clear.

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POLITICAL

SWEDEN

WESTERBERG SEEN PLAYING KEY ROLE IN NONSOCIALIST OPPOSITION

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 12 Oct 85 p 6

[Commentary by Sven Svensson: "Westerberg New Key Figure"]

[Text] On Tuesday there will be a debate among party leaders in Parliament, and the balance of power will be different than it has been for the past 3 years. The victor in the election, Bengt Westerberg, will play a key role as far as sharpening the nonsocialist parties in preparation for the 1988 election is concerned.

A new and exciting balance of power will prevail in politics when Parliament holds its general political debate on Tuesday. Thanks to his big election victory, FP [Liberal Party] leader Bengt Westerberg has won a key strategic role in politics that the Liberal Party has not had for a long time.

In the general political debate, the Liberal Party leader will go up to the rostrum ahead of the Center Party leader. Nothing like that has happened since 1968, when the Center Party, surfing on the green wave and Gunnar Hedlund's popularity, advanced to become the largest nonsocialist party.

At the same time, the two middle parties combined--the Liberal Party and the Center Party--are bigger than the Conservative Party. This means a return to the situation that existed before the 1982 election.

In the socialist bloc, the Social Democrats will be dependent on direct voting support by the VPK [Left Party-Communists], since there are more nonsocialists than Social Democrats in the Chamber. This means a return to the situation that existed between 1973 and 1976, when the forces in Parliament were equal.

Since the two middle parties together are bigger than the Conservatives, the Liberal and Center Parties will endeavor to agree on joint presentations on Parliament's 16 committees.

Such an arrangement is obviously in Bengt Westerberg's interest, but Center Party leader Thorbjorn Falldin is eager to join in following his setback. He wants to take revenge on the Conservatives for earlier wrongs.

The alliance between the middle parties on parliamentary committees will subject the Conservative Party's willingness to compromise to an interesting strength test.

The assumption in today's political situation is that if the Conservatives do not support middle-party bills in crucial votes, the Social Democrats will automatically win without the VPK's kind support. It can be assumed that efforts to split the nonsocialist front in votes by the Chamber will be a prominent tactical line in Prime Minister Olof Palme's behavior.

Through all the years, the Conservative Party has tried to present itself as the sure guarantor of nonsocialist three-party cooperation. That has been the Swedish Right's way of trying to gain political influence.

This year's election campaign brought something new: the Conservatives tried to set themselves up as the obvious alternative to the Social Democrats, while the existence of the middle parties was ignored. The purpose was to make progress toward a Swedish two-party system, but the nonsocialist voters favoring an all-inclusive approach willed otherwise.

Any attempt to sharpen the Conservative image at the expense of the middle parties is therefore likely to further undermine the credibility of the Conservatives as reliable partners in a nonsocialist three-party setup in the runup to the 1988 election.

In particular, former Conservative leader Gosta Bohman's repeated talk during the campaign to the effect that the Conservatives might form a minority government alone if the middle parties caused trouble has effectively curtailed Ulf Adelsohn's freedom of movement as regards the 1988 election.

For Prime Minister Olof Palme, too, trying to maneuver in the newly elected Parliament is going to represent an entirely new political situation. In the evenly balanced Parliament that existed between 1973 and 1976, it was possible to conclude the Haga agreements with, to begin with, FP leader Gunnar Helen.

That possibility does not exist today. The Palme government has used up its credibility with the nonsocialist parties. He will not be able to contact any nonsocialist party to feel out its attitude on a specific political issue.

The nonsocialist party leaders are willing only to come to the government as a group to hear what the country's prime minister has on his mind. Palme's freedom of action is limited as never before.

In this newly elected Parliament, Olof Palme will have to trust in being able to conduct meaningful talks through Parliament's committees. Otherwise, he will have to administer a disintegrating economy, as it was called in the days of the Haga talks. Bills to increase taxes and confidential talks between the Social Democrats and the VPK will further sharpen nonsocialist suspicion.

The upcoming wage negotiations are the Palme government's biggest headache. Just like the nonsocialist party leaders, the partners in the labor market

have scant interest in talking to Palme. The last Rosenbad round on inflation goals, which broke down, was not exactly a hit with either the employers or the union organizations. And most of all, the government's own negotiations with the government employee organizations broke down.

The government's goal is to try to achieve some kind of small improvement in real wages in 1986 to keep the wage earners in a good mood. It is going to do so by fighting inflation and through tax policy.

In the previous election campaign, the government tried to "bribe" the wage earners with a 600-krona vacation discount. For 1986, the government is putting its trust in an increase in the standard tax deduction from 1,000 to 3,000 kronor. For wage earners who do not have extra large travel expenses, that will mean a 1,000-krona tax reduction--some 100 kronor more than the tax rebate.

Nurses, industrial workers, and university people have already announced high wage demands in addition to the increases already provided for in this year's agreement.

The new minister of wages, Bengt K. A. Johansson, will therefore have a tough time molding public opinion when he tries to keep the union organizations in check. Now that the election is over, the new minister of wages is going to sound just like Bengt Westerberg did before the election.

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MILITARY

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

CONCEPT, SYSTEMS OF LUFTWAFFE'S UPGRADED AIR DEFENSE MISSIONS

Bonn WEHRTECHNIK in German Sep 85 pp 92-99

[Article by Col Juergen Engelhardt, General Staff: "Air Defense in the Luftwaffe; Concepts and Equipment"]

[Text] There is still much to be planned in air defense --let's get on with it. This motto guides the presentation of Juergen Engelhardt, Colonel, General Staff, department chief, Fue L III. He describes the tasks of the Luftwaffe in the area of air defense, and the resources to be used currently and in the near future. Moreover, he reports in detail about the current concept and the existing grand Luftwaffe program for air defense missile refitting, and points to the most important programs for the near and more distant future, such as the Fighter 90, improved F-4F, new air guided missiles, and the Intermediate Air Defense Missile System, needed by about the year 2000.

Air defense must not be considered in isolation, it is to be considered part of the totality of air combat operations. Air defense is part of the so-called "Counter Air" operations, i.e. the combat against hostile air forces from the ground and in the air. It is a component of the counter air mission that can only react. It has particular significance in connection with a basically defensive strategic posture and mission.

The basic defensive NATO posture, the kind and extent of the threat, the geostrategic situation of Central Europe, and the fact that air defense can only react lead to the fact that the integrated air defense will already in peace have a presence and preparedness that will allow for a rapid transition from peace to war. The integrated air defense avails itself in fulfilling its mission of flying and ground based combat resources and an air space surveillance and command system. Through its Luftwaffe the FRG contributes a considerable portion of these resources in Central Europe: 27 percent of the fighters, 50 percent of the Nike and Hawk air defense missiles, 80 percent of the NADGE/GEADGE sensors/command posts, and 100 percent of the low flying aircraft detection with the TMLD (Low flying aircraft reporting and tracking service). The threat, geostrategic situation, number and character of the forces and objects to be defended, as well as the number and action capabilities of the air defense resources available determine the action concept of integrated air defense. For

air defense purposes Europe is divided into four regions, North, Central, South, UK. It should be noted that the boundary of the Northern Region and the Central Region is not--as is usually the case--the Elbe, but the German-Danish border.

The Central Region--which is the one considered below--is subdivided into sectors of two allied tactical air forces and three air defense sectors (two in the North, one in the South).

Area Defense

The action concept that is currently still valid for the Central Region calls for the use of resources primarily for area defense.

--Antiaircraft Missiles:

The Hawk mobile weapon system establishes a forward antiaircraft missile zone that reaches from Schleswig-Holstein to Bavaria. In peacetime the batteries are in fixed positions, from which they can also fire, should that be required. In the period of tension and in war the batteries redeploy into preplanned but not prepared field positions. The batteries of the stationary Nike weapon system represent a second zone of action with fixed installations. That zone extends from the North Sea coast to the area south of Frankfurt.

Another rear antiaircraft missile zone with Nike and Hawk batteries covers the Palatinate/Saarland/southern Eifel Mountains.

While Belgian, Dutch, U.S., and FRG forces are deployed in the first two zones, the rear zone is manned exclusively by American units.

--Fighters:

Belgian, British, U.S., and FRG fighter units protect the areas without anti-aircraft missiles, the flanks, and serve to establish concentration for air defense and to close gaps in the antiaircraft missile zones. In addition, fighters provide escort for bomber units and make fighter incursions into enemy area.

--Air space surveillance:

An air space surveillance and command system with ground-based stationary and mobile units and the AWACS flying surveillance system is deployed to cover the area.

The operational subordination of integrated air defense forces to the NATO commander even in peacetime leads to a double subordination of our units and forces to national and NATO command.

Units of the NATO air defense are kept in part at a high state of readiness even in peacetime, i.e. with a reaction period of a few minutes. This denies the potential enemy the opportunity for a surprise attack without opposition and forces him to make extensive preparations, which, if recognized, will serve as indicators for early warning.

It should be mentioned that in war and during exercises integrated air defense liaison teams--Air Defense Operations Liaison Teams (ADOLT)--operate with the corps of the ground forces, tasked with coordinating the action of the air defense forces and of deployment of the Hawk and the TMLD with the movements of the ground forces.

Object Defense

Like all other nations and services the Luftwaffe supplements the general protection offered by the integrated air defense against air attacks with an immediate protection of its most important facilities and resources. This object defense currently consists of about 1000 20-mm twin cannon and weapons of the air defense. These weapons are served by active personnel in dual role until the callup of the reserves. An exception--an active air defense artillery platoon is located with every squadron to serve as cadre.

Weaknesses in the Air Defense

The NATO air defense system in the Central Region is a considerable deterrent at a high state of readiness. This system would force an aggressor to make great efforts to prepare and execute an attack, and would exact a high price for his attack.

But it is also obvious that a system so complex as the integrated air defense--but also the object protection of the Luftwaffe--requires constant development and improvement due to the constantly changing threat and new technological possibilities.

Many of the needed improvements and innovations have been recognized long ago; for a long time there has been appropriate planning. But it is precisely the air defense forces of the Luftwaffe that suffered particularly under the 1981 arms freeze. Now there is another silver lining on the horizon. The Luftwaffe chief of staff has put the focus clearly on air defense for the next few years. Among the ground based systems the greatest weaknesses are represented by the Nike in area defense and the 20-mm twin cannon in object defense, in addition to identification.

--Object Defense 20-mm cannon: No all weather capability, small caliber, short range, poor hit probability.

--Antiaircraft Nike missile: In service from more than 25 years, little protection against electronic jamming, little hit probability with conventional warhead at great range, not mobile, special problems with the nuclear warhead.

The FRG and the U.S. have concluded an agreement for joint acquisition of Patriot and Roland weapon systems. The most important points of the agreement are:

--The U.S. procure for

--the FRG 12 Patriot firing units and two abbreviated firing units for training and maintenance float, and

--undertake the retraining of German personnel and responsibility for depot level maintenance and modifications for the 12 American Patriot firing units.

--The FRG

--procures 27 Roland air defense missile systems for the protection of three American airfields, and mans and operates them for ten years,

--mans and operates 12 American Patriot firing units for ten years, and

--procures for the Luftwaffe an additional 12+2 Patriot firing units as well as 68 Roland air defense missile units.

A total of 40 Patriot and 95 Roland will thus be procured; the navy will join the Luftwaffe Roland procurement over and above the agreement and will obtain 20 Roland to defend three naval aviation sites.

Modification of the Action Concept

The replacement of the stationary Nike system by the mobile Patriot system has of course led to modifications of the action concept of the integrated air defense. The most important aspect of the new concept are:

--Area defense will remain basic.

--The Patriot and Hawk antiaircraft weapons will be deployed in the same areas in mixed clusters. Their effect can thus complement each other; the firing units offer mutual defense.

--Through linking several clusters from North to South a forward Patriot/Hawk deployment zone is created, extending from Schleswig-Holstein to Bavaria, approximately in the area of the existing Hawk deployment zone.

--Within each ATAF a further cluster is formed in the rear area to defend important installations.

--The elimination of the Nike action zone will create areas of appropriate size for the fighter forces, whose missions remain unchanged.

--The air space surveillance and command system will remain basically unchanged, the development toward the ACCS (Air Command and Control System) will naturally continue. An inclusion of the clusters in the command system is currently being studied. The Luftwaffe is of the opinion that command of the fire fight, the movement, and the support for all forces of a cluster must be controlled by one source. The command of the air defense by the NATO commander and the status of the NATO Command Force remain unchanged.

Patriot and Roland Missions

During peacetime the Patriot batteries will--like the Hawk--remain in fixed positions, and deploy into field positions in periods of tension or in war.

The newly structured Roland units (wheeled vehicles) will protect

--three airfields of the USAFE and

--as first priority the Tornado and F-4F airfields of the Luftwaffe.

Depending on the site several weapon positions and one combat command post (air defense command post Roland) will have to be deployed. In order to achieve maximum defense of the large number of sites and the relatively small number of weapon system the Roland units will be concentrated in detachments and deployed to the sites depending on the situation. All Roland units will remain under national command.

The refitting that will enter its "hot" phase in early 1987 with the delivery of the first weapons will last until about mid-1994.

It goes without saying that such a refitting project that affects not only the largest part of the Luftwaffe air defense missile units, but also other services (training, logistics), demands much from the Luftwaffe and its personnel. The partly extensive redeployments (one Hawk battalion will be redeployed from Schleswig-Holstein to Hesse), but also numerous shorter redeployments will cause problems--family, job, house. On the other hand, the Luftwaffe must raise 36 Patriot and 15 Roland firing batteries from the 24 Nike firing batteries.

Numerically, the Nike personnel is adequate (a few hundred slots will even be left over), but structurally it is not.

Success Justifies the Expense

However, the Luftwaffe is convinced that the effort will bring about success:

--The integrated air defense antiaircraft missile forces will be equipped with a modern, mobile weapon system with high firepower.

--A hitherto impossible close connection between the two air defense systems becomes reality.

--For the first time antiaircraft missile systems for engaging targets at medium and high altitudes will be stationed in Schleswig-Holstein and in Bavaria.

--Should the question of command of the clusters and their inclusion in the air defense command system be solved satisfactorily, there will be for the first time a uniform and immediate command of the antiaircraft missile forces.

--In object defense for the first time all weather combat ability will be afforded at least for some of the sites.

--Finally: The agreement between the U.S. and the FRG points to totally new opportunities which could possibly serve as examples for the future in one case or another.

Planning for More Distant Future

The line of departure for air defense planning is the threat posed by the fighter aircraft, missiles, and electronic warfare of the Warsaw Pact.

In addition, the financial situation creates another decisive limit. The current Bundeswehr Plan 86 which includes the results of the arms planning inventory of 1984, includes basically all important material projects of the Luftwaffe. Acquisition of new weapon systems will be realizable only in consecutive fashion due to the concentration of resources on one weapon system at a time.

Since existing weapon systems must thus be kept longer in service than previously thought, additional measures for lifespan extension and preservation of combat power are needed. These measures in turn further limit the opportunities for initial introduction of new weapon systems; this leads to postponement or delays in the introduction target dates or periods.

At this time this affects especially the JF-90 and the Hawk successor system.

Aircraft

With the F-4F weapon system short range targets in line of sight can be effectively engaged in fighter missions at this time. For this mission field the 20-mm cannon and the IR-guided Sidewinder AIM-9L are weapons that still meet the threat. Compared to the total threat spectrum and the development to be expected, there will be in the future some weaknesses in flight capability, avionics, and armaments.

Within the short and medium planning period these weaknesses can be overcome by further improvements in the F-4F and a closing in the armament gap. The preliminary phase and the concept phase for improving the F-4F have in the meantime been concluded and have led to the following results:

--Considering operational, technical, and economic factors the APG-65 radar was selected to replace the APG-120;

--Further improvements (replacement of the inertial navigation device and of the air data calculator) result in increased navigational accuracy and increased weapon drop accuracy in air-ground missions;

--With the integration of the AMRAAM the armament gap between all weather combat capability and range will be closed.

The improvement of the F-4F and the introduction of the AMRAAM are scheduled to begin in mid-1989.

The introduction of the fighter for the nineties (J-90) only beginning 1997 forces the maintenance of the F-4F until past 2000. Besides improvements in combat power measures are thus necessary to prolong the lifespan as well. Measures needed in that regard have been initiated. In addition, there is constant adaptation to the electronic threat.

In spite of the improvements of the F-4F in the second half of the 90s the replacement of this aircraft is unavoidable. Extensive national and international preliminary phase activities toward a JF-90 or a European Fighter Aircraft (EFA) have led to a joint program with participation from the FRG, UK, FR, IT and SP. The basis for this is a national tactical target and a European Staff Target.

The concentration of the EFA design will be on the air defense role, additionally, the aircraft is supposed to be capable for air-ground missions, but this must not result in a reduction of its air defense capability. The EFA will be designed for high maneuver performance at supersonic speeds as well as for high agility at subsonic and low speeds for short range aerial combat. Avionics and armament will be designed for the target range of bomber, fighter bomber, fighter, helicopter, and cruise missile within the entire performance spectrum and at altitudes from "very low" to "very high."

The armament is to include the AMRAAM/ASRAAM/AIM-9L at any desired mix.

Until the final decision regarding an international joint program such alternatives as the purchase of a marketed fighter aircraft, and national integration program, i.e. development of a fighter body and integration program, i.e. development of a fighter body and integration of marketed engines and avionics will be investigated.

Air to Air Missiles

The equipping of the Luftwaffe with the AIM-9L IR missile has been concluded. An improvement program is to make these missiles less subject to jamming and thus meeting the threat.

A further procurement plan for air to air missiles with short and medium ranges, ASRAAM and AMRAAM was initiated with a trans-Atlantic joint program, the so-called air to air weapons family, together with the U.S. and Great Britain. Within this program the U.S. has undertaken the development of the AMRAAM, Great Britain and Germany of the ASRAAM. Norway has joined the ASRAAM development, other NATO countries have expressed their interest in the program. AMRAAM and ASRAAM are not merely improvements to the existing Sparrow and Sidewinder series.

The requirements for a new air to air arms generation, based on tactical realizations and extensive operational simulations, can be met only by new designs using the most modern technology.

The operational requirements of the AMRAAM include: Look down/shoot down, multiple target engagement, ECM proof, great range, standoff range, launch and leave/fire and forget. This demands technical characteristics, such as active radar search head (inertial guidance with/without data input, home on jam, active terminal phase), high average speed, as well as all up round (long maintenance-free storage, high reliability, small maintenance costs).

The operational requirements of the ASRAAM include excellent maneuverability, suppression of decoys and background noise, fire and forget, great frontal standoff range and interoperability with AIM-9L. The appropriate technical characteristics include, for example, multielement passive IR search head (lock on

after launch, inertial guidance without data input, lock on before launch, passive IR target approach), very high average speed, and all up round.

According to current plans the AMRAAM will be ready for introduction (IOC) in the U.S. beginning 1988. The introduction in the Luftwaffe is planned starting 1989/90 along with the improvement of the F-4F.

ASRAAM is to be ready for introduction beginning with 1993 and is to be introduced in the Luftwaffe starting 1995, so as to replace the AIM-9L after a transition period.

Air Defense Ground Systems

The Hawk weapon system, a development of the 50s and used by the Luftwaffe since 1963, has been improved twice by now. With all the performance and mobility of the weapon system weaknesses as compared to the future threat, cannot be overlooked.

For that reason the Luftwaffe sees a need for an improvement program. However, in view of the scarce financial resources, it has decided on a minimum program including the following measures:

- Technological improvement of the radar sets,
- Improvement of the missile,
- Improvement in fire power.

The tactical target for this improvement has already been approved. Measures have already been initiated for the first program stage; this program will be performed over the next years within the NHMO along with other Hawk users. With regard to the improvement of the missile there are efforts to begin a program as soon as possible, since we attach particular importance to that measure. For all other planned measures the conduct of the concept phase is planned.

The ground to air starting device for the AIM 9L air to air missile is a concept dating from the time after the arms freeze of 1981 when the Luftwaffe initially had to forgo the Roland. The idea is to deploy the AIM-9L on airfields in a ground to air role since it is already available there for air to air use. The missile is to be deployed without technical modifications from a simple and strong starting ramp. Studies and test firing conducted to date indicate that the path seems to be a right one. The project is still in development, but there are hopes to introduce such devices to the forces beginning about 1986. However, it must be stressed that this is only an interim solution and not a replacement for the Roland.

The most important project for air defense after the introduction of the JF-90 is a new medium range air defense missile system (MFS). The 40 year useful lifespan of the Hawk makes this successor planning necessary. NATO has pointed to two alternatives:

--An improvement of the existing Hawk weapon system in stages to a new system (ESAM-Evolutionary Surface to Air Missile)

--New development.

Procurement resources have been halted. Whether there will be a development with German participation in the future cannot be predicted at this time.

The basic MFS concept is as follows:

--On the basis of the threat of predominantly low-flying aircraft and the consequent use of the Patriot the focus of effect is at medium range and low or very low altitudes,

--expected saturation attacks from all directions require high parallel fire power at 360°,

--strong enemy ECM require appropriate ECM resistance,

--the threat posed by anti-radar missiles, standoff and scatter weapons is to be countered by appropriate measures to increase survivability (large-scale dislocation, netting, active engagement, less large equipment).

The medium air defense missile system will be used in close cooperation with the Roland in area defense, but also autonomously in site defense. The introduction is planned to begin in late 90s.

The NATO has a strong integrated air defense system whose ability to deter the enemy or cause him heavy losses will be considerably improved with the introduction of the Patriot weapon system. Moreover, the Luftwaffe and the USAFE will considerably improve site defense with the procurement of the Roland system. Numerous programs for improvement of combat power or for new acquisition of airborne and ground based weapon system will result in a constant adaptation of the only reacting air defense to the threat.

The description of the air defense planning of the Luftwaffe was purposely limited to weapon system programs. It makes thus sense to point briefly to other areas of air defense where programs are also underway, such as the GEADGE, AEGIS and ACCS air space surveillance and command systems, the latter is also the command system for all tactical air war operations.




Figure 1. Prospective stationing of Patriot, Hawk and Roland missile Battalions in Germany

9240

CSO: 3620/496

MILITARY

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

ARMY CORPS, DIVISION LEVEL AIR DEFENSE WEAPONRY SURVEYED

Bonn WEHRTECHNIK in German Sep 85 pp 99-103

[Article by Lt Col Claus Cornelsen: "Air Defense and Antiaircraft Operations: Army Equipment Concept"]

[Text] The air defense branch represents the German Army's specific means for engaging the air enemy: The Roland air defense rocket vehicle the corps and divisional levels, and the Gepard air defense vehicle. In addition, all units have the air defense capability with light weapons such as the 20-mm automatic cannon or the machinegun. Lt Col Dipl Ing Claus Cornelsen, team chief for combat support forces material in the Army Office's Army Equipment Department, explains the equipment concept for air defense and antiaircraft operations, and points to the foci for future activities.

The army, Luftwaffe, and navy have to engage the air enemy jointly; each arm has its own mission and specific resources to meet the mission.

Only once the different concepts

--Air defense

--NATO integrated air defense

--Counterair and

--Antiaircraft

are taken into consideration can the mission and limitation in the execution by the armed services be correctly understood.

--Air defense is a joint mission of the army, Luftwaffe, and navy. It is the sum total of all measures to obviate or weaken the attacks by enemy aircraft or missiles after their launch.

--The NATO integrated air defense has the mission to preserve the inviolability of friendly airspace. Through a supernational organization, modern armaments, and high state of readiness it has to demonstrate already in peacetime the will and the ability for common defense against the potential enemy.

This means that the NATO integrated air defense is in operation already in peacetime. In the case of conflict it must defend its own territory against attacks from the air, and in doing so wear out the enemy air forces to a high degree. It fights according to the instructions of the NATO air defense commanders.

--Counterair means the surveillance of the airspace and the engagement of enemy aircraft up to heights of 3000 meters by the army's antiaircraft forces with the aim to protect army troops, their installations and important facilities from attack and detection from the air, and to wear down the enemy in the process.

--Antiaircraft operations include all measures taken by all forces against the threat from the air, such as antiaircraft measures, concealment, deception, dispersal, cover, observation of the airspace, and engagement of very low flying enemy aircraft and paratroopers in the air with all appropriate weapons.

Differentiation between Army Air Defense/Integrated Air Defense

The army air defense is not an organic part of the NATO integrated air defense, but it is connected to the latter's tasks in the execution of antiair mission. The main mission of the army's air defense forces is to protect the operations of the ground forces. Above and beyond this it complements and improves the effect of the NATO integrated air defense by its ability to engage and destroy very low flying, terrain utilizing aircraft.

High effectiveness of air defense and a minimal threat to friendly aircraft by avoidance of mistaken engagement are currently competing targets.

Due to its mission and its command and information systems the NATO integrated air defense possesses the more current information about the activities of friendly aircraft. Liaison and interface between NATO air attack and air defense forces insure a flexible reaction to the current air situation.

Luftwaffe liaison organs of the air attack and the air defense forces secure within the army the information flow between the integrated NATO air defense and the army air defense forces.

For that purpose the ground forces have on the corps level command posts for close air support and liaison commands to the NATO integrated air defense. On division level these functions are discharged by Luftwaffe liaison officers and on regiment or battalion level by air direction officers.

Conceptual Assumptions

Threat

In the case of war the enemy will open the hostilities with a massive air attack. His main purpose will be to

- Paralyze the air attack potential of the NATO,
 - Continuously prevent the deployment of NATO ground forces, and
 - Open gaps in the NATO integrated air defense,
- in order to create the prerequisites for an offensive battle.

Within the army the armored forces and the artillery in its firing positions will be preferred targets; additionally, troops at water crossing points, in constricted territory, command posts, and logistics traffic will be especially threatened. For that purpose the enemy will deploy tactical fighters, fighter bombers, reconnaissance aircraft, combat and transport helicopters, and combat zone aircraft. Electronic warfare is a natural part of the battle. The enemy will use special aircraft for that purpose.

Electronic countermeasures will on principle be components of all major enemy air attack operations. ECM and weapons will be used simultaneously or alternatively in connection with suitable air maneuvers to avoid antiaircraft fire. Attack operations still indicate massive combat jumps and straight-line approaches to targets. In the future it can be expected that the aircraft will in certain flight segments perform computer-assisted automatic maneuvers in altitude, laterally, or in speed, in order to irritate surveillance radar.

Today's enemy aircraft are overwhelmingly capable of night flight, some have limited night combat capability by using pyrotechnical means (battle field illumination), a few are already capable of night combat. The trend toward night combat capability is being pursued consistently.

For the immediate support of his ground forces by the air force the enemy is increasingly switching the focus from fighter bombers to combat helicopters. The latter will thus pose a particular challenge to the army air defense.

A combat helicopter represents an increased threat to the combat and combat support forces, since it

- attacks with surprise by using the terrain,
- is able to fight from a long range and is thus often outside the range of the weapons that threaten it (battle tanks, armored air defense artillery),
- has a partially armored body and thus places great demands on the air defense.

Drones, cruising missiles, and anti-radar missiles (ARM) represent a new kind of threat. Due to their small dimensions, small radar diameter, and--in the case of the ARM--their great speed (several times the speed of sound) these missiles are difficult to locate and to engage.

Equipment

The army air defense force performs its mission with

- tube artillery systems,
- guided missiles systems, and appropriate
- control and reconnaissance assets.

Antiaircraft Weapons on the Corps Level

The refitting of the armored air defense artillery rocket regiments of the corps with the Roland weapon system was completed only in 1984.

The Roland is a highly mobile, all-weather guided missile weapon system with a search radar capable of detecting targets at a distance of 16 kilometers, and a tracking radar for tracking them. Its guided missiles--the combat load consists of ten--have a range of 6000 m and can be both radar guided and optically guided by the gunner.

One air defense missile regiment (corps) consists of six Roland batteries with six weapon systems each (i.e., 36 Roland). The displaced air defense cannon 40L70 has been concentrated on the corps level. The cannon and the Super Fledermaus fire guidance instruments (each fire guidance instrument has two cannons) are still fully functional.

Air Defense Weapons on Division Level

The air defense regiments of the divisions (excluding the airborne division) were from 1977 to 1980 refitted with the Gepard air defense vehicle, replacing the obsolescent M-42 air defense vehicle. Each regiment has six firing batteries with six armored vehicles each.

The Gepard, too, is a highly mobile, all weather capable weapon system. Its search radar covers the airspace to a distance of up to 16 km, and its cannon engage targets at up to 3500 m distance. In its combat load the Gepard carries 600 rounds of air defense artillery and 40 cartridges of solid core ammunition (against an enemy on the ground).

Over the past years the Gepard and Roland have fully proven themselves in numerous large-scale army maneuvers and in cooperation with the forces of the integrate air defense.

Besides the Gepard and Roland the army air defense forces use portable guided rockets that are fired from the shoulder. One such weapon is the Redeye; a

guided missile that guides itself to the target with its IR-search head (fire and forget). The Redeye 1 is suitable to fire at escaping targets at distances of up to 3800 m and at speeds of up to Mach 0.7 (aftershot!).

Command and Intelligence Resources

For large-scale air reconnaissance at corps or division level the army air defense force has at this time only one TPS-1E radar search device per air defense unit (with a range of up to 300 Km). This instrument has been used by the Bundeswehr from 1957. The TPS-1E is to be deemed "obsolescent" at this time.

Close Air Defense

For close air defense the army makes use of:

--7.62 mm rifle

--7.62 mm machinegun

--20 mm automatic cannon MK 20.

Depending on its deployment the machinegun is mounted differently for air defense engagement, for example, on a circular mount of the 2 t to 10 t truck, on the free-aiming mount of the 1 Fuchs transporter, or on a tripod.

The 20 mm automatic cannon has an optical air defense sight for engaging air targets. It is used as an on-board cannon of armored vehicles (Marder, Lucks) and on mounts that are placed on the ferries of the bridging troops or are towed by vehicles.

Evaluation of Current Equipment

The future plans of the army must consider that

--the command and intelligence components (to include identification) of the army air defense forces are currently not adequate;

--the Redeye no longer meets the requirements of engaging high performance aircraft, it can merely be used for aftershots;

--the Gepard and Roland weapon systems meet the military requirements of the 80s, but must be adjusted to meet the expected threat of the 90s, especially with regard to the expected enemy electronic countermeasures and the fight against armored helicopters;

--the close air defense, based on field and automatic cannon, must be considerably improved in its air defense material and also in its conceptualization.

Equipment in the 90s

Deliberations about equipment in the 90s first turned toward a joint successor to Gepard/Roland. The generational change of the systems, however, slows down under the pressure of the enormous increases in costs of complicated successor systems.

The decision made in the meantime runs along the following lines: "Implementation of measures to improve the capability of the Gepard and Roland air defense systems so as to preserve their usefulness and increase the lifespan of the weapon systems."

Further development of the army air defense force and of its equipment is thus proceeding with consideration of the following aspects:

--First, it is important to adapt oneself to all the possibilities of the increased air threat.

--At the same time, the arrival of new airspace users "from our camp" complicates operational air defense conduct. Concepts superseding the individual services must, moreover, assure that the target concepts of friendly air space users do not compete or even collide.

--Organizational, personnel, and economic limitations must be observed.

Improvements of Gepard and Roland Capability

Four areas are to be pointed out for improvements in the capability of the Gepard and Roland:

--Improved survivability.

--Improved hit probability on maneuvering targets.

--Improved effect against helicopters,

--Logistical improvements.

Stinger

The Stinger will be procured as a successor for the Redeye. The Stinger is a further development of the Redeye with an improved IR-search head, a higher performance propulsion, and improved IRCM capability. The improved search head allows for detection and engagement of approaching targets (head-on capability), while preserving the fire and forget principle.

Army Air Defense Command and Intelligence System

Without an external reconnaissance and command system the air defense weapon systems can be used only autonomously, i.e., each weapon system engages what it sees.

The Army Air Defense and Command System (HFlaAFueSys), currently under development, will after its introduction in the early 90s improve the effect of the weapon systems by

--Early warning (wins time for engaging)

--Surprise of the enemy (air defense operational areas will be unknown for some time)

--Fire direction with rational ammunition use by target distribution and increased safety of friendly aircraft.

Moreover, the system will improve the survivability of friendly air defense systems against enemy electronic countermeasures.

Essentially, the HFlaAFueSys consists of components for the functions of

--Reconnaissance,

--Command, and

--Combat

along with information distribution.

Reconnaissance

Reconnaissance is performed by the sensors of the armored radar vehicles for low-flying aircraft surveillance (9TUEr) and Air space surveillance radar (LueR). The low-flying aircraft surveillance radar is a short range radar, designed especially to detect low flying aircraft. It can also be deployed on the battlefield close to the VRV [expansion unknown].

The air space surveillance radar is a medium range radar. It will

--provide air defense weapons systems with current air space information at medium altitudes,

--complement the acquisition range of the TUEr "forward" and "upward",

--increases the ECM resistance of the reconnaissance complex.

Command

The "command" component consists of the HFlaAFueSys "fire direction" equipment that will be installed in the Fuchs armored transport vehicle.

Combat

The "combat" component consists of HFlaAFueSys specific additional components that will be installed in the Gepard and Roland.

Remaining Equipment Wishes

In spite of all improvements in the army air defense and other measures, such as the introduction of the antitank/antihelicopter combat vehicle in the combat forces, there are still wishes for equipment that cannot be overlooked, and that must be surely met--if there are financial and conceptual opportunities. These include:

- Interface HFlaAFueSys--Integrated air defense,
- Number of sensors,
- Improved friend/foe identification,
- Equipping the army air defense force with EW means,
- Defense against helicopters,
- Air defense of rear areas (40L70 cannon).

Conclusion

The above described equipment concept of the army for air defense and antiair activity includes equipment that can be realized within the next 15 years from financial and personnel standpoints. The army air defense force planning concepts will continuously be adapted to new realizations.

The protection of friendly forces and military installations on the battlefield from the enemy who is constantly improving numerically and in performance must be assured by the maintenance of friendly mobile combat operations through an improved air defense weapon system.

Moreover, concepts exceeding branches and services must guarantee that these army air defense weapon systems will be brought to bear to the optimal extent.




Figure 1. Structure of Army Air Defense Forces

MILITARY

SWEDEN

ECONOMIC SQUEEZE ON ARMED FORCES VIEWED BY SUPREME COMMANDER

PM181539 Stockholm SVENSKA DAGBLADET in Swedish 13 Oct 85 p 3

[Swedish Armed Forces' Commander in Chief General Lennart Ljung "Focus" article: "We Are Facing a Choice of Directions"]

[Text] "Our total defenses must therefore inspire respect and confidence both in the rest of the world and amongst the Swedish people." The statement comes from the report made public in May this year by the 1984 Defense Committee. The Defense Committee was unanimous. What is at stake is the credibility of Sweden's total defenses. Their observed and estimated capacity in peacetime, during crises, in neutrality and in war.

The rest of the world expertly and unsentimentally observes the development of the defense forces. It compares what we have and what happens in Sweden with the changes and the operational conditions for the combat forces around us.

Technical developments have made it possible for both NATO and the Warsaw Pact to palpably increase the quality of their military units.

Weapons and command systems are improving rapidly. Mobility both within and between theaters of war is increasing. Aircraft and helicopters are acquiring greater range. Ships of different types are now able to choose their landing and unloading sites more freely. Land units can move more quickly and are less tied to roads. Systems for electronic warfare are being developed.

The increased investment in conventional forces has already produced a significant strengthening of the combat forces in Europe. The conditions which affect the establishment of new units and systems also mean that during the remainder of the eighties we must expect this major improvement in efficiency to continue.

Developments of this sort naturally cost money. In both East and West the economic investment in military forces has been increased gradually.

This has not happened in Sweden. The economic resources allotted to the military defense forces have largely remained unchanged throughout the seventies and eighties. We have been able to improve many weapons systems but this has

happened at the expense of the numbers of units which it has been possible to modernize. In several cases, the number of units that had been given high priority has had to be halved.

Even a very critical observer would have to conclude that our total defense capacity has fallen in comparison with the rest of the world. This has happened at the same time as our military strategic situation has become more exposed.

The directives which the government gave for the recently presented long-term plan--OB 85--contained, for example, the instruction that the defense forces should analyze an economic level which would be a drastic reduction compared with the present situation. The analysis shows that major changes would have to be made in what have up to now been the defense forces' plans. The Army's wartime organization would be undermined and weakened, antisubmarine defenses would be neglected and air defenses would be drastically reduced. And this would not happen according to some cream-skimming principle. In the analysis, account has been taken of the interdependence of and the demand for total balance between the various functions performed by the Armed Forces. However, defense strength--even in comparison with the present situation--would decrease quickly and increasingly.

It is very doubtful whether the defenses which could be achieved at this level would really "inspire respect and confidence both in the rest of the world and amongst the Swedish people." The conclusion is unavoidable that the opposite effect is more likely. Adapting the defense forces to this level would undoubtedly give a negative signal to the rest of the world about our determination and ability to maintain defenses strong enough to meet the strategic circumstances in which we find ourselves.

At the beginning of 1986 the defense committee will already have an opportunity to prevent such an unfortunate signal being sent to the rest of the world by recommending to the government that it rule out the "lowest level" from future planning consideration, and instead to direct future investigations toward an economic level which could break the downward trend in our defense strength compared with the rest of the world.

The level proposed by myself in OB 85 has been formulated precisely with this aim in view. It is by no means a level which would satisfy all the wishes of the military or an attempt to "pull up" other economic alternatives. It presupposes an annual increase of 3 percent during the 5-year planning period, that is, a growth rate that has long been applied in many European countries. We have made a very honest attempt to analyze the developments in other combat forces in the light of both the increase in quality we are able to observe and the economic investments being made in the defense sector.

Through this alternative we would have defenses that would develop according to economic conditions that are the same as in many other countries. The defense forces' share of GNP would continue to be low. This is shown by the accompanying graph.

However, a decision in favor of this level would both preserve our relative defense strength and be a clearly positive signal to the rest of the world of the important connection we made between our security policy and our defense capacity.

The economic situation of the defense forces is to a certain extent linked to the defense forces' peacetime organization. The question of unit closures (it is symptomatic of developments in the Swedish defense forces that for more than 30 years we have, with very few exceptions, never talked about new peacetime units, but always about closures) is one which attracts almost overwhelming interest prior to every new piece of defense planning legislation.

Politicians and public opinion seem--as far as I am able to understand--often to take a much greater interest in peacetime units than in wartime units and our defense capacity.

There is probably too much faith placed in the idea of creating room for improved defense strength by making changes in the Armed Forces' peacetime organization. This is particularly relevant now, when for many years the armed forces have been carrying out extremely tough rationalizations and have in several cases been forced to lower the level of their ambitions.

In the majority of cases the Armed Forces have themselves proposed these measures, since we have seen them as the only way to have money left to maintain as far as possible our readiness and wartime organization.

Since the end of the sixties we have closed 15 peacetime units of various types. We have reduced our level of permanent employees by more than 10,000. According to the 1982 Defense Planning Bill we will save more than 10 billion kronor on peacetime running costs.

Of these around 8 billion still remain to be saved in the years leading up to 1992 and personnel still needs to be reduced by 3,000. And this we have to try to achieve despite many new and difficult tasks for our personnel. We have already taken these savings into account in our plans for the future.

But at the same time we must remember that the savings goals were worked out under conditions different from those which now prevail. Since then new tasks have been given to us, not least in the area of peacetime readiness.

There is also possibly a mistaken view that the Armed Forces' peacetime organization is merely a training organization. This is by no means the case. The Armed Forces' peacetime organization is the foundation for the whole of our extremely important mobilization system. Its command bodies will also be largely responsible for wartime command.

Our peacetime units form the nucleus of the readiness which in future we must maintain better than we have done hitherto. They provide support for the civil defense and voluntary organizations' important work and tie the defense forces to civilian society.

We will try to find new training alternatives for conscripts. In the long term we will adapt to the reduction in size of the annual intake of conscripts which will begin to take full effect from the mid-1990's. We will limit the size of our peacetime organization to the extent that this is possible.

But it would be completely wrong to think that the sayings that can be achieved in such a way can produce economies that could change the present negative trend in our defense capacity. Changes in peacetime organization generally call initially for new investment.

Savings the present 5-year period--during which our defense strength needs to be maintained--will at best be small. "Death patrols," [reference to past committee set up to decide unit closures] no matter how heavy-handed they are, cannot solve the problem of keeping up with developments in the rest of the world. It is impossible to magic away the difference between our defense efforts and those of others with structural changes and or new "organizational approaches."

Hitherto our Armed Forces have not been allowed to change in the way called for by our strategic situation. What is needed now is that we realize the seriousness of the situation. From the viewpoints of security and strength we cannot treat the 1987 Defense Planning Bill as a routine question.

The facts require us to be aware that we are facing a choice of directions. Either we allow the gap between our defense capacity and the rest of the world's military resources to continue to increase or we break this trend and make the necessary adaptation to today's reality and develop our defenses so that they "inspire respect and confidence in both the rest of the world and amongst the Swedish people."

/8918

CSO: 3650/33

MILITARY

SWEDEN

EVOLUTION, STRUCTURE, CAPABILITIES OF ARMS INDUSTRY REVIEWED

Vienna OESTERREICHISCHE MILITAERISCHE ZEITSCHRIFT in German Sep/Oct 85 pp
416-426

[Article by Hans Sigmund: "The Swedish Arms Industry"]

[Text] If this report is to be more than a mere listing of manufacturers, their products and capabilities, we must provide some insight into the national, historic and geopolitical background of the amazing development of the Swedish arms industry. Only in this manner can it be comprehended from an international viewpoint.

In doing so, we must not start out with the notion of a nation of jolly people suffused with Nordic romanticism, as it is commonly portrayed in superficial reports. Nor are the Swedes merely embittered taxpayers or diehard pacifists; Swedish history provides an entirely different, more correct picture.

At the time of the Wasa monarchy Sweden was anything but neutral or inclined toward neutrality--on the contrary: despite its geographic position at the edge of Europe it contributed to and participated in all political and ideological movements of the continent. Thus during the wars of the Reformation Swedish troops fought in southern Germany and their king was considered by the protestants to be their liberator and protector. Even though the nation had to make heavy sacrifices, it assumed, for the first time in modern history, a "European responsibility." Sweden fortified its territory on the far side of the Baltic and came to realize that power and influence can be maintained only as long as they are defended.

Under Karl XII the Swedish colors penetrated deep into Russia. In common non-Swedish historical interpretation, these events are lumped together as "failed wars of aggression," a judgment which from a modern viewpoint may be much too narrowly defined. No matter how one evaluates the motivation for these campaigns, Sweden became conscious of the tragedy of overly ambitious strategic objectives. This may perhaps serve as an explanation of why since then Swedish politics, for all its courage, gives the impression of careful rationality.

During the Napoleonic Wars, Swedish policy was primarily "solidarity with Europe," when major objectives were involved; in any case, it was one of loyalty to alliances, and one of conciliation where conflicts in the coalition were concerned.

Military defeats had not impaired the army's pride. This consciousness of self-worth probably contributed decisively in the final analysis to the fact that the state was able to maintain its neutrality in two world wars; today the feeling still predominates among the people and its leadership that the armed forces--thus the people themselves--can be relied upon. This may further serve as an explanation for the fact that in Sweden neutrality, from its human aspect as well as from the political and military ones, has come to be taken for granted--the Swedes are hardly inclined to view the world in terms of being "black" or "white."

Sweden has all by itself solved the political aspect of its defense problem: it does not at all subscribe to the "Swiss version of neutrality," but rather has proclaimed a policy of "non-participation in alliances in times of peace." This by itself predestines neutrality in wars as not only a possible option, but as the most likely one. One major basis for staying clear of alliances consists of the fact that Sweden attempts to restrict confrontational possibilities of the large military blocs in Scandinavia. In view of this, the state pursues an "active" policy of neutrality.

The specific impact of this policy upon world peace is not widely realized: access to the Baltic is of major strategic importance. So long as strong Swedish forces remain in a neutral position, none of the parties concerned are free to operate there at will. It is a well-armed Sweden which makes the Baltic into a "sea of peace" rather than do the platonic declarations of esoteric friends of peace. This kind of neutrality policy has of course a strong impact upon the Scandinavian NATO partners: as a result of Swedish policy, Denmark and Norway are able to avoid the stationing of foreign troops as well as of nuclear weapons on their territories--at least in peacetime. Likewise, Finland is enjoying its "special relationship with the USSR" only so long as Swedish neutrality maintains its high military credibility.

Typical for the unique arms policy relationships engendered by Swedish neutrality is a "Treaty for Cooperation and Trade" which was concluded between Sweden and Norway in 1983/84, a supplementary agreement, signed by both defense ministers, provides for large-scale bilateral collaboration in military R&D projects, as well as for the procurement of defense materiel. Among other things, the treaty provides for exporting Swedish arms to Norway, as compensation for "nonmilitary" (Norwegian) goods, even though the Swedish minister of defense did not deny an "interest in Norwegian defense electronics and guided missile technology"--an absolutely authoritarian statement which permits any kind of interpretation.

It is obvious that this kind of neutrality would be unthinkable if the Swedish armed forces were equipped with NATO or Warsaw Pact weapons, and a "weapons mix" would be militarily untenable. It is equally obvious that armament based on procurement from a neutral country, e.g., Switzerland, would not have lasting value in case of a European conflict. No matter what party is in power, Sweden therefore depends upon a relatively large domestic arms industry, since for non-participation in a European war no "sacrifice" is too great. However, the

trade-off for this is a highly developed technology which is generated by arms development efforts.

The essential industrial prerequisites for developing a modern industry in Sweden were propitious: iron ores and non-ferrous metal deposits are plentiful and had been mined for a long time. Hydroelectric power had long been used in operating foundries; charcoal production was widespread, permitting the development of many regional centers with many small enterprises. The initial situation was probably similar to that of the Austrian iron forges of the 14th through the 16th century. Swedish foreign trade on the Baltic, in cooperation or in competition with the "Hansa," gave steady impetus to shipbuilding and the fishing industry, which resulted in a basic demand for wood and metal products.

Production of army and naval weapons had its start as a "royal privilege:" since the time of the Reformation hand firearms had been produced in state-owned plants; as early as the middle of the 16th century King Gustaf Wasa had built a powder factory. Around 1620, when the Swedish army had need for it during the 30-Years War, production was increased in both sectors. An armament complex was formed, which has however since 1770 been part of the Ministry of Industry as a result of many mergers with related enterprises and which has since that time been by far the most important state-owned arms production facility of the kingdom, known as the FFV Group.

Today the FFV is divided into three sections: the Weapons and Ammunition Group, the Maintenance Group, and one holding group of the Swedish and US subsidiaries, including the Research organization of the overall enterprise. At present the FFV has almost 16,000 employees in 30 different locations.

In addition, the Bofors enterprise developed almost in parallel with the FFV; to this day it is in private hands. The original plant is located in the iron-rich Karlskoga region in Central Sweden, where in the village of Bofors one plant started to outproduce several neighboring enterprises in the same line of business in the 17th century and thus gave its name to the future conglomerate. This is where the world-renowned Swedish steel was developed, the technique of forging and casting was perfected and where toward the end of the 19th century--about the same time as Krupp/Essen and Schneider/Creusot--an efficient gun factory was founded.

The enterprise was then taken over by Alfred Nobel, who merged it with his explosives production plant and who led it to its most successful period. Nobel was a typical "idealist" of the incipient industrial revolution; he was active on an international scale, to include Russia, where he initiated oil production in Baku. Peace and unimpeded international trade were more useful to him than war.

The Bofors works' first successful entry into the world armaments market came with their 40mm guns. Today the enterprise offers a wide range of defense materiel, employs about 13,000 people, even after abandoning part of its steel processing production. Apart from the weapons and ammunition area, it is active also in chemicals and plant construction which is strongly oriented toward the defense sector.

In addition, the development of the SAAB-Scania Group has been of major importance; it produces automobiles, but is also engaged in the military vehicle sector. Successful developments in motor vehicle and aircraft engine construction originated here, as did Swedish tank construction incorporating quite unconventional technologies, in cooperation with another major firm, Hagglund & Soehner. Joint operations with several major and intermediate-size enterprises are quite common in this area.

In the area of defense electronics, Ericsson Radio System is one of the most important Swedish firms, currently employing some 6,000 persons. Here the military sector is financially firmly secured by the civilian sector (up to almost 50 percent); the firm has worldwide renown with its mobile telephone and paging systems and communications technology in its broadest sense. In-house developed computer technology makes Ericsson independent of foreign technology in many critical areas.

Of similar importance to the Swedish defense industry is Philips-Elektro-Industrier, with about 2,000 employees. Its main military activity at present concerns guidance, fire control and electronic warfare systems. Its second most important activity is a civilian branch, mainly concerned with the production of data terminals, measuring instruments, electric power plants and microwave technology.

Naval arms production is mainly the responsibility of Karlskronavarett, the official navy yard, which was founded in 1679. In submarine construction and smaller vessels, the Kokums shipyard is the leader, and smaller firms produce high-quality special equipment such as sonar systems, submarine batteries and electronic warfare systems.

The aircraft industry occupies a special position within the Swedish defense system. Many foreign observers consider it to be inappropriately large and expensive; but here too Sweden has sought to fulfill the great demands of its neutrality policy. Its history may therefore be of considerable interest.

The Swedish national defense first became interested in establishing an air force about 1910. A 1914 law provided for equipping the army with 35 aircraft, the navy with eight, within the following 2 years, with the primary mission of reconnaissance. Until that time, the country received most of its aircraft technology from France; however, during the war no systematic development was possible with this partner. Thus Sweden had recourse to its traditionally close ties with Germany, mainly because it was more expeditious to obtain German rather than French aircraft. After the end of the war aircraft and especially aircraft engines were procured in Great Britain and the United States.

In 1925 the air force was founded as a fully autonomous service branch apart from the army and navy. It was to receive about 300 aircraft for reconnaissance, artillery observation and fighter protection as well as for bombing and torpedo attacks. This was an ambitious goal, which was not attained until 1936. It was not a case of overwhelming expenditures; rather, technology was developing at such a fast pace that procurement decision planning became very difficult.

The most modern materiel could not be procured from foreign countries, and prudence dictated that obsolescent materiel was not acceptable. In addition, the Swedish air defense doctrine was at the time still the subject of considerable controversy between the army and the navy: the latter mostly wanted a defensive weapon against an invasion from the sea, as well as bomb and torpedo launching platforms; but the army demanded fighter aircraft for airspace defense.

More important however was the army's demand for a domestic Swedish aircraft manufacturing industry, to enable the country to survive an extended war in Europe as a neutral. The prevailing opinion was that political neutrality absolutely requires autonomic defense production capability in the essential armament areas.

While the controversy was in progress, civil aviation policy was firmly pursued with the result that it provided technical, navigation and air safety experience which in the end became available to the Swedish air force at the appropriate time.

Development of civil aviation also spotlighted the strong personalities of Adrian and Carl Flormann, who for a long time exercised strong influence in the aircraft industry and therefore also in air defense policy.

About 1930 a license agreement was concluded with the British firm Bristol, which became the cornerstone of the Swedish aircraft engine industry. Cooperative efforts had already been underway since 1921 with Heinkel and since 1925 with Junkers in fighter aircraft production. The value of this cooperation consisted primarily in the fact that a cadre was trained which obtained practical experience in construction and mass production.

When in 1935/36 sufficient funds finally became available for goal-directed military aircraft procurement based primarily on all-Swedish manufacturing, the Swedish market was split between the Wallenberg Group (with its factory in Linköping--the origin of today's SAAB works) and the Wenner-Gren Group, which started producing aircraft engines in the Trollhättan Engine Factory. All other competitors, among them the Austrain immigrant Sparmann, a capable manufacturer with too little capital, lost out in the struggle.

In 1938 Wallenberg officially founded the SAAB (Svenska Aero Aktie Bolaget) and Wenner-Gren the SFAB (Svenska Flygmotor AB). The decision by these two all-Swedish firms to immediately enlist U.S. know-how and to employ many U.S. engineers and technicians had far-reaching industrial impact. It was significant also that both enterprises were founded in the private sector, which they remain to this day, even though the government was the only customer for military aircraft production and has remained so to date.

The goal-directed development policy of the two firms was considerably aided by the fact that the air force knew exactly what it wanted and that industry therefore did not have to develop any expensive alternatives; also, that the politicians were unified in their support, which they are to this day. Important also was the fact that navy opposition disappeared and that an air force was generally recognized to be better equipped and more economical in defending against an invasion by sea, than would be naval forces.

Also, Swedish industry had not been weakened by the world economic crisis to the extent that this was true of the Central European economy and thus had capital at its disposal; the labor unions were in favor in the expectation of secure jobs. There was agreement also about creating a monopoly: in view of the small size of the Swedish market, internal competition would have been murderous. Competitive campaigns were to be waged against foreign industry, which would have to be equalled.

A significant event took place in 1941: German construction specifications which had hitherto been in force were replaced by U.S. (FAA) standards. About the same time the first successful product of the new firm, a light bomber, went into production; it showed considerable similarity with a U.S. Northrop model. Toward the end of the war this aircraft would have gone into mass production but for the fact that the jet age had dawned and SAAB had switched to the J-29, the "flying barrel." Since this model went into production the Swedish aircraft industry can withstand comparison with any international standard.

As indicated above, the Swedish arms industry covers almost the entire defense materiel spectrum. For purposes of this article, a complete listing of its productivity would therefore be too exhaustive. We should like however to spotlight particularly significant developments of its defense technology, emphasizing those which might be of particular interest to Austria. We are therefore purposely neglecting developments in the naval and similar fields.

Antitank Systems

As is generally the case in the infantry armament area, FFV production is paramount here. One well-known system, which has been most successful for exports, is the Carl-Gustaf antitank gun. Through successful follow-on development, this unguided weapon has evolved into the Carl-Gustaf M-3 lightweight weapon, weighing only 8 kg (compared with the original 14 kg); its FFY 507 warhead can penetrate an armor thickness of 90 mm. For antitank combat, its effective range is about 300 meters; its maximum firing distance usable against some targets with fragmentation rounds is more than 700 meters. For this purpose the warhead has a supplementary rocket propulsion and fin stabilization. Since a variety of warheads is available, orders are likely well into the future.

The most recent development at the FFV is the AT-4, a particularly lightweight and compact disposable weapon weighing a mere 6 kg and a range of about 300 meters also. The shaped charge projectile has a special geometry and penetrates armor of about 350 mm thickness; beyond its point of impact it develops a particularly strong blinding/incendiary and heat effect. The United States has purchased a series of 1,000 AT-4s for purposes of comparing them with their own developments in a long-term test.

The BILL guided missile antitank system is the subject of interesting, not yet completed development activities. The projectile is launched from a launch and aiming device mounted on a tripod, with the line of fire above the line of sight, attacking the armored target with a shaped charge aimed at a 30 degree downward angle.

In this manner the tank is hit at its top, which as a rule is thinly armored; partly dug-in tanks can also be attacked in this manner. The system, including six missiles, can be carried by a three-man crew and weighs a total of 345 kg. Its normal combat range is about 2 km; installation on a lightly armored wheeled vehicle is under consideration. BILL is being developed by Bofors. This then constitutes one of the infrequent cases in which the FFV's dominant market position is being challenged.

The new type of 12 cm STRIX grenade thrower munition may become significant for armored combat. The projectile is guided by an infrared sensor in its end phase flight, weighs about 17 kg and has a range of about 8 km. Here again the "tank attack from above" is considered to be of great tactical value, apart from the fact that from above tanks usually have a very clear infrared signature even under natural concealment. STRIX is a joint project between FFV and SAAB.

The electrically triggered FFV 028 shaped charge mine can also be counted among effective antitank systems. A specially dedicated minelaying machine was built for quick and hard-to-detect digging in of mines. In addition the FFV has developed an armor-piercing 7.62 mm munition which can penetrate a 15 mm armor plate at a distance of 300 meters. Great demand for this item can be expected in view of the many lightly armored vehicles to be expected on the battlefields of the future.

An ambitious antitank program, designated PV 2000, is currently active at the FFV. Its objective is the development and application of new technologies for enhancing the effectiveness of warheads. It will combine all available experience and knowledge accumulated by the firms and which show promise for development.

Artillery Systems

Bofors is the leader here. Alfred Nobel incorporated defense chemistry into this enterprise, making Bofors the only firm in the world which combines the production of guns and guided weapon systems with the requisite munition technology (powder propellants, explosives, pyrotechnics etc.).

The currently most successful development is the FH-77 field howitzer, which is fully operational in the Swedish army, thus covering domestic requirements. A slightly modified model, the FH-77B, is being produced for export.

The development objective was an easily transportable weapon in the 8-ton weight class with quickly attainable readiness for action, a high rate of fire and an effective range of 20 km.

In effect the gun can travel on secondary roads at a speed of about 70 km/hour; its self-propulsion permits a speed of 8 km/hour. While the combat weight was exceeded by almost 3 tons, its range actually amounts to about 30 km. The fact that a simple automatic loading mechanism permits a firing rate of 3 rounds within 8 seconds should be of great tactical advantage. The aiming instrumentation is manufactured by Philips-Elektronik-Sweden and is

capable of direct gunlaying up to 1,500 meters. Since at present several large and small countries are considering modernization of their artillery inventories, there could be some demand for the Bofors FH-77B.

The fact that only TNT is used in the munitions can be considered another vestige of the Nobel tradition. Swedish safety regulations forbid the handling of Composite B. However, due to intensive research efforts in the area of end and explosive ballistics the lethal effect of the TNT munitions has proven only slightly inferior to that of a Composite B filling. Research work in the TNT area, strongly encouraged by the government, have resulted in developing a technology which is capable of enhancing the performance of other explosive mixtures also.

Bofors produces munitions for almost all calibers and all purposes. This production is supplemented with the production of modern fuses, among which the Zelar proximity fuse is worth mentioning; it offers a choice of being fired with delayed action, impact or proximity ignition. Proximity ignition can be set within a wide range of distances.

The major part of naval gun production also comes from Bofors--on-board as well as coastal guns. These are long-range weapons, ranging from 7.6 cm/L50 calibers with a 30 round/min rate of fire to 12 cm/L50 twin guns. Both models are in use also in foreign naval forces, among them those of The Netherlands, Finland and Norway.

We will discuss tank guns in greater detail in the section on tanks.

Air Defense Weapon Systems

During World War II Bofors unintentionally achieved a worldwide breakthrough of the defense market with its 40 mm antiaircraft guns; the firm's high reputation endures to this day. However, the present version of the 40 mm weapon, which is produced in many countries under license agreements, bears only a scant resemblance to the original gun.

The modern 40 mm/L60 guns are today used by more than 50 armies, in conjunction with an endless variety of mounts, aiming and fire control systems. Sweden itself has now integrated the weapon into the BOFI system, in which the fire control is observed on a Ku-band monopulsing radar. To counteract electronic interference, two operating procedures are provided, fixed frequency with MTi or frequency hopping within a band width of 670 MHz. For optical target tracking, the following are available: a laser with a 10 km range for distance measuring; a daylight sight with a 10 degree visual angle; a night vision sight (image intensifier) and an electronic firecontrol computer.

By combining both sensor systems considerable accuracy can be achieved. A critical ECM situation can be dealt with by switching from one system to the other. Target allocation is performed by a battery radar. The rate of fire of the system can be increased to an order of magnitude of 500 rounds/minute.

The development of a reliable proximity fuse for such a small caliber was of decisive importance for the value of the system. It operates on a dual radar procedure whose response sensitivity is variable as to flight path, thus avoiding a premature response in very low-altitude air defense.

Tungsten pellets are incorporated in the grenade projectile jacket, thus attaining a satisfactory fragmentation effect even at longer distances. The 40 mm caliber also has good armor-piercing qualities for ground targets, since the antitank projectile made of special steel penetrates 20 mm armor. It penetrates deeply into the target and upon detonation 165 grams of Oktonal do their job.

The great destructive effect of the overall system was apparently one of the reasons for the U.S. Army to use it in the DIVAD anti-aircraft tank program. Even though Bofors is always ready to grant license rights, it is an indication of the high regard in which Swedish quality is held, that in both the Breda-Marconi production of the naval antiaircraft twin and the U.S. DIVAD system the 40 mm barrels were procured direct from Bofors.

The increasing threat from terrain-following aircraft and sea-skimming guided weapons will continue to favor the 40 mm system over smaller calibers because of its greater range, since projectiles weighing 6 kg are fired at a high rate of fire.

In contrast to the 40 mm caliber, the Bofors SAK 57 mm/L70 is not purely an antiaircraft weapon, but rather a multipurpose gun. But it is nevertheless of interest for antiaircraft purposes because of its rate of fire of 200 rounds/minute and an effective range of 6 km. Countries which are not permitted to use air defense guided missiles could use it as quasi-stationary defense resources in vulnerable point protection.

In the air defense guided missile area the RBS 70 system was developed; it is currently in use not only in Sweden, but also in Norway. Other countries are considering its procurement. It is a medium-range system with relatively great mobility. The rocket-propelled warhead combines an impact and a proximity fuse; the latter works on the laser principle and is therefore hardly subject to interference. The system is intended for use against aerial targets at a maximum altitude of 3000 meters and a maximum distance of 5000 meters and is guided as a "laser beam rider," whereby the beam is always kept superimposed on the line of sight. Night vision instrumentation is under consideration. One fire unit travels in three trucks.

RBS-70 units in Sweden are organized into companies with three platoons each, each of the latter containing three firing units. One company constitutes the guided missile air defense of a division or brigade. A system designed by SATT serves as the IFF unit; it is not being exported. Mounting the system on armored vehicles with integrated surveillance radar is under discussion; this could become an extremely far-reaching air defense protection for armored units. Integration with an Ericsson-3-D radar or the Ericsson Giraffe radar system is provided for a more stationary situation.

To deal with especially difficult target acquisition situations (e.g., very fast aircraft flying at low altitude passing the position at a distance of only a few hundred meters), a new type of laser beam receptor in the rear of the guided missile was developed, providing a relatively wide detection angle for the guide beam. The overall system still has a potential for significant development possibilities and increases in effectiveness.

Swedish Tank Production

Postwar arming of the Swedish armored forces started in a relatively conventional way with the introduction of the Centurion, a good quality heavy tank, which however must now undergo modernization of several of its major components if it is to retain its combat effectiveness until 1995.

Thereafter, the well-known S-tank went into procurement, which at the time appeared to be a leap into unknown territory. The motivation for its unconventional design is not fully appreciated in foreign countries: on the one hand, the tank is supposed to be able to prevail in any duel situation due to its especially effective armament; on the other hand, it must be suitable for travel in the typical terrain conditions found in the Swedish Norrland (few roads, dense forests, some steep inclines and some swampy lowlands). In this regard the S-tank has proven its worth and is fully accepted by the armored troops.

On the other hand it must be realized that such an item is not suitable for export--apart from the fact that it is expensive. But the technical solution of the problem, the original combination of a diesel/turbine power plant; a track and suspension which performs the entire gunlaying task for the main weapon; and the main weapon itself were great achievements of contemporary technology.

Inasmuch as the weapon is rigidly mounted, it was possible to choose the 10.5 cm cannon with a 60-fold caliber length, which is still suitable for destroying today's armor. In addition, carefully chosen auxiliary systems were available for attaining a high state of crew proficiency, such as a training munition whose trajectory at 2000 meters coincides exactly with that of the 10.5 cm cannon; thereafter the training round drops off steeply, thus providing full safety in the maneuver area with a minimum of restrictive procedures.

Today the S-tank is obsolescent also and, like the Centurion, is being radically modernized, with special attention given to the electronics, fire control and night vision systems and the power plant. Both vehicles will be equipped with modern diesel engines.

The Centurion will in addition be equipped with a stabilized daylight aiming device with distance meter and scanning spot generator made by Ericsson. Improved munitions are planned for the main weapons, and the long cannon of the S-tank will receive a muzzle control system. Both tanks will require multiple-layer armor, though according to different technologies. With all this, the systems will be serviceable until the year 2010 and the manufacturers--especially Bofors, Hagglund & Soener and the related electronics industry--will remain suitably busy.

For the time being there will be no changes in the fairly modern Ikv 91 tank destroyer; only a version incorporating TOW missiles will be added.

In the meantime development of a new type of tank is in progress, encouraged by the commanding general of the armored forces and internationally respected tank designer Sven Berge.

Basically the Swedish army has no requirement for the classic combat tank (MBT), since offensive use of such a system is not compatible with its defense situation. Rather, there had always been a desire--more or less conscious--for a relatively lightweight, but heavily armed tank destroyer. The S-tank design is a clear illustration of this.

The new procurement plan--for entering service with the army in 1995--calls therefore for a lightweight, but in critical places heavily armored vehicle with great survival capability and heavy gun armament. To be able to procure it in great numbers and to keep the cost reasonable, it is planned that components from the civilian sector be incorporated. From that standpoint, Sven Berge arrived at his well-known UDES designs:

The UDES 11 would be an obvious derivative of the S-tank. It would have a 3-man crew; the commander and gunner would have one fire control display each and if the gunner rotates his seat to face the rear he would find there a second set of driving controls. Thus if the tank were forced to retreat in combat, it would not have to execute a turn; the commander could not only continue to observe the enemy but could quickly return to a firing position, always facing the enemy with the tank's most heavily armored front side.

The main weapon would once again be rigidly mounted and would presumably be a 120 mm smooth-bore gun. As is well known, the loading automation in rigid gun mounts is not expensive. Once again, the entire vehicle would be involved in aiming as to elevation and traverse. However, in this case the aiming mechanism could not be stabilized and a firefight could be conducted only from a standing position. Total weight would amount to about 22 tons.

However, for Swedish tastes this did not represent sufficient progress over the S-tank, and an additional design was submitted.

The UDES 17 does not deviate from the basic idea of the S-tank (no turret, low silhouette, small weight, great mobility, small crew), but tries to avoid the tactical restriction caused by the rigidly mounted gun. It is therefore equipped with an elevating and traversing gun which in combat is extended from the tank hull until the breech is clear. In this position it can rotate 360 degrees and can be elevated like a gun on a regular turret tank. For reloading it must be lowered again; this is done quickly and simply by the automatic loading mechanism. In firing tests, the rate of fire forward was 8 to 9 rounds/minute and rearward 6 to 7 rounds/minute, both while the tank was in motion. This is good performance, hardly achievable by turret tanks without automatic loading mechanism.

The UDES 17 project was opposed because of the requisite high development cost for an adequate fire control system and aiming optics. Thus the UDES 17 was shelved for the time being.

Another project design was the UDES 15, a conventional turret tank, which however would have weighed about 35 tons with appropriate quality and equipment, which was not at all what the tank corps had in mind.

Thus the S-tank concept was examined once again, resulting in the design for the UDES 19. The presently unsolvable problems with the 360 degree aiming optical system were circumvented by placing the gunner into a sort of mini-turret at the foot of the gun mount and by renouncing the capability of raising and lowering the weapon, which is once again externally mounted. In this way so much space became available in the interior of the vehicle that a widening of the tracks became possible, resulting in a further reduction of ground pressure which is most welcome in the Norrland terrain. However, the external gun mount requires a somewhat complex automated loading procedure; but it permits reloading at any side angle from the magazine, which is located in the rear, outside the hull of the tank.

The UDES 19 apparently comes closest to satisfying the demands of the tank corps and can be built economically with available technologies.

Nevertheless one additional, somewhat exotic version of a design for an infantry tank which can be used also as a tank destroyer has been built and is being tested. This is the UDES xx20, whose two elements are linked by a joint which can rotate horizontally as well as vertically. The articulated tank, developed jointly by Volvo and Hagglund, demonstrated surprisingly high mobility, maneuverability and capability of traversing trenches. An additional excellent feature is the fact that its road adherence in curves is almost 90 percent, whereas a conventional tank achieves hardly more than 10 percent under similar conditions.

Despite full compliance with all requirements for armor protection, the tandem tank weighs only slightly over 22 tons and for experimental purposes is equipped with a Rheinmetall 120 mm smooth bore gun. However, its recoil has been reduced by almost 55 percent from its Leopard version by a muzzle brake made in Sweden.

Despite all the tests and trial runs which demonstrated its qualities, the UDES xx20 is far from being complete, nor has its final design been firmed up. It could be produced in a combat-efficient tank destroyer version, in the form of a relatively strongly armed infantry personnel carrier or as a guided missile carrier. But the updated Centurion and the S-tank as well as the Ikv 91 are still in the inventory. There is no great urgency, and Swedish tank production will no doubt come up with good and unusual developments--development activity is continuing.

Bofors and Hagglund are working on Project "Combat Tank 90," a conventional type of light tank which will accommodate the 57 mm gun or the BILL guided missile and which in its APC version will carry a 3-man crew and five infantrymen. All versions would be based on the same basic vehicle and would meet the tank corps' specification as to weight (22 tons), system longevity and cost.

The Aircraft Industry

Sweden has always been aware of the fact that a domestic aircraft industry was indispensable to maintain its neutrality. Compared with international practice, a thoroughly progressive development policy was practiced. For example, as long ago as 1943 the SAAB 21A fighter bomber had a domestically produced ejection seat and in the early 1950s the J-29, which was also in use in Austria, certainly was among the most modern European jet fighters.

The Lansen, developed about the same time for low level attack missions, already had an on-board radar for ground target recognition, and the Draken was one of the first Mach 2 combat aircraft. Less striking than its double delta wing was its good performance as a fighter and its great extra-weight carrying capacity for use as a fighter bomber. The Ericsson radar, the gun armament and the air-to-air guided missiles with infrared search heads made in Sweden proved once again that despite high development costs Swedish defense policy achieved domestic production of all essential system components.

Its successor, the SAAB-37 Viggen, was in many respects a revolutionary design, with its canard airfoil and new types of advanced electronics. More than 330 aircraft of this type were built in four different versions.

In the international market the Draken as well as the Viggen were at a decided disadvantage: as new developments, they were relatively expensive and the establishment of a maintenance organization overseas would have increased their cost even more. It makes sense therefore that only Finland and Denmark became customers for them, which was due surely to the facts of Sweden's geographic closeness and "reliable neutrality" as well as its technical expertise.

The SK-60 trainer found no foreign buyers either except for a version with GE 85 engines sold to Austria as the SAAB-105. In this largest aircraft business deal to date between Sweden and Austria, Swedish industry has proven to be a most cooperative business partner.

It could be that the SAAB-105 will once more go into production in an extensively modified form, as a light fighter for secondary operational missions, since in Sweden too quantity is an important factor next to quality.

For some time now the Swedish aircraft industry, whose products are 90 percent military, has been preoccupied with a new project which timewise will run almost parallel with the development of a "new European fighter aircraft"--the JAS-39 Gripen. Due to the single-engine design (as far as is known) this may be the first time where procurement of the Swedish development could be cheaper than that of foreign competitors.

The JAS-39 project concerns a multi-purpose aircraft with canard design with the most modern computer-guided flight controls, extensively using titanium/aluminum and synthetics construction. It will probably be the most ambitious startup development which a state of Sweden's size can afford. At least 140 JAS-39 Gripens are to be delivered until the year 2000. Development and/or construction contracts have been issued for the first 30 aircraft.

Apart from SAAB, the most important partner in the JAS-39 consortium is Volvo-Flygmotor as the engine manufacturer. The firm has frequently purchased foreign licenses, but by its efficiency frequently managed to sell its own products to the license giver for reasons of price and quality. The JAS-39 program will probably use an advanced version of the GE F-404 engine. The agreement with General Electric assigns to Volvo the right of adapting the engine to the JAS-39 program, thus integrating Volvo into advanced development of the engine.

Volvo's production share for the Swedish aircraft will be 40 percent. However, when the Northrop F-20 Tigershark goes into production, Volvo will receive about 20 percent of the contract share for its F-404 engine. Since defense contracts in Sweden usually are received in fits and starts, Volvo hopes in this way to be able to arrange its production in a smooth, continuous manner after 1989 as a result of the Tigershark boom expected for that period.

Beyond that several other firms are engaged in this consortium: Bofors Aerotronics will build the VHF/UHF instruments; Ericsson the updated PS-46A pulse-Doppler radar from the Viggen. This instrument will have a flat antenna and be capable of very flexible frequency changes for optimum adaptation to the ECM environment. In addition, Ericsson will deliver the head-up system and an on-board version of the its FLIR system.

To be able to afford such advanced and expensive technologies, Swedish arms manufacturers must export their products so as not to be dependnet only on contracts from their own government. These efforts are successful in some measure, e.g., for the weapon aiming instruments of the RGS line; in fact, these instruments have become relatively inexpensive due to the large-scale production figures and are therefore increasingly penetrating the European and American markets.

The RGS aiming devices achieve a bombing accuracy of 10 mrad with tolerances of +40 percent in altitude above ground level and +20 percent in approach speed at a 15 degree dive angle. Several hundred RGS systems have so far been installed in 14 types of aircraft; for the next 10 years, total requirements are estimated at 2000.

In the meantime, a new version has been developed, the RGS-Mk 3, which additionally integrates the bomb release parameter, flight situation and angle of attack, and for the use of air-to-ground guided missiles, also their average cruising speed and range.

The Electronics Industry

The Swedish electronics industry is in a good economic position not only because of its defense activities, but also because, in contrast to other defense areas, it is heavily engaged in export. Thus for instance Philips Industrier AB (better known as PEAB) has for some time been exporting about 60 percent of its production, mostly naval electronics.

The Swedish domestic market is shared by many firms, some of which are quite small. The larger enterprises frequently are subsidiaries of international conglomerates, such as the above-named PEAB or SATT-Electronics (an AEG subsidiary). Nevertheless they are quite independent in their technological and marketing aspects and frequently compete against their parent companies in the international markets. On the other hand, the traditional defense manufacturing firms have established their own electronics departments or firms, e.g., Bofors-Aerotonics or DATA-SAAB.

One of the largest, dominant Swedish electronics producers is LM Ericsson/SRA. Even before their merger in 1981, the two firms had 20 percent and 50 percent, respectively, of the civilian market share and correspondingly large export activities.

The new firm presently has some very interesting projects, e.g., a nose radar for the Gripen with a central computer system for target acquisition and fire control and the upgraded FLIR system; also, a more efficient Universal ECM system.

A project incorporating a significant share of electronics is the upgrading of the RBS-15 guided missile group, in which Ericsson is working on the data link between the guided weapon and its launch aircraft. The requisite miniaturization task for this fits in well with a total surveillance system which Ericsson is working on as well. This involves a pilotless aerial vehicle, a dedicated ground station and a navigation system.

Another developmental project is an early warning radar to be carried in a container attached to the outside of the JAS-39 aircraft, which would assume the functions of a fixed ground early warning station of the territorial air defense network in case the latter is disabled and which would transmit its data direct to the airspace defense center.

In addition, Ericsson produces significant quantities of various laser types for distance measuring, target tracking and target illumination. In addition to those military activities, the firm is a leader in the telephone and communications area as well as in the construction of TV, radio and data transmission satellites for the Swedish and European markets.

LM Ericsson has also produced the Swedish version of the Sidewinder guided missile: the fuse functions with six transmitter/receiver segments, thus producing a semi-hemispheric preliminary scan. At the same time, the side lobes are being suppressed, which makes detection or interference much more difficult.

Similar interesting projects are ongoing at the SATT Group, which appears to have specialized in the ECM and ECCM areas. The firm employs about 600 people. It was the developer of the enemy situation analysis system for the Gripen. This involves wide-band signal processing for conventional as well as for very high radar frequencies but also for laser beams: enemy emissions are acquired by the appropriate receivers and are transmitted to a multi-purpose computer via a high-powered amplifier. The computer has access to an "emission library" (histograms) for the purpose of threat analysis.

Since Sweden is situated between the Northern Flank of NATO and the USSR, it is in a good position for electronic surveillance which makes it easy to analyze both the NATO and USSR IFF technologies. With this experience, it was decided to develop an independent early warning system and SATT produced the very advanced air force IFF system which is now in use--a series of radar warning receivers and interference transmitters of great band width, sensitivity and selectivity, as well as pulse and frequency analysis instruments which cover the 2 to 18 GHz area. The military environment is expected to generate high signal density.

One particularly spectacular achievement of SATT was the modernization of the Super-Fledermaus systems, which makes possible their continued use well into the 1990s.

The Philips subsidiary PEAB has for many years participated in the development of fire control systems for the field artillery. The most up to date system is a ground or air transportable system which includes an I/J band radar with easily interchangeable frequencies, a TV camera and a laser target illuminator. The fire control data are processed by a ballistic computer and displayed (also as a PPI image). The system is in use in Sweden and several have been sold elsewhere.

Many firms are engaged in the electronic long-distance communications field, but Ericsson and Bofors are the market leaders. The cryptographic area is the particular province of PEAB. All products in this area are of the highest technical quality, which is not surprising in view of the international ties of many enterprises.

The development of guided missiles which has been dealt with elsewhere in this article was certainly possible only because of the high quality of Swedish electronics. These systems are mostly air or shipboard based, e.g., the RBS-15 with a range of about 60 km. For close combat the Norway-built Penguin guided missile is available; Swedish industry participated in its development.

To begin with, Swedish guided weapons were generally rocket-propelled; air-breathing engines were first used with the RBS-15 system, which made considerable increases in range possible. The next generation of guided missiles is expected to use advanced ramjet technology as its propulsion and further increases in range will become possible as a result.

It is important that due to PEAB development efforts an excellent radar target search head is available which in several versions functions with different types of monopulse antennas with X or Ku bands. Due to the continuously tunable magnetron, great frequency agility and concomitantly good resistance to active interference can be achieved; also, great acquisition range and a high degree of target discrimination.

One of the keystones of Swedish air defense is the STRIL airspace surveillance system, which covers the entire kingdom. DATA-SAAB is mainly responsible for the system architecture: the main source of information are the airspace observation radars which are spread out throughout the country; their inputs are combined in a heavily secured center with the sensor data of other systems,

e.g., those of the forward airspace observation, coast artillery, the air defense command and of course those of the civil defense. The system is subject to a continuously ongoing process of modernization and today has modern 3D radars (ITT/Gilfillan) and enormous computer capability, using modern multiprocessors. This fixed location system, which has region centers in addition to the main headquarters, is supplemented by mobile facilities, thus permitting air defense focal points to be established as required by a given situation. The communications technology necessary for this comes mainly from Ericsson. Its high quality products have resulted in export orders, even for the civilian sector, among others in the FRG.

Ericsson is also the manufacturer of the Giraffe tactical radar, which is to be used in conjunction with the RBS-15 guided missile system. Further development to enhance its capabilities (maintaining its dimensions for transport and installation) is under way and is designed to work with a typical medium-range ground-to-air guided missile system. The prominent feature of the Giraffe is its retracting antenna carrier, with an antenna height of 12 meters above ground level when extended, it has excellent acquisition possibilities for the terrain-following flight area, and indirectly a good visual concealment possibility in overgrown terrain.

A project complementary to this Ericsson product is a sort of "mini-3D radar" designed for fire control of light antiaircraft gun systems and short-range antiaircraft guided missile systems. It is a pulse-Doppler radar with frequency agility and pulse compression capability. Its installation in lightly armored vehicles has been proposed.

As previously stated, Ericsson has also built the on-board radar for the Viggen and will also provide instrumentation for the Gripen. One significant feature of this instrument consists of the fact that it normally uses a "peacetime frequency" and only in time of crisis switches to a "wartime frequency," which is relatively easily accomplished by merely switching software. This changes the radar's signature so drastically that prewar electronic reconnaissance, e.g., histograms obtained prior to the outbreak of hostilities, become worthless. The system has already been integrated in Viggen units and will be maintained in the JAS-39 project in appropriately updated form.

Summary

The foregoing article was an attempt to describe the background of the amazing development of the Swedish defense potential and to feature a few of the outstanding products of the renowned defense manufacturers.

It is evident that Sweden is active in all areas of the defense industry and that it can cover its procurement needs almost entirely from domestic sources and/or from enterprises active in its territory. Nevertheless, in the case of an extended-duration war Sweden is not absolutely economically self-sufficient for defense materiel--some important components can be obtained for Swedish requirements only through barter arrangements in whatever form they take; but such barter is possible only because of the availability of a large civil and military technology potential. Nor must we underestimate the stimulating effect of heavy demand: Swedish inventive talents would surely be able to compensate

for long periods of time for a decline in defense materiel quality through non-availability of foreign imports.

Even in times of crisis the country would be able to maintain its defense materiel standards in the essential areas and would not become subject to political blackmail from any quarter.

Swedish politics are in fact making worldwide contributions to detente. Despite their strong military components not even the most orthodox pacifists would be able to impute any aggressive intentions to them. However, Sweden's international arms trade policy is unequivocal and not impaired by opportunism or similar factors. Decisions are made on the basis of careful political analyses whose value and objectivity are not impacted by political day-to-day events, but which remain valid even through a change of governments. Approval for export plans of defense materiel is granted prior to acceptance of a contract and thus remains a political obligation, which is of course of benefit to the country's international reputation and its industry. The Swedish reputation for its "reliable neutrality" is thus well earned.

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BOFORS GETS LARGE ORDER FOR BILL ANTITANK MISSILE

Successful Tests Demonstrated

Stockholm SVENSKA DAGBLADET in Swedish 25 Sep 85 p 7

[Article by Jan Thorsson]

[Text] Bofors has now completed the development of a new, advanced antitank missile.

It has been named Bill, and it effectively stopped a Centurian tank when it was test fired at the Ravlunda range south of Kristianstad on Tuesday.

There was great interest in the test firing, especially from abroad. Among others, there were representatives from 20 foreign military powers, including the chief of the American army, General John Wickham.

Strict security measures surrounded the exercise, including a large police contingent. In Bofors there was some excitement before the firing, because there was a great deal at stake. The costs for the development of the missile were much greater than anticipated. The final bill was about a half a billion, of which Bofors was responsible for approximately half. The enterprise is now expected to be highly successful because of Bill's unique performance.

The missile is fired by two men and can be used at distances from 150 to 2,000 meters. It bursts with the force directed downward to penetrate the tank's most vulnerable part, the top. The missile goes above the soldier's line of sight and adjusts itself vertically. It goes over possible obstacles, and can therefore be used against shielded targets. By means of an advanced optical system it can even be fired at targets in darkness.



Antitank missile Bill on the way to its target; it goes over possible obstacles.

Foreign Orders Expected Soon

Stockholm SVENSKA DAGBLADET in Swedish 27 Sep 85 p 9

[Article by Erik Liden]

[Text] Bofors will soon receive an order for the new antitank missile Bill from the Swedish army for close to 1.5 billion kronor, one of the largest army orders of all time. Since each missile costs almost 200,000 kronor, very few will be fired during compulsory military training.

The first missiles will be delivered in 1988, and the class of 1988-1989 will be the first to be trained with the Bill missile. The missile has been test fired three times this week at the Ravlunda range in Skane and at Bofors' own range in Varmland.

In Skane a Centurian tank was steered directly toward the marksman, who fired the wire directed missile at about two kilometers distance. The direct hit on the top of the tank also set off the 40 shells stored in the tank's ammunition compartment.

At the Bofors range the target was a tank that was moving laterally at the rate of ten meters a second. In this case as well there was a direct hit on the top of the tank.

The missile's principle, which is unique in the world, is the downwardly directed explosive pressure that penetrates the thin top of the tank. The missile marksman aims directly at the tank, while the Bill missile describes a path a good meter over the line of sight.

Since the target seeker reacts only to metal, the detonation does not occur against bushes or trees.

Hill Firing

A disadvantage appears in firing in hilly terrain when an attacking tank can only be seen in certain areas. The marksman must aim at the target the whole time. If he doesn't, the chances are the missile will pass over the target.

The missile's speed makes it necessary for the marksman, in spite of his low position, to expose himself for ten seconds, delicate seconds when he is vulnerable to enemy fire and can be prevented from directing his Bill against the intended target.

Bofors has invested 400 million kronor over the planned development money to complete the project since it began in 1979. The army has also contributed, but the great economic investment will be made before the new year when the first orders are filled, possibly divided into two partial orders with a total value of 1.5 billion kronor. The project is a good year late.

Bofors thinks that the first foreign orders for Bill will come at the end of 1986.

MILITARY

SWEDEN

NOW FOREIGN AIRLINES ATTRACTING AIR FORCE PILOTS

Stockholm SVENSKA DAGBLADET in Swedish 25 Sep 85 p 7

[Article by Erik Liden]

[Text] The drain of pilots from the Air Force continues. This year 32 pilots at Viggen or Draken have resigned or requested leave. The agreement with the Swedish airline companies last winter was for a maximum of 25 pilots during 1985.

SAS, linjeflyg, and Swedair have not taken more than 20 pilots, but Swedish flying officers are now signing contracts with foreign airlines as well, in Europe and the U.S. Study leave has also increased, something that experience has shown leads to departure in a few years.

Many in Line

"More and more of our very efficient pilots are standing in line to enter civilian airlines," Colonel Rolf Clementson, an F-17 wing commander in Ronneby, said. "Resignation and leave are just the tip of the iceberg. Many are waiting to see what the new military flying benefits will be, for contract proposals, etc. If the flying officers don't like the proposals, the departures will increase again, and the pilot shortage will become acute.

The problem is the same with helicopters and technicians. If the recruiting of helicopter pilots cannot be improved as soon as possible, it will be difficult to man the 20 antitank helicopters of type BO 105 that will begin to be delivered in 1986.

Poor Consolation

"A poor consolation is the increased enrollment in the civil aviation school in Ljungbyhed," Lt Col Cleive Hornstrand, head of the Personnel Planning Section of the Air Staff, said. Fourteen students are taking their final examinations this week, 29 were admitted this spring, and we are trying to be able to admit close to 60 new students in April of next year. The airline companies must also show responsibility and support training and guarantee positions in the long run in Sweden.

In Norway the pilot shortage is even more acute. In Bodo at present 18 F-16 aircraft are being manned by ten pilots.

ECONOMIC

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

GUTEHOFFNUNGSHUETTE DEPARTURE IS BITTER PILL FOR RUHR

Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 24 Sep 85 p 13

[Article by Hans Juergensen, Duesseldorf: "An Industrial Concern Leaves the Ruhr Area; GHH Moves to the Isar Area"]

[Text] When the headquarters of a large industrial concern changes its location, that is always an important event even though merely about 100 employees may be directly affected. There are no more than that in the case of the Gutehoffnungshuette (GHH), which wants to move its headquarters from Oberhausen to Munich. Therefore there cannot be any question of blood letting in terms of employment policy for the Ruhr area. The tax aspect of the move, too, is hardly likely to be earth shaking the way the concern is set up. The actual dimension of the event becomes evident only from the historical perspective. That an enterprise that with complete justification can be called the basic unit of industry at the Ruhr moves away to Bavaria can leave nobody indifferent between Dortmund and Duisburg. The move is a bitter pill for the Ruhr area and nowhere is that better understood than in the state chancelleries in Duesseldorf and Munich. In a way it is a late revenge of the Bavarian lion for "humiliations" that go far back.

"It is in the nature of things that if an enterprise such as Gutehoffnungshuette is a more or less influential partner in an enterprise of the manufacturing industry, it will support the latter to the best of its resources as far as in any way possible," Paul Reusch, the founder of the concern, wrote 65 years ago to the then MAN chairman of the board. With these diplomatic words and the assurance that MAN's South German and Bavarian character will be maintained, the association with the GHH, the "mighty industrial combine from the north," was to be made palatable to the chairman of the board of the big Bavarian machine building enterprise. The merger did take place soon after an embittered power struggle between Stinnes and the GHH, but not in the manner in which Augsburg had imagined it.

Instead of the one-third interest originally agreed to, the "Prussians," as everyone was then called in Bavaria who lived north of the Main River line, had bought up a majority interest in MAN and thus had struck a heavy blow to Bavaria's self-esteem. At that time the circumstances of the transaction induced the disappointed MAN chairman of the board to express his views in a newspaper article under the heading, "The Industrial Main River Line" with the

following summary: "In any case by the close combination of the two works the great difference of the attitude to life and ideology between the South German and North German industry has been clearly revealed."

As a result of the announcement of last weekend that GHH and MAN now 65 years later have been merged and the headquarters of the concern is to be moved from Oberhausen to Munich, this episode in the history of the GHH concern suddenly appears in a new light. Therefore it is not inappropriate to point out in the dialogue now conducted under changed conditions across the Main River line that the Prussian expansionist pressure was by far not so unrestrained as it appeared to be to the Bavarians. At any rate, August Haniel, the then GHH chairman of the board, even then pointed out "that the decentralization resulting from the horizontal organization (greater involvement in processing) and the spreading to South Germany into the metallurgical field might push the old GHH in Oberhausen more into the background." This then happened indeed, more than anyone could predict at that time and the move of the concern headquarters is the consequence of this fact.

The historical location of the GHH combine's headquarters actually lost its economic sense immediately after World War II when the occupying powers removed the two basic materials fields of coal and steel from the Gute Hoffnungshuetten system. These two fields were the basic units of the concern whose history goes back to the 18th century. To ensure sales for these two fields, the road to further processing was embarked upon, especially after World War I when the arms deliveries stopped. The investment in the Deutsche Werft in Hamburg during World War I and the acquisition of MAN shortly thereafter were important steps in this direction. Paul Reusch, the founder of the concern, already shortly before World War I had come to the realization "that in the coming difficult times the profitability of our enterprise can be guaranteed first of all by refining the semifinished products produced by us." This realization remained the guiding factor of his policy until his dismissal by the Nazis. He could not foresee that the Allies would promote this development after World War II by radical surgery and would deprive the concern completely of its raw material base.

In the following years of the economic miracle they had other worries in Oberhausen than to be concerned about relocation of the firm headquarters. Even if that had been done, a location in Bavaria would have hardly been considered even though the firm had temporarily added a second location in Nuremberg during the French occupation of the Ruhr area in the 20's. For the GHH continued to be a domain of the Haniel family who were attached to the Ruhr area. A few things had to come together to make this step possible: the shifting of the controlling influence with the GHH extending over several increases in share capital from the Haniel family to the Allianz Group in Munich and the crisis of the MAN at the beginning of this decade which entailed considerable tensions between the Oberhausen concern headquarters and the headquarters of its biggest subsidiary in Augsburg.

Not until Klaus Goette, an Allianz man, had assumed the GHH directorship and the Haniel family had relinquished the chairmanship in the board of directors it became clear that a relocation of the combine leadership, a move that had

suggested itself for a long time for economic reasons, to the south and its merger with the MAN executive board would no longer be left undone because of regard for North Rhine-Westphalian sensitivities. It will, of course, also influence the relationship between concern headquarters and the MAN executive board. The hurry with which this relocation was pursued in recent months and received its blessing at a session of the supervisory board convoked at short notice could arouse the impression that the GHH started to slide only recently on the south-north slope.

However, in reality the move of the biggest European machine-building enterprise from the Emscher River to the Isar River is the result of a long drawn out process to which a measure of inner logic cannot be denied however painful this realization may be for the Ruhr area.

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ECONOMIC

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

DIMENSIONS, CONSEQUENCES OF YOUTH UNEMPLOYMENT ANALYZED

Bonn AUS POLITIK UND ZEITGESCHICHTE (supplement to DAS PARLAMENT) in German
21 Sep 85 pp 16-26

[Analysis by Wolfgang Beywl: "Youth Unemployment - On the Effects on the Individual of a Displaced Labor Market Problem"]

I. Introduction

"The trouble is that I am too old for vocational training, nobody will take me, and I have no chance to stand on my own two feet. The other trouble is boredom...To have a lot of time and not enough money...When I walk about the city and cannot buy anything. What's also bad is having too much time to think. I am constantly thinking, and the more I think, the more I fear the future."(1)

Ilse S. was 23 when she described the effects of her unemployment in these words. After elementary school, she spent some time in "holding patterns"--vocational school, temporary employment, practical training. And suddenly she was unemployed and without the prospect of a satisfying occupation.

The other statements cited in this article were also made by unemployed people over 20 (most well over). Is it justified to speak of "youth unemployment" with respect to such young adults, some of whom are married and even parents?

Teenage unemployment as a quantitative problem has now been largely dealt with and will continue to decline due to shrinking numbers. However, the successfully deployed educational and labor market measures are so constituted that growing numbers of young people (currently several hundred thousands) will be unemployed at some time after their 20th birthdays. Consequently, unemployment is being shifted from the sociologically explosive teenagers who are generally considered in need of protection to the age groups above and repressed as a social difficulty for the individual with frequent life-long effects. We call it amnesia if an individual suffers a lapse in remembrance, and this is manifested in a memory gap. In social terms, displaced youth unemployment threatens to be subject to a kind of social memory gap, with serious consequences for the persons affected.

II. Ten Years Youth Unemployment--And No End in Sight?

Our economic society has been battling the problem of youth unemployment for more than 10 years. In the 1974/1975 recession, 300,000 young unemployed were recorded--a figure that was frightening at that time. Since 1982, we have been compelled to live with 600,000 unemployed below age 25. The fact that the unemployment rate for juveniles has been well above the general average ever since 1975(2) justifies our speaking of the special phenomenon of youth unemployment. The "fever curves" drawn in the graph (3) serve as points of reference in the following description.

Graph: Age Specific Unemployment Rates

Key:

- | | |
|---|----------------------------|
| 1. Unemployment rates (percentages) | 5. Total unemployment rate |
| 2. Lack of training facilities | 6. Below 20 |
| 3. Cyclical manifestation | 7. 20-24 years |
| 4. Unemployment among entrants to the labor market | |
| 1. From "Cyclical Manifestation" to "Unemployment Among Entrants to the Labor Market" | |

Following the first symptoms in 1973, the rate of unemployment for teenagers climbed to 6.2 percent in September 1974. For this age group, that figure represented the record deviation of 2.1 percent above the general unemployment rate. Politicians largely shrugged off this development, considering it "due

to cyclical features." The Federal Government, for example, commented on "youth unemployment and the situation with regard to trainee jobs" that it was not to be expected..."that in the medium or long term structural youth unemployment will occur in the Federal Republic of Germany."(4)

The combination of various short-term measures (such as the expansion of trainee jobs and the offer of continuing education outside the schools as well as within the scholastic system) succeeded in 1978 (annual average rate) and 1979 (September rate) in lowering the teenage unemployment rate below the average rate. Even then, some critics pointed out that this merely represented a delaying effect and short-term palliative, and that the therapy employed did not promise long-range success.(5)

In the course of the second push, the annual average of unemployed below 25 tripled from 200,000 (1980) to the (so far) record rate of about 600,000 (early 1985). The public registered this development primarily as due to the "lack of trainee jobs." In 1981-1982, declines were recorded in the figures of new as well as existing apprenticeship contracts.(6) In the year he took office, Federal Chancellor Helmut Kohl emphasized "new trainee jobs for young people" as being the priority objective of Christian-Liberal government policy.(7) As the result of "the solidarity and community action of all those involved in vocational training," 1983 and 1984 turned out to be "record years of vocational training in the dual system" with almost 680,000 and more than 700,000 apprenticeship contracts concluded respectively. This successful outcome is somewhat vitiated by the fact that the figure for applicants for trainee jobs not accommodated by 30 September (deadline) has risen from 34,000 (1982) to 47,000 (1983) and 58,000 (1984).(8) The annual average of 160,000 to be expected has certainly not reduced teenage unemployment to a socially tolerable level; on the other hand, this age group is no longer affected more than the average.

Unemployment among the 20-24 year olds has increased dramatically since 1981--though public perception continues to be preoccupied with the topic "lack of trainee jobs." Ever since September 1982, the unemployment rate for this age group is 4 or more percentage points above the general unemployment rate--sharply though this has risen also. At the present time, around 12 registered unemployed are counted for each 100 employed in this age group. Almost every fifth unemployed person now is 20-24.

As each year a rising number of unemployed in this age group has never held a job, public consciousness is slowly awakening to the problem of "unemployment among entrants to the job market." Roughly 20 percent of the 400,000 currently registered unemployed in the 20-24 age group have not held a job before or lost it immediately after training in the factory or elsewhere (or sometimes in the course of such training). It is frequently argued that any training is better than none, but this is a fallacy because the large majority of the unemployed who had started on a profession successfully completed factory training. The creeping devaluation of recognized training completions is made obvious by the fact that the proportion of graduates of the dual system who lost their jobs immediately after completion of factory training rose from 8.7 percent (1982) to 14-15 percent (1984).(9) Next year, therefore, about every sixth trainee must expect to be unemployed after

passing his examination. Nor, in many cases, does this involve only brief and transitional unemployment--as exemplified by the 34,000 trained young skilled workers who had been unemployed for 1 or more years at end September 1984.(10)

2. On the Anatomy of a Displaced Disease

To some extent, the current youth unemployment is the result of deliberate shifts in past years. Due to the extension of compulsory schooling and the introduction of "holding patterns" (such as the year of occupational preparation), 50 percent of all teenagers are already 18 when beginning their training.(11) As a consequence of the tremendous expansion of the system of primary, secondary and university education, the proportion of gainfully employed persons in the 15-24 age group has shrunk from 52.6 percent (1972) to less than 40 percent now.(12) Young people increasingly have their first contacts with the labor market after completion of their 20th year (or even later).(13) Unemployment as an individual fate is correspondingly shifted to the following year of life, dragged along as a social problem to the 1990's.

It is a cause of concern that long-time unemployment among young people can no longer be considered the exception. While, in 1980, the project group on "juvenile unemployment" at the Federal Office for Labor was still able to note "...that the age groups below 25 are hit harder by unemployment than the average of the working population, but on the other hand suffer much shorter periods of joblessness,"(14) the situation is radically different now: In 1976, the average duration of unemployment for young people up to the age of 24 amounted to only 9.8 weeks, it has risen to almost 30 weeks now. In 1980, less than 20 percent of the 20-24 age group were unemployed for more than 6 months, the proportion of long-time unemployment in the same age group had climbed to 37 percent in 1983 and 40 percent in 1984.(15)

The fact that increasing numbers of trained people are without jobs, and youth unemployment is therefore a frequent element in the "normal biography" should not disguise the circumstance that generally disadvantaged social groups continue to be even more affected by unemployment. German and male skilled workers continue to run far less of a risk with regard to unemployment than juveniles without completed vocational training, girls, aliens, juveniles without the school leavers' certificate or graduates from special schools, juveniles coming from large or broken families or children of parents in unskilled or semiskilled jobs. If such features accumulate, unemployment threatens to be a virtually inevitable fate.(16) The "displacement" of youth unemployment contributes to this "social structural effect," because "the more the unemployment rate rises, the less are the chances of any reintegration of the conflict ridden problem groups."(17)

3. Statistics Pass Over the True Dimension of Youth Unemployment

Up to now I have spoken of "registered" youth unemployment as reflected in the statistics of the Federal Office for Labor. These statistics consider unemployed only those juveniles who are registered as such at the employment offices and are available to the labor market (in other words not interested exclusively in a trainee job).(18) Due to the lack of compilation, the

statistics do not tell us exactly how many young people lose their jobs in the course of the year. Estimates begin at 1.1 million juveniles annually affected by unemployment.(19)

The term "hidden" youth unemployment covers those who, though interested in having a job, do not register with the employment offices (for example unemployed students at continuation schools, young aliens without working or residence permits, participants in government collection measures of a "warehousing nature,"(20) young people who, considering their quest for employment hopeless, have taken "refuge" helping out in the family, young tramps and vagrants). The Institute for Labor Market and Occupational Research (IAB) at the Federal Office for Labor assumes a "reserve pool" of 300,000 under the age of 25 in 1982.(21) Using conservative methods of assessment, we must presume that about 1.5 million young people under the age of 25 are now affected by unemployment in the course of any year--some 15 percent of the 15-25 age group.

The combination of displacement and concealment threatens to give rise to a base of youths who are permanently unemployed. The social and sociological effects are almost incalculable. Let me recall Theodor Geiger's analysis of youth unemployment in the mid-1920's: This section of a generation, he said, lacked "any proper direction or ambition. It has no economic or social location."(22)

4. Individual Selection Criteria and Social Factors Determining Youth Unemployment

It is difficult to ascribe the emergence of youth unemployment to any single cause. The inferior standard of theoretical and empirical research on the topic as well as the dispute about the explanation of the cause among various social groups (23) have the result that often not even the attempt is made to distinguish between the factors involved in the social problem of youth unemployment on the one hand and the selection criteria governing the individual affliction of youth unemployment on the other.(24)

The selection criteria are in part identical with the features of "structured" unemployment. They are, in particular, lacking educational and professional qualifications, the lack of German citizenship, sex (females) and physical or mental handicaps.(25) Furthermore, the threat of unemployment is increased by training in a profession with an above average "employment risk"(26)--specially in combination with being female or the failure to supply "job relevant behavior" (punctuality, politeness, and so on). The position of individual job applicants may be improved by ambition and discipline, the rational choice of occupation and committed behavior (with the exclusion of innate features such as sex, citizenship, age and physical/mental handicaps). However, no such efforts are able to affect the dimension of the social problem posed by youth unemployment.

The outstanding groups of causes with regard to youth unemployment are:(27)

- Cyclical developments;
- The age structure of the population;

- Coordination between the educational and employment systems;(28)
- Structural changes in the economy.(29)

In view of their direct and at least roughly estimable significance for the medium-term development of youth unemployment, let me here insert some remarks regarding the two first named factors:

Both jumps in the expansion of youth unemployment were linked to interruptions in the growth of the gross national product.(30) The recent cyclical recovery was not able to stop the continuing rise in the unemployment rate for the 20-24 age group. We may therefore deduce two hypotheses for the development of youth unemployment: Firstly we must assume that even a stronger cyclical upswing will be unable to solve the specific problems of entrants to the labor market and of "structured" youth unemployment.(31) Secondly we must expect a surge of youth unemployment in the case of a recession at the end of the 1980's. However, due to demographic factors, this affects only older juveniles who are poised on the threshold between training and job.

As the result of the German population's unbalanced age structure, more young people enter the labor market than old employees leave it. Consequently, the manpower potential steadily increased in the past, despite the pronounced exodus of alien workers. Dieter Mertens, head of the IAB, speaks of a considerable additional need for jobs through 1990: "Up to the end of the 1980's we will need about another 700,000 jobs if we want to at least somewhat cope with the entire wave. This will not even signify a reduction in unemployment."(32) However, at that time, the total of young people in the 15-20 age group will only amount to around 60 percent of the present figure, and there should be no problem in placing them in the training system.

In view of the background outlined here, it is evident that displaced youth unemployment will continue to plague our society at least until the early 1990's--even if the economy does well. This could come home to roost within just a few years, when a high and lasting "base" of unemployed in the 20-30 age group will be missing as a growth and prosperity potential in our society--whether because these people are consciously or unconsciously alienated, or because they have been permanently damaged in their psychological and physical integrity.

III. The Consequences of Youth Unemployment for the Individual

Although youth unemployment has prevailed for the past 10 years and without any prospects of its early elimination, we have amazingly little data on the consequences of this social problem. This applies primarily to total societal effects (for instance the changes in value systems and the mechanisms of social integration)(33) but also to individual hardships and problem situations.(34) Financial, psychological-social and other hardships are serious byproducts of youth unemployment and tend to closely interact. Psychological and somatic damage must be considered likely to occur in the long run. We are failing to integrate these young people in the working life and depriving them of an income sufficient for leading a life of their own, two factors which presage the long-range problems ahead of us.

1. Financial Hardships Rank First

While the older unemployed feel most strongly about psychological-social hardships,(35) young people and entrants on the labor market rank financial problems first. In a 1974 study, for example, 62 percent of those polled mentioned financial hardship first. Girls feel this even more than boys; this indicates the particular difficulty experienced by female juveniles to find and keep jobs "in the situation of the dictatorship of the labor market." (36) The longer unemployment lasts, and the more the features of "structured" unemployment are present (poor schooling, father unskilled or semiskilled, many siblings), the more were the juveniles compelled to cut down on personal spending.(37) Some of them "needed to borrow and could no longer manage instalment payments, savings contracts, insurance and rent payments. Fear destroyed many youthful partnerships and marriages." (38)

The discrepancies arising in the system of employment among the various groups of wage earners are even more glaring when unemployment strikes. Young people, for example, are particularly hard hit by the steady deterioration in social security since 1969, "the elimination of the unemployed from unemployment benefits." (39) In September 1983, 30 percent of all registered unemployed did not receive any unemployment benefits. For teenagers the figure was 48 percent (for girls in that group 52 percent, for alien youths as much as 78 percent).(40) This development is due to the youth specific cuts in various social service systems: The basis of apportionment for unemployment benefits payable to entrants to the labor market, for instance, was lowered from 100 percent to 50 percent only of the wage to be expected after completed training, waiting periods were extended, unemployment benefits cut for recipients without children, and so were grants for training as per the Federal Law for the Advancement of Education and for occupational training.(41) Even in 1975, 64 percent of the unemployed youths polled depended on their parents for financial assistance.(42). The percentage is likely to be greater now.

As a consequence of this financial dependence, the young people are kept in a dependent life situation or even returned to such a situation. Denial of their own adequate income is liable to directly impact the psychological-social well-being of the young because "their competitive ability among their friends diminishes, and opportunities for participation in action systems" (43) are restricted. Still, not all simply resign themselves to being pushed back into economic infancy. Even during their apprenticeship, those threatened by unemployment develop some strategies how to continue their education or earn money by some other types of work. They also believe that their success largely depends on their own efforts.(44) In contrast to widely held beliefs, this motivation for earning one's own living by working for a wage is particularly strong among the badly disadvantaged young women from working class households: The increase in the proportion of young women gainfully employed as well as empirical studies document that this group is more and more considering paid work an indispensable element of planning their lives. "That is all the more necessary as the life situation of unemployed working class girls is characterized by severe hardships which get subjectively more intolerable the longer unemployment lasts. Work for wages is the only way to escape boredom, futility, the lack of money...and not least the pressure of

the parents."(45) Unfortunately, the longer unemployment lasts, the harder it gets to fight the threatening destruction of one's future. Long-term unemployment, now more prevalent among the younger unemployed also, threatens to deprive them for a long time of the financial basis for independent action.

2. Between Depression and Self-Organization--On the Ambivalence of the Subsequent Psychological-Social Manifestations

"You know, I've become a bit odd. Distrustful and nervous. One does make mistakes if one is not working. One is not really in training, neither mentally nor physically. There is always a feeling of worthlessness. Also, since I have been unemployed, I have fewer contacts. I have retired into my shell, and former friends no longer get in touch..."

Susanne M., 20 years, single, trained florist

"Soon the old anxieties return. Office work is simply not for me, it is killing off everything I still have in the way of strength and nerves. So I gave in my notice and reported to the employment office again...This time I am properly using the time of unemployment. I went to the unemployment center and was really given a leg up by the unemployment initiative. The period of unemployment is an extreme material and psychological hardship for the person concerned, but it also offers an opportunity for inner growth and reorientation."

Juergen Z., 26, married, former industrial representative

The biographical and social location of youth as a phase of the formation of the personality on the one hand and their incorporation in a differentiated and changing educational and occupational system on the other is being destabilized. The diminution of the volume of labor in production proceeds parallel to a process which dissolves the "professionalism of labor," hitherto unchallenged as the core of one's life.(46) In this situation of economic and cultural upheaval, the young are confronted with increasing challenges to their ability to find their own identity, in particular because they lack reliable role models, customized to fit the new social conditions of the adult world.

We are bound to doubt the present validity of the research results, dating back to the 1970's, on the psychological-social effects of youth unemployment, because the framework for the individual processing of unemployment has changed by the multiplication of the absolute figures and the cultural revaluation of gainful employment ("postmaterialism doctrine"). At the level of symptoms it probably remains true to say that, by comparison with working youths, young unemployed people are "more disturbed in somatic or psychosomatic terms, moodier and less sure of themselves, react more strongly, are more aggressive, less inclined to make contacts and less sociable."(47) Many young people also complain about family disputes which tend to get more acute the longer unemployment lasts. In contrast to the older unemployed, social isolation represents a secondary problem for young people, though the field of social contacts tends to shrink, and meetings with friends are less regular.(48) No evidence exists that unemployment causes deviant behavior in

juveniles. A single disputed result notes that "unemployment raises the risk of alcoholism..., so that we must expect lasting mass unemployment to lead to another rise in the already alarming numbers of alcohol abusers and severe alcoholics."(49) Juvenile crime does not seem to be caused by unemployment, but both problems may....in many cases have common causes."(50)

"Boredom...the lack of variety and contrast in the course of the day (is) one of the heaviest burdens." As unemployment is prolonged, the horizon of temporal expectations dwindles, and confidence in the future is lost. Consequent on frequent disappointments and a life of economic dependence on the parents, a process of "destructurization" occurs, "...of a psychological slide..into hopelessness, helplessness and apathy..." involving the vital destabilization of the personality, the disruption of the balanced identity and emotional weakness."(51) In extreme cases, profound depressions, suicides or attempted suicides are the result.(52)

The emergence of depressions is quite explicable by the psychological model of "learned helplessness." In young unemployed, helplessness may arise from the conscious or unconscious expectation that their future life situation cannot be affected by their own actions (such as ambition, longer and more intensive education).(53) Any research relating to the foreseeable status of the affected age groups on the labor market must deal with the assumption "...that, in view of the standard obligation to work on the one hand and the restricted training and work opportunities on the other, unemployment produces a life situation for growing numbers of young people, which shows them the senselessness of their attempts to cope with this situation and, given their subsequent appreciation of the uselessness of their efforts, condemns them to passivity and resignation."(54) According to a study completed on behalf of the Federal Center for Health Information, "...psychological stresses were found to be noticeable wherever definite work and activity orientations remained without a social response."(55)

Incidentally, not everybody feels unemployment to be stressful. The occasional limitation to the dimensions of hardship (56) neglects consideration of the various opportunities for young unemployed people to hold their own. We cannot be sure whether the positive aspects mentioned in the course of a poll taken in 1975 still apply. These were: "It was rather nice not to have to stick to the daily routine." Or, "at that time I did more things with my friends." The length of the period of unemployment and the confidence in being able to find another job are certainly among the factors crucial for the possibility of enjoying the positive aspects.(57) The Frankfurt "Institute for Youth Research and Youth Culture" undertook an intensive poll of about 100 juveniles in 1983/1984 and noted the following: "Not dependence alone, freedom also is extended: Unemployment (and also scholastic holding patterns) leave much leisure for working on one's identity, meeting other unemployed."(58) Despite many hardships, young middle class women especially appreciate unemployment as a time for finding themselves, "...an opportunity to develop their non-professional abilities..."(59)

Youthful subcultures evolve, which set their own values and rules in contrast to the standards of the performance society. "For anyone integrated in the subcultural milieu, the importance (of the work status) drops toward zero.

Consequently, subcultural involvement may temporarily represent a complete substitute for professional and work prospects."(60) Removal from the work society is therefore not necessarily identical with passivity: "...indeed, marginal ghetto lives appear to evolve, which--as outsiders--develop some of their own and not always legal forms of subsistence, representing a kind of counter society."(61)

Low and middle class youths develop different attitudes: "In contrast to the alleged trend of value perceptions in direction 'postmaterialism,' we actually note stronger 'materialist' and 'instrumental' orientations to work among the non-academic youths questioned. The confrontations with the selection criteria and requirements of the work world experienced by the young upon transition to the labor market initiate a process of socialization for and by the labor market. Consequently, their plans for action and hopes for the future are tightly linked to conventional value perceptions, though they have few illusions."(62)

With a few class and sex specific handicaps, we do not know which situations lead young people to consider unemployment a challenge--whether they prevail within or against the given structures of wage labor--, or cause them to resign themselves and fall prey to destructive depressions. To arrive at pedagogic, youth and labor market policy decisions, it would be imperative to know which individual and social "reinforcement sources" positively affect the self-confidence and self-organization processes of unemployed youths.(63)

3. Unemployed as a Young Person--Sick in Middle Age?

In view of the rising youth unemployment, the year of youth offers an occasion to deal with the question: "youth 1985--out of work and sick?"(64) Public attention has been aroused by the suggestion that school leavers without work are members of a group likely to suffer ill health.(65) This is attributed to, among other factors, their greater consumption of coffee, nicotine, alcohol and other drugs as well as poor nutrition and socio-psychosomatic influences.(66) While comparably well documented data are available with regard to the effects of unemployment on the health of older people,(67) we have little definite information on the effects on the young.

Just as in the case of older people, we must assume that for the young there is no direct causal connection either between unemployment and sickness. Instead, this interaction depends on a series of additional objective and subjective conditions. Pursuing this rather more differentiated track,(68) we should ask the following questions (among others):

-- May sickness possibly be a risk factor or 'individual selection criterion' for young people with regard to unemployment?

-- Does the threat of future unemployment accompanying subjective helplessness exert more of an adverse effect on health even at school or during factory training or in insecure first job conditions than does unemployment when it actually occurs?(69)

-- What is the influence of psychological, family, class or sex specific conditions on the risk of sickness?

-- In some groups the early period of unemployment has been found to improve health. Does this apply to young people also, or does unemployment adversely (if at all) affect the health of the young due to their particular time of life?(70)

In view of the fact that 'youth unemployment' is increasingly shifting to early adulthood and is there more and more consolidated as permanent unemployment, and that this situation is going to continue for another 5-10 years, a study of the medium and long-term consequences for the health of the young unemployed seems necessary. Scandinavian research results underline the urgency of this task: "Juveniles fall ill in middle age." This conclusion by a Finnish investigation of the state of health of unemployed juveniles suggests long-range consequences of youth unemployment, which we are as yet unable to gauge. More hazardous behavior has been noted among unemployed youths with regard to eating habits, alcohol and tobacco consumption, personal hygiene, and so on. The full effects of such behavior will not be felt until a later stage in life.(71)

IV. Arousing Public Awareness of Shifted Youth Unemployment--A Sociopolitical Assignment

The visible and severe unemployment among teenagers has indeed been reduced. However, the present problem is with unemployment among the 20-24 age group and, barely noticed up to now, the 25-30 age group. The severity of the unemployment problem affecting these 10 years of life has been repressed in the public consciousness. The political system is failing to cope with the quantitative as well as with the qualitative aspect of youth unemployment. It is increasingly evident that the "considerable efforts of recent years" to obviate the "lack of trainee jobs" were not geared to a changing employment system. Tens of thousands of beauticians, motor mechanics and other skilled workers are currently idle. The situation is similar with regard to the growing numbers of unemployed college graduates. At the locations of major institutions of higher education, unemployment among them sometimes actually exceeds that of young skilled workers.

We are frequently told that these groups must be offered opportunities for improving on and expanding the qualifications they have already earned. That, however, will not be good enough as long as we do not know what kind of employment situation might be available to people with such multiple skills, and what the place value of the exercise of a paid profession is going to have in the evolving outlook for this generation.

It is already obvious that the latest school leavers are preferred to "older applicants" when new staff is hired. The latter, both adolescents and young adults who have crossed the first threshold between school and training but are being barred from crossing the second threshold between training and jobs, represent a new problem group on the labor market with incalculable consequences for their personal and political identity, a fulfilling life and health.

A first step toward at least arousing public awareness of this commonly repressed pauperization of an entire generation would be something like separate figures for the 20-24 age group in the monthly labor market reports. In addition it would be desirable to calculate and publish the unemployment rate of entrants to the labor market (standing at the second threshold); this would serve as an important qualitative indicator of the labor market situation. The urgency of a resolute review of structural, cyclical and labor time policy might then be more quickly appreciated, and possibly wage labor uncoupled from the receipt of income. Subsequently we might initiate the establishment of a minimum income, enough to secure a decent life. This would certainly limit though not eliminate the individual and social damage caused by youth unemployment.

FOOTNOTES

1. The excerpts from conversations cited in this article are reprinted from Ch.Rumpeltes, "Arbeitslos. Betroffene Erzählen" [Unemployed. Affected People Talk About It], Reinbek 1982.
2. The unemployment rate describes the ratio between the figures of registered unemployed and the total of gainfully employed persons. The September figures for teenage unemployment are well above the annual averages due to the seasonal features caused for these age groups by the end of the school year. Average annual figures for these age groups were higher than the annual average unemployment rates for all age groups only in 1975-1977 and 1982; see The Federal Minister for Education and Science, "Berufsbildungsbericht 1984" [1984 Vocational Training Report], Bad Honnef 1984, p 60.
3. Source: Federal Institute for Labor, 1984 Labor Market Analysis Using Selected Data on Status and Movement. Special issue of AMTLICHE NACHRICHTEN DER BUNDESANSTALT FUER ARBEIT (1985) 3, p 295 (until 1984 always published at end September). The seasonally distorted unemployment rates for March amount to 6.4 percent for adolescent and 14 percent for the 20-24 age group; see K.Schober, "Aspects of Unemployment Among Young People in Changed Demographic and Educational Contexts," to be published in "Mitteilungen zur Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung 1985" [1985 Reports on Labor Market and Occupational Research], quoted from manuscript, p 4a.
4. Federal Government comment on youth unemployment and the trainee job situation, in BULLETIN, 28 January 1975.
5. See H.-Chr.Harten, "Strukturelle Jugendarbeitslosigkeit. Bildungs- und Beschäftigungspolitische Konzeptionen und Massnahmen" [Structural Youth Unemployment. Educational and Employment Policy Conceptions and Measures], Munich 1977, pp 92ff, and O.Ulrich, "Reduction of Unemployment by Flexible Labor Time Rules," in "Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte" [About Politics and Contemporary History], Vol 43/75, pp 19-30.
6. From 605,000 to 602,000 or from 1.78 million to 1.76 million; see The

Federal Minister for Education and Science (note 2), pp 26 and 41.

7. Press and Information Office of the Federal Government (publisher), "Bundeskanzler Helmut Kohl, Reden 1982-1984" [Federal Chancellor Helmut Kohl, Speeches 1982-1984], Bonn 1984, pp 9-48.
8. In its "Berufsbildungsbilanz 1984" [1984 Occupational Training Results], based on more complete statistical documentation, the DGB mentions 288,700 juveniles entitled to occupational training but unable to obtain it; see "DGB on the 1985 Vocational Training Report. The Federal Government's Inaction Prevents the Realization of the Right to Proper Training for All Juveniles," in BERUFLICHE BILDUNG (1985) 15, p 4.
9. K. Schober (note 3), p 26a.
10. Ibid, p 30.
11. DGB 1985 (note 8), p 2; K.Schober (note 3), p 6: "The age group below 20 was increasingly "thinned out" by the above mentioned educational measures and currently comprises 2 or a maximum of 3 years instead of the former 5 years."
12. The results of a study by K.Klemm, Essen Comprehensive College; DPA report; see also ERZIEHUNG UND WISSENSCHAFT, (1985) 12, p 3.
13. The unemployment rate for the 25-29 age group rose from 4.4 percent (September 1980) to 11.4 percent (September 1984); see Federal Institute for Labor 1985 (note 3), p 295.
14. Project group "Unemployment Among Juveniles" at the Federal Institute for Labor, "Juveniles at the Transition to Training and Occupation," Contributions to Labor Market and Occupational Research. Nuremberg 1980, p 43.
15. P.W.Kloas, "Examination Passed - What Follows? Unemployment Is Increasing Among Young Skilled Workers," ZEITSCHRIFT FUER BERUFS- UND WIRTSCHAFTSPAEDAGOGIK, 80 (1984), pp 522-528, and Federal Institute for Labor (note 3), p 297; also my own calculations.
16. See the earlier investigations by K.Schober, "Unemployed Youths. Hardships and Reactions by Those Affected," in MITTEILUNGEN ZUR ARBEITSMARKT- UND BERUFSFORSCHUNG, 11 (1978), pp 198-215 (pp 202 ff), and K.Heinemann, "Arbeitslose Jugendliche. Ursachen und Individuelle Bewaeltigung Eines Sozialen Problems. Eine Empirische Untersuchung" [Unemployed Youths. Causes and Individual Management of a Social Problem. An Empirical Study], Darmstadt 1978, pp 34ff, pp 100ff; also the study by H.Bilden and others, "Unemployed Girls. First Jobs. Family Situation and Relations with Their Peers," ZEITSCHRIFT FUER PAEDAGOGIK, 27 (1981), pp 677-695.
17. R.G.Heinze, "Social Structuring of Unemployment: On the Way to a Split Society?" in W.Bonss/R.G.Heinze (editors), "Arbeitslosigkeit in der

Arbeitsgesellschaft" [Unemployment in the Work Society], Frankfurt 1984, pp 106-142 (p 112); this is impressively documented by two case histories of young women who either lost their jobs or were threatened with unemployment: R.Brandherm-Boehmker/B.Stiegler, "Stay Cool, Otherwise You Flip Out" - The Subjective Aspect of the Crisis, in "Keine Arbeit, Keine Zukunft. Die Bildungs- und Beschaeftigungsperspektiven der Geburtenstarken Jahrgaenge" [No Job, No Future. The Educational and Employment Prospects of the Baby Boomers], Frankfurt 1984, pp 7-24; B.Keddi/E.-M.Otto, "But They Don't Give Us a Chance," Training as Industrial Sales Persons and the Opportunities for Female Trainees," ZEITSCHRIFT FUER BERUFS- UND WIRTSCHAFTSPAEDAGOGIK, 81 (1985).

18. See D.Cassel, "Youth Unemployment. Dimensions. Causes. Countermeasures," in Baden-Wuerttemberg Land Center for Civics (publisher), DER BUEGER IM STAAT, 34 (1984, 1, "Unemployment," pp 43-50 (p 44); Project Group "Unemployment Among Juveniles" (note 14), pp 9ff; in great detail A.Giesbrecht, "Jugend Ohne Arbeit. Einfuehrung in die Problematik und Hilfen fuer die Praxis" [Youth Without Work. Introduction to the Problem and Aids for Its Management in Practice], Frankfurt 1983, pp 10ff, 24ff.
19. E.Stark- von der Haar/H.von der Haar, "Threat to the Lives of Juveniles by Unemployment - on the Unknown Figure of Unemployment and Income Security," WSI-MITTEILUNGEN (1984) 99, pp 533-545.
20. The holding pattern function is made obvious by the fact that about 80 percent of the graduates of full-time vocational schools and external courses seek a trainee job in the dual system; see The Federal Minister for Education and Science (note 2), p 36.
21. K.Schober (note 3), p 5.
22. T.Geiger, "Die Soziale Schichtung des Deutschen Volkes" [The Social Stratification of the German People], Stuttgart 1967, p 97, cited by K.Heinemann (note 16), p 13.
23. On the conflict of interests when explaining the causes of and with respect to the validity of scholarly statements on youth unemployment, see the minutes of the conference on "youth problems in class," in particular the chapter "Labor Market," in: Federal Center for Civics, "Jugendprobleme im Politischen Unterricht. Politische Identifikation - Friedensbewegung - Arbeitsmarkt" [Youth Problems in Civics Instruction. Political Identification - Peace Movement - Labor Market], Bonn 1983, pp 299ff.
24. Exemplary is H.Nierhaus, "Youth Unemployment: Causes and Possible Solutions from the Standpoint of the German Salaried Employees' Trade Union," in W.Schlaffke (editor), "Jugendarbeitslosigkeit" [Youth Unemployment], Cologne 1976, pp 120-144. In addition to cyclical causes, Nierhaus mentions only the lack of individual education and skills. The "Joint Statement on the 1985 Trainee Job Situation" repeatedly and emphatically calls on the individual young person for flexibility in looking for a trainee job and for a rational choice of occupation, geared

to the future utilization of the skills acquired. This delegation of responsibility to the young person willing to undergo training is in fact rather cynical, because neither the bureaucrats at the ministry nor the respective scholars have genuine clues about the prospects of the various occupations. Nor do the overwhelming majority of the applicants in fact enjoy a free choice of occupation; see INFORMATIONEN BILDUNG WISSENSCHAFT (1985) 6, pp 1f.

25. H.Schroeder provides a survey of the particularly precarious job prospects of graduates of special schools, "Special School Graduates on the Way to the World of Work. An Analysis on the Job Prospects of the Learning Disabled," Cologne 1984, (working papers on economics and business teaching).
26. We must expect that, in 1986, every third auto mechanic, hairdresser, gas station attendant and every fourth interior decorator, pastrycook, gardener, and so on, will be unemployed immediately after completion of training; see the forecast by P.W.Kloas (note 15).
27. For a quick survey, see H.Friedrich/U.Brauer, "Arbeitslosigkeit. Dimensionen. Ursachen. Bewaeltigungsstrategie" [Unemployment. Dimensions. Causes. Management Strategy], Opladen 1985.
28. The chances for getting a job are dropping for many of the popular occupations because--due to the low net cost of training, among other reasons--far more people are trained than required, and because these trades are declining. We thus get a "polarization of employment development in the skilled occupations," coupled with additional discrimination of entrants; see H.J.Petzold, "Vocational Training for All--Work for Nobody? On the Need for a Government Training and Employment Strategy," DEUTSCHE JUGEND, 32 (1984) pp 255-260 (p 257).
29. To be singled out from this large group of causes is the effect of technological advances (microprocessors, industrial robots) on the drop in jobs; see W.Bonss/R.G.Heinze, "Work, Wage Labor, Without Work. On the Sociology of Unemployment," in W.Bonss/R.G.Heinze (note 17), pp 749 (pp 27ff). Because, as entrants, youths depend on labor intensive jobs, they are disadvantaged vis-a-vis other job applicants due to the rising capital intensity of production; see A.Giesbrecht (note 18).
30. In 1974, the growth of the gross national product declined to 0.5 percent, in 1975 it shrank by 1.6 percent. The declines for 1981 and 1982 amounted to 0.2 percent and 1.2 percent respectively; compare the relevant movements of youth unemployment in these years as shown in the graph.
31. In view of the course of the unemployment rate of the 20-24 age group in 1976-1979, it is no longer possible to assume "...that young people are more quickly reincorporated during an upswing than are other unemployed persons"; see The Federal Minister for Education and Science (note 2), p 60.

32. "The Best Possible Education," see the interview with D.Mertens, DER SPIEGEL (1984) 30, pp 27-30.
33. Unanswered questions on this topic are to be found in F.-X.Kaufmann/J.Quitmann, "What Are the Social Consequences of Unemployment? Youth Unemployment as an Example," in Land Center for Civics (note 18), pp 189-207.
34. Some of the information to hand with regard to the effects on the individual has a very narrow data base (for instance Heinemann [note 16]); the investigations are up to 10 years old (for instance Schober [note 16]). As, in this situation of relative prosperity, youth unemployment has become more acute and the prospects for early improvement are poor, no more than a limited transfer is possible of the earlier findings and interpretation to present circumstances. The "more recent" IAB investigations of the consequences of unemployment on individuals below the age of 25 also go back 4 years. Publication of the results is still awaited and set for this year by K.Schober. Particularly at times of rapid and profound structural changes on the labor market, such a delay (typical for the evaluation of representative studies) handicaps the appropriate public discussion of the problem.
35. Ch.Brinkmann, "The Consequences for the Individual of Long-Term Unemployment. Results of a Representative Study," MITTEILUNGEN ZUR ARBEITSMARKT- UND BERUFSFORSCHUNG, (1984) 4, pp 454-473 (p 461).
36. W.R.Heinz/H.Krueger, "Seeking a Profession in Conditions of the Dictatorship of the Labor Market. On the Evolution of Normal Female Biographies," ZEITSCHRIFT FUER PAEDAGOGIK, 27 (1981), pp 661-676.
37. Schober (note 16), pp 205ff.
38. Stark-von der Haar/von der Haar (note 19), p 540.
39. The subtitle of the book by W.Balsen and others, "Die Neue Armut" [The New Poverty], Cologne 1983.
40. Ibid, p 120.
41. Other examples and more exact data in DGB (publishers), "Jugendarbeitslosigkeit. Sozialabbau bei Jugendlichen" [Youth Unemployment. Social Descent of Young People], Duesseldorf 1985.
42. Schober 1978 (note 16), p 205.
43. Heinemann (note 16, p 140).
44. G.Kaerntner, "On the Development of Occupational Prospects During Dual Vocational Training--Results of a Longitudinal Section Study," in IAB (publishers), "Publikation zum Workshop 'Verbleibsanalysen beim Uebergang in das Beschaeftigungssystem an der 1.und 2.Schwelle'" [Publication for the Workshop 'Whereabout Analyses at the Transition to the Employment

System at the 1st and 2d Threshold'], Nuremberg 1985 (about to be issued, quotation from manuscript), p 20.

45. Bilden and others (note 16), p 682; see also K.Heinemann and others, "Arbeitslose Frauen. Zwischen Erwerbstätigkeit und Hausfrauenrolle. Eine Empirische Untersuchung" [Unemployed Women. Between Gainful Employment and Housewife Role. An Empirical Study], Weinheim 1983, p 84.
46. For details see Kaufmann/Quitmann (note 33), p 191, and J.Berger, "The Future of the Work Society," in R.G.Heinze and others (editors), "Beschaeftigungskrise und Neuverteilung der Arbeit" [Employment Crisis and Redistribution of Work], Bpnn 1984, pp 50-62.
47. M.Wilhelm-Reiss, "Psychische Veraenderungen bei Jugendlichen Ohne Arbeit. Eine Empirische Studie zu den Folgewirkungen der Arbeitslosigkeit" [Psychological Changes in Youths Without Work. An Empirical Study on the Consequences of Unemployment], Weinheim 1980, pp 226f; Heinemann (*note 16), p 186.
48. Schober 1978 (note 16), pp 208f.
49. D.Henkel, "Unemployment as a Psychosocial Risk Factor for Alcohol Abuse and Alcoholism," Bremen 1984, issued as part of Th.Kieselbach/A.Wacker (editors), "Arbeitslosigkeit. Psychosoziale Theorie und Praxis. Beitrage des Symposiums v.11-13 Oktober 1984 in Bremen" [Unemployment. Psychosocial Theory and Practice. Contributions by the Symposium held on 11-13 October 1984 in Bremen], Bremen 1985.
50. "Fighting Youth Unemployment. Response by the Land Government to the Major CDU Inquiry," pamphlet 9/3753, Land Assembly North Rhine/Westphalia, 22 October 1984.
51. Heinemann (note 16), pp 121,127,163; see also Heinemann and others (note 45), p 94.
52. Bilden and others (note 16), p 685.
53. For details see Th.Kieselbach, "Die Gesellschaftliche Verarbeitung von Massenarbeitslosigkeit: Gesundheits- und Sozialpolitische Konsequenzen aus der Arbeitslosenforschung" [The Social Processing of Mass Unemployment: Health and Sociopolitical Consequences Ascertained by Unemployment Research.], revision of a lecture at the SPD forum "Banishment to the New Poverty" on 5 December 1984 in Bonn. Bremen 1984, pp 6f.
54. Ch.Lenz, "Youth Unemployment - Dimensions, Course, Causes, Countermeasures and Analysis of Its Psychological Effects," dissertation, Cologne University 1985, p 343.
55. F.-J.Land/H.Viefhues, "'Arbeitslosigkeit' als Gegenstand Sozialmedizinischer und Medizinsoziologischer Forschung" ['Unemployment' as the Subject of Sociomedical and Medicosociological Research], Bochumer

Sozialmedizinische Forschung e.V. [Bochum Sociomedical Research - registered association], p 78 (may be obtained from the Federal Center for Health Information).

56. For example Stark-von der Haar/von der Haar (note 19), p 542.
57. Schober 1978 (note 16), p 21.
58. R.Peukert, "On the 'Step' from School to Profession, the Incalculable Process: Socialization At a Time of Lacking Prospects and Changing Values," lecture at the DGB Conference "Youth and the Future of Work" of 21-23 November 1984, Wiesbaden 1984 (manuscript).
59. Bilden and others (note 16), p 685.
60. Peukert, p 16.
61. W.Bonss and others, "The End of the Hardship Discourse? On the Subjective and Social Significance of Unemployment," in Bonss/Heinze (note 17), pp 143-188.
62. W.R.Heinz, "Change in Values or Anticipation of the Labor Market for Young People," Bremen 1984; to be published as part of Kieselbach/Wacker (note 49), quoted from manuscript; the same results for working girls at H.Bilden/A.Dietzinger, "Individualized Youth Biography? On the Discrepancy of Demands, Pretensions and Possibilities," ZEITSCHRIFT FUER PAEDAGOGIK, 30 (1984), pp 191-207.
63. Relevant suggestions at Lenz (note 54).
64. The designation of a press colloquium organized by the German Green Cross on 11 April 1985 in Bonn.
65. See the Labor Protection Encyclopedia of the International Labor Organization (ILO), quoted in WESTDEUTSCHE ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG, 12 February 1985.
66. According to Paul Fisher, ILO, at the above mentioned colloquium; see also interview with Dr Thomann in WELTGESUNDHEIT (March 1985) 3, pp 16-19.
67. F.-J.Land and H.Viefhues (note 55) provide a survey of the status of research.
68. See Bonss and others (note 61), p 156.
69. Among older unemployed people, so-called "reserve sicknesses" have been observed "during the phase of anticipation of unemployment"; see L.Pelzmann and others, "Anticipation of Unemployment," Bremen 1984 (manuscript), to be published in Th.Kieselbach/A.Wacker (note 49).

70. See D.Schwefel, "Unemployment, Health and Health Services, Results of German Unemployment Research. Report for the General Secretariat of the Council of Europe," Munich 1984 (manuscript).
71. See Th.Kieselbach (note 53), pp 8f, who refers to a study by S.Mannila and E.Lahelma, "Das Problematische Verhaeltnis Zwischen Arbeitslosigkeit und Gesundheit" [The Problematic Relation Between Unemployment and Health], Bremen 1984 (ibid).

11698

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ECONOMIC

FINLAND

LESS INTERLOCKING BETWEEN COMPANY BOARDS, GOVERNMENT LEADERS

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 10 Sep 85 p 29

[Article by Jaakko Hautamaki: "Minister Is Multijob Man"]

[Text] The Finnish capitalist has changed his mind.

Only about 10 years ago political kingpins were enticed onto enterprises' boards of directors, but now politicians are shooed away.

Information gathered from HELSINGIN SANOMAT correspondents indicates that Finland has chosen its own path.

Elsewhere a minister's participation in an enterprise's board of directors is generally forbidden by law.

In Finland, the participation of ministers in business life has become a political-moral issue. Perhaps ministers' memberships in the administrative organs of enterprises do not affect decisionmaking in the State Council, but they can affect trust.

State Council decisionmaking is not paralyzed by the fact that Defense Minister Veikko Pihlajamaki is on the advisory board of the Kauhava Cooperative Store. Urpo Leppanen has had his fill of business activity, but genuine kingpins at the enterprise level are also found on the State Council.

Ministers' links to the business world were brought up by Jaakko Lassila, president of the National Joint-Stock Bank. Lassila was nettled by the Finance Ministry's treatment of the law concerning tax exemption for bank deposits. In his opinion, a Gebhard spirit hovers in the ministry. The main target of his remarks was Finance Minister Ahti Pekkala, who is a member of the Tapiola advisory board, a member of the Ironworks, Inc, advisory board, a member of the Nordic Traffic, Inc, administrative board, chairman of the advisory board of OKL [Central Federation of Savings & Loans Associations], and president of the Haapavesi Cooperative Bank.

President Jaakko Lassila himself belongs to the administrative organs of about 30 Finnish enterprises.

Lassila would like to banish politicians from banks. For many politicians, membership in the administrative organs of banks means additional forces for the election campaign. Before the elections it is nice to hand out baseball gloves --paid for by the bank--to the teams in the election area. For an enterprise director, by the same token, membership in a bank's advisory board means knowledge that the enterprise can never collapse.

Only three ministers of the current State Council can sit in sessions in complete tranquillity. The others are forced to disqualify themselves from time to time. Education Minister Kaarina Suonio, Labor Minister Urpo Leppanen, and Culture Minister Gustav Bjorkstrand have left business life to others. Leppanen is so bound up with business life that he is still paying the bills for former business activity.

Taxell Is Involved in Numerous Things

Justice Minister Taxell is on the administrative board of Partek. Perhaps Minister Sakari T. Lehto wants a minister as his successor.

Taxell stresses that problems may arise, particularly on the municipal level, when powerful entrepreneurs and municipal politicians join forces. Right now Partek is an influential enterprise.

Taxell is also a member of the Finnish Steamship, Inc, administrative board, chairman of the Turku Savings Bank board of directors, and a member of the Stockmann, Inc, administrative board. At least with respect to the position on the board of directors, those who are envious can take comfort in the fact that the only benefits he reaps from it are two dinners a year.

In terms of local banks, Center Party politicians are often divided into savings-bank men and cooperative-bank men. Taxell is one of the savings-bank men on behalf of the Swedish People's Party.

Taxell also participates in the programs of the Swedish Art Society. The institution is not a business enterprise, but the groups to which it is linked include, for example, the Helsinki Joint-Stock Bank and HUFVUDSTADSBLADET.

Taxell emphasizes that no legal obstacles of any kind have been placed in the way of ministers' participation in business life. The possible challengeability of State Council members is always resolved in each individual case separately.

Does a minister's membership in the administrative organs of enterprises have an effect on decisionmaking?

"It is not allowed to have an effect. Whether it affects trust is something to think about."

Taxell's justification for his memberships is that familiarity with commercial and industrial life helps in making decisions. The notion forms part of the Swedish People's Party platform, and the same justification obviously also applies to the leftwing ministers.

"It is good to have experience in something besides politics," says Taxell.

Laine Often Between Rock and Hard Place

Foreign Trade Minister Jermu Laine frequently finds himself in embarrassing situations during State Council sessions. The chairman of Valmet's advisory board ends up disqualifying himself when, for example, requisitions of the Defense Forces or petitions for export licenses are discussed. Laine is also involved in the Economic Commission. According to the loose principles of the State Council, a member of an advisory board is not disqualified, but the chairman of an advisory board is. A member of an enterprise's administrative board is always disqualified.

Prime Minister Kalevi Sorsa is a member of the Postal Bank's administrative board and occasionally ends up disqualifying himself. He serves as chairman of the Finnair advisory board.

Foreign Affairs Minister Paavo Vayrynen is an advisory board member of Kemijoki, the Raisio Factories, and the Central Bank of Cooperative Banks. He is chairman of the Suomenmaa advisory board, but that fact causes no inconvenience for [State Council] sessions.

Tax Minister Pekka Vennamo is involved in Finnair and Tapiola. Agriculture and Forestry Minister Toivo Ylajarvi participates in Veikkaus [Betting]. Communications Minister Matti Luttinen is on the advisory board of Valvilla.

Environment Minister Matti Ahde can use the People's Tennis Turns as an advisory board member and attend the evening parties of Retirement Pay Assured. Minister of Social Affairs and Health Matti Puhakka is involved in Outokumpu, and Eeva Kuuskoski-Vikatmaa of the same ministry can work out at the Alko athletic house.

Interior Minister Kaisa Raatikainen is on the advisory board of Kemira.

Multijob Man Seppo Lindblom

The enterprise list of Minister of Trade and Industry Seppo Lindblom is long. He is on the Finnish Sugar advisory board, chairman of the Finnish Export Credit advisory board, a member of the Tervakoski advisory board, and insurance matters bring him close to Sampo.

A minister who declares himself disqualified does not withdraw from the session. He is simply just silent. Matters in the government proceed quickly because the duration of the final decisionmaking is, for the most part, precisely as long as the speech of the presenting functionary.

There exists one situation in which the disqualifications fly around the meeting room. Once a year "clown money" is distributed. Nearly every minister sits on the board of directors of some association receiving money.

Taxell's better half sits on the board of directors of a home for the aged in Turku, and the head of the household ends up disqualifying himself when the home for the aged receives its allotment.

As the new chairman of his party, Taxell does not know yet whether his party will receive money, for example, from Partek, which is often linked to the Swedish-language districts of capital. "Quite honestly I do not know. I take care of politics, not money."

Is the Justice Minister's position somewhat delicate?

"I have thought about the matter for a long time. I do not shrink away from the debate which has arisen. Strictly from the viewpoint of politics, one should not be involved in anything, but, on the other hand, it is good to get personal experience."

Taxell does not consider politicians' participation a problem. "Then again, I am disqualified from giving an opinion on this subject, as my own experiences color my viewpoint. If the public debate shows that a crisis of confidence has arisen, then..."

The debate may shift next to the position of leading functionaries.

Attorney General Kai Korte is following the disqualifiers on the State Council. According to Korte, the ministers' participation in business life is a political-moral question. The matter is formulated more precisely by the administrative procedure law.

12327

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ECONOMIC

GREECE

GOVERNMENT BOOSTS PRICE OF FERTILIZERS

Athens TO VIMA in Greek 27 Sep 85 p 17

[Text] Fertilizer prices are rising by 30%. This is what the minister of agriculture announced yesterday, declaring that this increase was decided on for the following reasons:

1. Total consumption of fertilizers in our country is around 2,100,000 tons. About 92% of which is manufactured by Greek industries while the remaining 8% is covered by imports. But even for the fertilizers manufactured in our country, up to 80% of the raw materials have to be imported from abroad. Thus the value of the imported raw material in relation to the total cost of domestic fertilizers is around 65%. The average rise in the prices of imported raw materials during the last two years was approximately 50%.

2. However, aside from the rising prices of raw materials, from 1983 to the present we had the increased costs of energy, labor, interest rates, etc., well known to all. A result of those increases is the rise in the manufacturing costs of fertilizers, which in 1985 will be over 60%, approximately.

3. As is known, fertilizers are subsidized. Every year the State takes in far less than the amounts it pays out to manufacturers for the value of fertilizers. In recent years this deficit has evolved as follows: in 1980, approximately 7 billion drachmas; in 1981, approximately 12 billion drachmas; in 1982, approximately 16 billion drachmas; in 1983, approximately 20 billion drachmas; in 1984, approximately 25 billion drachmas; in 1985, approximately 35 billion drachmas.

This deficit is in fact a form of subsidy to farmers so they can purchase their fertilizers at prices much lower than manufacturing and distributing costs.

From the foregoing data it can be inferred that this year as well subsidies for all types of fertilizers will again exceed 50% of their cost.

12278
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ECONOMIC

GREECE

TRADE BALANCE TILTS IN FAVOR OF TURKEY

Athens TO VIMA in Greek 29 Sep 85 p 9

[Article by Alkis Kourkoulas: "Turkish Products Invade Greece"]

[Text] Istanbul 29 September - Turkish exports to Greece rose by 68% in the first 4 months of '85, whereas in the first 5 months of the same year Greek exports to Turkey decreased by 11.4%.

This picture, which emerges from data published by the Turkish statistical services, becomes even grimmer for Greece if we add to it the great sluggishness in touristic exchanges between the two countries and the harsh competition on international markets.

In the first quarter of '85 Turkish exports to Greece reached \$39.7 million. Whereas during the same period of 1983 they were \$20.7 million.

For the first 5 months of '85 Greek exports to Turkey reached \$16 million, whereas during the same period of '84 they were \$17.8 million.

In the first quarter of '85 Turkey exported to Greece 65,000 tons of light petroleum worth \$14.8 million, kerosene worth \$5.8 million, canned seafood worth \$4.9 million, fish worth \$1.9 million, shrimp, walnuts, dried fruit, magnesium, cotton, synthetic fabrics, carpentry products, copper wire and other products totalling \$12.3 million.

Greek exports to Turkey for the first 5 months of '85 consisted of steel industry products worth \$7.9 million, phosphorus oxide for \$1.2 million and various qualities of paper worth \$960,000.

In the field of tourism, 179,284 Greeks visited Turkey in 1984, leaving foreign currency estimated at around \$40 million, whereas in 1985 the number of tourists is expected to exceed 200,000 and the foreign currency \$50 million.

Consular authorities in Greece estimate the number of Turkish visitors to Greece at about 12,000 for 1984, while for 1985 they estimate that they will increase to 14,000. The exceptionally large figure of Turks coming to Greece is due to the restrictions imposed on Turks travelling abroad. For every trip abroad, each individual must pay the equivalent of \$100. An exception is made for those who travel to Northern Cyprus, who have to pay only \$25.

According to VIMA calculations, the trade balance with Turkey (imports, exports, tourism) will show a deficit in 1985 of the order of \$170 million to the disadvantage of Greece.

In order to project a more complete picture of Greek-Turkish economic relations, we also have to take into account the data originating from the harsh competition between similar Greek and Turkish products on international markets. According to tables of the International Monetary Fund, Greek exports compare with Turkish ones as follows:

- Greek exports to the Near East and North Africa showed a decline in the period 1980 to 1984, and from \$1 billion in '80 they fell to \$750,000 in '84, whereas Turkish exports climbed from \$400,000 in '80 to \$2.6 billion in '84.

- Greek exports to the United States during the same period declined from \$384,000 in '80 to \$383,00 in '84, whereas Turkish exports went from \$187,000 to \$48,400.

- The same picture also emerges in the exports of both countries to Western European countries. Undoubtedly this kind of data requires a much more careful and complex analysis. But the trade deficit to Greece's detriment thus shown is due in large measure to the administrative measures of Turkish authorities (restrictions on Turkish tourists) and to aggressive trade practices (subsidizing of exports, prices, dumping and so on). After all this, how is one to interpret the threats hurled by the Turkish premier of imposing an embargo on the Greek merchant marine?

12278

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ECONOMIC

PORTUGAL

POLL RESULTS ON PUBLIC ATTITUDES TOWARD WORK, EMPLOYMENT

Self-Employment Preferred

Lisbon SEMANARIO in Portuguese 17 Aug 85 pp 12-13

[Article by Jose Pedro Barreto]

[Excerpt] Work and employment in Portugal were the subject matter for a NORMA poll investigating Portuguese attitudes toward that duality. How long would you like to work every day? Where would you like to do it? What kind of work do you prefer? Those are the essential questions flowing from the first and basic question: if you could or had the choice, would you choose to work or not?

Work, and not Just a Little

And here is where the sampling has caught you in its net, dear reader: you go around bad-mouthing life, but you would not know what to do with your hypothetical freedom not to work at all: 85.8 percent of those polled in six Portuguese cities would prefer to work. And not just a little: given a choice as to the number of working hours per day, the majority (67.3 percent) chose 5 to 8 hours per day (only 1 percent chose "none"). Don't tell me you agree with those who say that the only people who work are those who don't know how to do anything else. One thing is certain: you flatly reject the exotic idea that work is anything we don't like to do. You like work.

The problem is that you are employed in the wrong spot. The fact is that the majority (60.6 percent) would prefer to be self-employed. It should be added that the preference for working for someone else (19.1 percent) is stronger than the longing for a cooperative system. You are among those for whom it is all or nothing. Unfortunately, most people (35.1 percent) work for someone else--and pensioners make up the second-largest group (23.7 percent). Only 10.7 percent work for themselves. Does this mean that about 50 percent of you are frustrated? Don't be discouraged. Just look at your cup as being half full instead of half empty.

All in all, you are a person who appreciates thought and reflection, because if you could, and if you could earn the same amount of money, you would choose

intellectual work, although only by a small margin (49.4 percent compared to 42 percent preferring manual labor). That is why you consider it ideal to work in an office (47.7 percent) rather than on a farm (16.9 percent) or in a factory (13.8 percent) and, above all, never at home (0.8 percent). You already spend enough time at home. But that is a subject for another poll.

Now something else: while the burden of breadwinning falls on the man (because the burden of working in general is also another subject), he is the one least likely to choose it if given the choice: 86.2 percent of the women would choose to work, compared to 85.4 percent of the men--those lazy bums. By age group, those between the ages of 18 and 44 are the ones most eager for the idle life (84.6 percent would like to work, whereas the figure rises to 87 percent among those over 45 years of age). And be it known to you, middle-class reader, that you are the one least interested in working (85 percent). In the upper classes, the figure rises to 86.7 percent, while in the lower classes it reaches 91.3 percent.

Male Intellectual

The typical citizen choosing to work from 5 to 8 hours per day is a woman over 45 years of age and belonging, in this instance, to the middle class. But it is men who prefer self-employment involving intellectual work in an office. A larger percentage of women prefer manual labor in a factory--and therefore, logically, they prefer to work for someone else.

To conclude, where do you think you would find the most people choosing to work rather than remain idle? The answer is Evora (93 percent). You weren't expecting that. It is also in that city in Alentejo that most people would choose to work from 5 to 8 hours per day. On the other hand, Vila Real is the city where most people long to work for themselves and in an office. When it comes to the place where intellectual work is preferred, you are correct, dear reader: Coimbra sets the example.

But don't draw any hasty conclusions from all this. Take the trouble--work again--to read the tables published below and see whether you recognize yourself there. Forgive us for discussing this laborious subject while you are part of another majority: the one on vacation. But take careful note: it is set down here in writing that you prefer work to doing nothing. Be calm: it will soon be time for you to come back to work. Until then, be careful not to get worked up. Be self-relaxed instead of self-employed. Do as little as possible--and then rest a bit.

Technical Data

Universe: Portuguese population over 18 years of age and residing in the cities of Coimbra, Evora, Lisbon, Porto, Vila Real, and Viseu. Sample: 609 individuals. Sampling: random, stratified by city with nonproportional imputation. Selection: homes selected by the random route method, with the individual within each home being selected by the Kish method. Technique: Direct personal interviews using a

structured questionnaire at the interviewee's residence. Sampling points: six cities within which starting points were selected. Fieldwork: Interviews conducted during the period between 18 and 26 July 1985. Margin of error: in total, ± 4 percent with a confidence interval of 95 percent. For P = 50 percent. Polling institute: the poll was conducted by NORMA, Inc., the Portuguese member of Gallup International.

Poll results	Cities					
	Total	Coimbra	Evora	Lisbon	Porto	Vila Real
	10,356	598	317	6,625	2,571	94

Evora: Greatest Desire To Work

If I could or were free, I would choose to:

Work	85.8	92.2	93.0	86.7	81.0	89.5	87.4
Not work	13.3	7.0	6.0	13.3	16.1	8.9	10.9
Don't know	0.6	0.8	-	-	2.3	1.5	0.9
No answer	0.2	-	1.0	-	0.6	-	0.8

Lisbon: Many Prefer Part-Time Work

I would like to work this many hours per day:

1-2 hours	2.2	4.9	1.0	1.7	2.5	15.1	5.9
3-4 hours	20.7	15.0	9.0	22.3	19.9	20.8	9.2
5-8 hours	67.3	74.0	85.4	69.5	57.8	64.0	73.7
9-12 hours	1.3	2.1	1.4	1.2	1.2	-	5.1
All	0.4	-	-	0.6	-	-	-
None	1.0	0.8	-	1.2	1.0	-	-
No answer	7.1	3.3	3.3	3.6	17.6	-	6.0

Vila Real: Not Interested in Working for Others

I think the ideal thing would be to work:

For myself	60.6	73.8	46.9	57.3	66.5	80.2	70.5
For someone else	19.1	13.4	28.5	17.6	23.5	6.4	20.6
Cooperative system	12.6	8.1	18.5	16.3	4.2	6.2	3.3
No answer	7.7	4.7	6.1	8.8	5.8	7.2	5.5

Porto and Coimbra: No one Wants To Stay Home

If I could, I would prefer to work:

On a farm	16.9	20.3	14.8	19.0	10.0	11.7	21.1
In a factory	13.8	10.5	24.1	10.7	20.8	15.0	22.0
In an office	47.7	60.0	35.8	46.5	49.4	66.4	39.1
At home	0.8	-	-	1.2	-	-	2.7
At a school/teaching	0.5	-	2.8	0.6	-	-	-
No preference	12.9	5.6	5.4	16.1	7.6	4.4	11.6
No answer	7.4	3.6	17.1	5.9	11.4	2.3	3.5

Total	Sex		Age		Socioeconomic class		
	M	F	18-44	45+	A-B Upper	C Middle	D Lower
10,356	4,920	5,437	4,960	5,397	3,351	6,539	467

Let the Young People Work!

If I could or were free, I would choose to:

Work	85.8	85.4	86.2	84.6	87.0	86.7	85.0	91.3
Not work	13.3	13.4	13.3	15.3	11.6	13.3	13.7	8.7
Don't know	0.6	1.2	0.1	-	1.2	-	1.0	-
No answer	0.2	-	0.3	-	0.3	-	0.3	-

Older People Set the Example

I would like to work this many hours per day:

1-2 hours	2.2	2.2	2.2	2.8	1.7	1.9	2.3	3.5
3-4 hours	20.7	19.5	21.7	27.0	14.8	26.9	16.0	41.8
5-8 hours	67.3	66.6	68.0	63.5	70.8	66.5	68.6	54.8
9-12 hours	1.3	2.7	-	-	2.5	1.0	1.6	-
All	0.4	-	0.7	-	0.7	-	0.6	-
None	1.0	-	2.0	2.1	-	2.4	0.4	-
No answer	7.1	8.9	5.4	4.4	9.5	1.3	10.5	-

Middle Class: Down With Bosses!

I think the ideal thing would be to work:

For myself	60.6	62.9	58.5	67.5	54.3	67.6	57.2	58.8
For someone else	19.1	15.0	22.8	16.0	21.9	12.6	22.1	24.0
Cooperative system	12.6	16.1	9.5	10.1	15.0	13.3	13.2	-
No answer	7.7	6.0	9.1	6.4	8.8	6.6	7.5	17.2

The Poor Ready for any Job

If I could, I would prefer to work:

On a farm	16.9	23.6	10.8	15.2	18.5	25.8	12.8	10.9
In a factory	13.8	12.9	14.5	9.3	17.9	8.5	16.8	9.2
In an office	47.7	47.6	47.9	54.7	41.3	50.7	49.0	9.0
At home	0.8	-	1.5	-	1.5	-	0.7	8.5
In school/teaching	0.5	-	0.8	0.1	0.8	-	0.7	-
No preference	12.9	9.4	16.1	13.4	12.5	7.8	13.2	45.3
No answer	7.4	6.3	8.4	7.3	7.5	7.1	6.9	17.3

Total Coimbra Evora Lisbon Porto Vila Real Viseu

Unemployment Highest in Porto

Occupation	Total	Coimbra	Evora	Lisbon	Porto	Vila Real	Viseu
Self-employed	10.3	23.3	14.3	9.3	9.5	11.7	7.9
Work for employer	35.1	34.7	42.3	40.8	19.8	35.1	34.9
Student	7.7	13.9	4.6	6.8	8.8	12.5	11.0
Unemployed	7.6	0.8	5.2	3.5	20.4	2.0	4.9
Retired	23.7	11.7	24.7	25.4	21.8	28.0	28.5
No answer	15.6	17.7	9.0	14.2	19.7	10.7	12.7

Intellectuals Are in Coimbra

If I could and would earn the same, I would prefer:							
Intellectual work	49.4	65.2	35.7	53.9	36.7	53.5	27.0
Manual work	42.0	24.4	62.2	38.5	51.5	39.7	60.3
Don't know	3.4	6.3	1.0	4.0	1.1	0.7	7.3
No answer	5.3	4.1	1.0	3.6	10.7	6.1	5.4
Total polled	609	100	101	110	98	100	100

Socioeconomic
class

Total	Sex		Age		Socioeconomic class		
	M	F	18-44	45+	A-B Upper	C Middle	D Lower

Women Work Only for Others

Occupation	Total	Coimbra	Evora	Lisbon	Porto	Vila Real	Viseu
Self-employed	10.3	14.3	6.8	9.4	11.1	14.6	6.4
Work for employer	35.1	35.8	34.6	53.1	18.7	42.9	23.6
Student	7.7	7.5	8.0	16.2	-	11.9	6.2
Unemployed	7.6	11.6	4.0	11.5	4.0	0.9	10.4
Retired	23.7	29.6	18.4	0.1	45.4	20.1	24.5
No answer	15.6	1.6	28.3	9.7	21.0	9.9	18.5

The Rich Pull for Intelligence

If I could and would earn the same, I would prefer:							
Intellectual work	45.4	60.8	39.0	55.3	43.9	74.7	39.8
Manual work	42.0	32.9	50.1	35.7	47.7	20.7	50.8
Don't know	3.4	2.1	4.5	3.3	3.4	1.3	4.2
No answer	5.3	4.2	6.3	5.7	5.0	3.2	5.2
Total polled	609	241	368	314	295	156	419

Choices in Employment

Lisbon SEMANARIO in Portuguese 24 Aug 85 pp 10-11

[Text] Feeling comfortable is something everyone longs for. And contributing greatly to such a feeling is one's choice of the activity that fills at least one-third of our lives: our occupational activity. Do most Portuguese feel comfortable? As far as occupations go, the picture is not great. While most of them had the privilege of freely

choosing it, the fact is that while their choice was not unfortunate, neither was it permanent. In general, they would like to make a change and open up new horizons. Whether from dissatisfaction, a desire to escape monotony, a lack of self-realization, or simply restiveness, a good number of us--especially the women--would like to pack our briefcases some fine morning and try something else.

But what? In Portugal, there is still a great fascination with the "sheepskin"--for the title of doctor, engineer, and so on. Only the oldest--those over 45 years of age--seem to have realized that between a sheepskin and the opportunities open to a skilled worker, the latter are the best. And as for being an employer or businessman, few people in Portugal aspire to that, although it is one of the ideals of the middle class. For those who were unable to choose the occupation they currently have--and they total about 30 percent, mostly in the lowest class--material difficulties were the chief obstacle. And those difficulties affect primarily women and young people.

Material Difficulties Prevent Choice

Freedom to choose one's occupation is curtailed considerably as one descends further on the socioeconomic ladder. Upper-class men over 45 years of age are the most successful in this respect, and Coimbra is the city where most of them are to be found. The most constraint in choosing an occupation is felt by women and young people.

Material difficulties are by far the main factor preventing such a choice, and those difficulties affect primarily women and--again--the city of Coimbra. Family pressure, on the other hand, which is cited as the second reason, is exerted on the male population in the lowest classes and the oldest age group.

That pressure is felt most strongly in Evora. It should also be noted that a significant number (27.4 percent) did not answer this question.

Did you freely choose your current occupation?

Answer	Total	Sex		Age		Socioeconomic class		
		M	F	18-44	45+	A-B Upper	C Middle	D Lower
Yes	72.1	75.9	67.9	67.5	81.0	86.6	62.6	52.2
No	27.8	23.9	32.1	32.4	18.9	13.3	37.3	47.8
No answer		0.2					0.1	
Number not choosing their occupation	1,307	585	722	1,004	302	255	985	67
The reason was:								
Material difficulties	58.8	47.1	68.3	60.6	53.1	64.7	58.0	48.5
Family pressure	7.3	14.0	1.8	1.9	25.1	2.4	6.0	44.5
Other	6.5	1.5	10.6	7.6	3.2	3.8	7.2	7.0
No answer	27.4	37.4	19.2	30.0	18.6	29.1	28.8	

Did you freely choose your current occupation?

Answer	Total	City					
		Coimbra	Evora	Lisbon	Porto	Vila Real	Viseu
Yes	72.1	75.2	68.2	73.2	68.6	69.2	53.8
No	27.8	24.8	30.1	26.8	31.4	27.5	46.2
No answer			1.7			3.3	
Number not choosing their occupation	1,307	83	54	891	327	12	30
The reason was:							
Material difficulties	58.8	71.2	31.9	62.9	47.5	26.4	55.3
Family pressure	7.3	8.8	30.3		25.1	29.9	27.1
Other	6.5	20.0	23.3		21.2	17.2	13.2
No answer	27.4		14.5	37.1	6.1	26.4	4.5

Being a Doctor the Dream

Being a doctor, engineer, or lawyer--that is the dream filling the heads of most Portuguese when they think of their occupation. But with one important exception: those over 45 years of age feel that in Portugal, it is better to be a skilled worker--perhaps because the idea of having a sheepskin loses its mystique as one matures. The desire to be a businessman, which is especially noticeable in the middle class, is only in the middle place. The lower class does not want to hear about being a businessmen. As far as it is concerned, there is nothing like being a doctor or an engineer, and this is especially true in Viseu. On the other hand, few people yearn to be a middle-level executive. Who says the Portuguese are wishy-washy?

Do you feel that in Portugal, it is best to be a ...?

Answer	Total	Sex		Age		Socioeconomic class		
		M	F	18-44	45+	A-B	C	D
						Upper	Middle	Lower
Doctor, engineer, lawyer	31.5	34.6	28.2	30.3	33.9	37.0	25.3	73.6
Skilled worker	28.8	33.1	24.1	23.1	40.0	31.5	27.2	21.3
Businessman, employer	21.3	23.7	18.7	24.1	16.1	16.2	26.2	0.9
Middle-level executive	3.4	1.5	5.4	3.2	3.7	6.6	1.0	3.3
No opinion	9.7	4.1	15.8	11.9	5.5	0.7	16.8	0.9
No answer	5.2	3.0	7.6	7.4	0.9	8.0	3.5	

Answer	Total	City					
		Coimbra	Evora	Lisbon	Porto	Vila Real	Viseu
Doctor, engineer, lawyer	31.5	34.8	28.8	33.0	23.2	24.3	48.6
Skilled worker	28.8	34.2	36.0	24.2	46.8	11.5	18.1
Businessman, employer	21.3	22.4	13.4	22.2	17.0	47.1	25.2
Middle-level executive	3.4	2.5	5.3	2.3	7.8	5.0	3.9
No opinion	9.7	4.7	16.5	11.4	3.3	10.5	4.3
No answer	5.2	1.4		6.8	1.9	1.7	

Women Want Change

Viseu is the city where the most people are dissatisfied with their present occupation. A longing for change characterizes a little over half (52.5 percent) of those polled, and it is particularly noticeable among young people in the middle class. And among women. But there are many who have adjusted to their job and their situation. The tendency to want to change reverses itself after the age of 45, especially among the lower classes (73 percent). The majority of the rich are also content.

Would you change your occupation if you could?

Answer	Total	Sex		Age		Socioeconomic class		
		M	F	18-44	45+	A-B	C	D
				Upper	Middle	Lower		
Yes	52.5	52.1	53.0	59.7	38.6	41.5	61.9	26.5
No	47.4	47.7	47.0	40.2	61.2	58.5	37.9	73.5
No answer	0.1	0.2			0.2		0.2	

Answer	Total	City					
		Coimbra	Evora	Lisbon	Porto	Vila Real	Viseu
Yes	52.5	49.9	45.2	55.3	42.3	56.2	61.9
No	47.4	50.1	53.1	44.7	57.7	40.5	35.9
No answer	0.1		1.7			3.3	2.2

Learning New Things

Since the lower class is the group most content with its current activity, that is where the desire for specialization predominates, and this is true especially of the men. But while older people are the ones with the least desire to change (see the table above), it is the young people who are most interested in improving their skills in their current occupation, whether they like that occupation or not. And it is the middle class, especially in Lisbon, that shows the greatest desire to open up new horizons by learning something new.

If you had the opportunity, would you like to...?

Answer	Total	Sex		Age		Socioeconomic class		
		M	F	18-44	45+	A-B	C	D
				Upper	Middle	Lower		
Specialize more	35.1	39.3	30.6	37.6	30.3	39.9	29.6	73.5
Learn new things	59.0	52.6	65.9	58.6	59.7	50.0	67.2	25.5
No answer	5.9	8.1	3.6	3.8	10.0	10.1	3.2	1.0

Answer	Total	City					
		Coimbra	Evora	Lisbon	Porto	Vila Real	Viseu
Specialize more	35.1	52.3	41.1	31.4	40.2	40.5	56.9
Learn new things	59.0	41.6	55.5	62.8	52.5	51.3	41.0
No answer	5.9	6.0	3.4	5.8	7.3	8.2	2.2

Retirement? No, Thanks!

At what age would you like to retire? Never—that was the overwhelming response from those polled by NORMA. Portuguese like to work, and they want to work right up until the end. Unless, of course, their attitude reflects a distrust of pensions and familiarity with how meager those pensions are. Of those stating a preferred age for retirement, the following characteristics can be noted: young men in the middle class prefer the earliest age stated in the question: between 40 and 45. And it is women over 45 who prefer to retire at the latest age: between 65 and 70. The traditional age of 60 to 65 is preferred by older men at the lowest socioeconomic level.

At what age would you like to retire?

Answer	Total	Sex		Age		Socioeconomic class		
		M	F	18-44	45+	A-B Upper	C Middle	D Lower
40-45	11.4	14.9	8.2	22.1	1.6	7.1	14.4	0.6
45-50	20.1	21.1	19.2	33.3	8.0	24.6	18.9	4.5
50-55	30.9	29.9	31.7	38.3	24.0	32.5	31.1	16.1
55-60	36.3	34.0	38.5	25.4	46.4	34.5	35.1	66.0
60-65	37.1	38.3	35.9	25.5	47.7	37.4	35.3	58.9
65-70	16.5	22.4	11.1	12.9	19.7	20.8	13.9	20.5
No answer	13.6	7.2	19.5	7.8	19.0	16.3	13.2	0.3
Never	85.8	92.8	79.5	91.9	80.3	83.7	86.0	99.7

	Total	City					
		Coimbra	Evora	Lisbon	Porto	Vila Real	Viseu
40-45	11.4	5.5	8.6	7.8	22.5	8.3	11.5
45-50	20.1	21.5	18.4	19.6	20.8	19.5	26.7
50-55	30.9	37.3	26.9	31.5	27.2	36.2	43.7
55-60	36.3	43.0	44.6	40.6	21.5	53.0	45.8
60-65	37.1	32.7	56.3	42.5	21.7	38.7	37.0
65-70	16.5	11.8	17.3	16.0	19.1	5.9	16.2
No answer	13.6	17.7	1.0	13.6	15.3	4.1	1.6
Never	85.8	80.0	99.0	85.8	84.7	95.9	98.4

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ECONOMIC

SPAIN

SPAIN'S SOLCHAGA PRESENTS 1986 STATE BUDGETS

PM211345 Madrid EL PAIS in Spanish 2 Oct 85 p 51

[Unattributed report: "Solchaga States That Government's Economic Policy Will Find Few Allies in Country's Social Groups"]

[Text] Madrid -- "These budgets are stringent and solidary," Minister of the Economy and Finance Carlos Solchaga stated yesterday at the presentation to the press of the draft submitted to the Cortes on the previous day. However, he admitted that "they cannot find too many allies among the country's social groups." He stressed that, although criticisms of the draft will intensify throughout the parliamentary debate, the government is aware that the line of austerity followed is the best course for recovery, and that growth of private activity is now more necessary than increased public investment.

The two basic aims of economic policy reflected in the draft budgets are confined to promoting the conditions for reviving investment and the creation of employment, as well as continuity in the struggle against inflation. The minister explained that the "undeniable progress achieved, acknowledged even by some international bodies, is not consolidated." The improvement achieved in our economy's competitiveness, with a 4 percent fall in output unit costs, requires maintaining vigilance over inflation, because the EEC countries -- "our partners" -- are also achieving a similar reduction in prices, and "have lower rates."

Next year will be another fiscal year of adjustment, with the hope that the recovery of the private sector will make possible an expansion of the economy. If this does not happen, he said, the advantage will be that enterprises will have a more consolidated production structure and be better prepared to compete when expansion is begun.

Temptation of Expenditure

The Spanish economy's operating parameters defined by the minister are: a lower level of inflation; greater competitiveness as a result of wage restraint and the reduction of production costs; the considerable increase that is forecast "for the third consecutive year" in the business surplus; and a situation of falling energy prices with a more favorable exchange rate for the peseta.

This scenario will make it possible to achieve growth of 2.5 percent next year, with an increase of 1.6 percent in private consumption and 0.5 percent in public consumption (as against the 2.5 percent forecast this year). The government also expects a strong revival of exports, with a 5 percent increase (3 percent more than this year), although, in return, imports will increase by 4 percent.

According to Solchaga, when defining these aims, the government "shunned the temptation to stimulate the economy: by resorting to expenditure, because that would be to jeopardize the clear signs of recovery experienced this year. As instances he cited the appreciable fall in the rate of destruction of employment, the 10 percent growth in investments in capital goods, and the recovery also displayed by the construction sector. According to Solchaga, budgetary laxity would bring about greater apparent activity, but would unavoidably cause a revival of inflation and unemployment.

In the policy adopted, the recovery of the private sector and the freeing of funds for its expansion required a reduction of the public deficit, whose financing costs "are becoming worrying." The two possible solutions were greater revenue, which would result in an increased tax burden, or lower expenditure, intensifying budgetary austerity.

An increase in the tax burden was rejected, since with the wage restraint envisaged in the Economic and Social Agreement, it would bring about a reduction of real incomes, and hence a fall in private consumption. According to Solchaga, consideration of tax justice also carried weight, to the effect of not increasing taxes on those who are already paying and promoting an increase in state revenue by means of inspection and better tax management. On the contrary, the urgent measures adopted in April have resulted in a reduction of the rate of income tax, bringing about fall in state revenue by this means of 150 billion pesetas, and the correction of the discrimination in the cases of the accumulation of incomes through marriage.

Public Investment

The sharp fall in public investment next year was explained by the minister as the necessary reflection on its desirability at present. [sentence as published] According to his reasoning, any public investment represents a growth in current state expenditure for the future. He gave as instances the schools which, once built, requires the payment of the teachers' salaries, or a hospital's running expenses.

The government's stance has been to make the contributions necessary to maintain public investments that are under way, while restricting to the utmost the initiation of new investments, despite the "electoral attractions" of the next fiscal year, in order to avoid projecting increases in expenditure into the future. The beneficial effect of public investment on employment could be made up for by the impetus to private activity which could be provided by the state bodies' increase in consumption.

The next fiscal year ushers in a new state account -- the so-called Budget B -- which contains the accounts between Spain and the EEC as a result of entry. The value-added tax (VAT) -- a new fiscal instrument comprising most of the consumption taxes -- will also enter into force from 1 January. The government believes that the degree of reorganization already accomplished makes it possible to face "calmly but not without concern" the inflationary factor in VAT, limited officially to 1.5 percent or 2 percent on the consumer price index.

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ENERGY

EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

NORDIC COUNTRIES' ENERGY CONSUMPTION INCREASED IN 1984

Helsinki UUSI SUOMI in Finnish 30 Aug 85 p 19

[Article: "Nordic Countries' Electricity Consumption Grew 7 Percent; Consumption Increase Fastest in Finland"]

[Text] Last year electricity consumption in the Nordic countries rose 7 percent on the average. The increase was fastest in Finland and smallest in Iceland, it emerges from the annual report of NORDEL, a Nordic agency for cooperation in the electric power field.

The Nordic countries altogether consumed 285 billion kilowatt-hours of electricity last year, one-sixth of it in Finland. Two-thirds of the Nordic countries' electricity was furnished by water power and not quite one-fourth by nuclear power. A good one-tenth was generated by counterpressure and other thermal power.

Finland's electricity consumption increased 8.3 percent and was 48.5 terawatt-hours. Nearly the same growth, or 8 percent, was achieved by Sweden. The pace was slower in the other Nordic countries.

Electricity exchange between the Nordic countries was nearly 15 billion kilowatt-hours all told in the year 1984. Norway was the biggest exporter and Denmark the biggest importer.

Last year Finland imported 1.5 terawatt-hours of electricity from Sweden and 4.1 terawatt-hours from the Soviet Union. Finland exported 0.4 terawatt-hours of electricity to Sweden.

More than five-sixths of Finland's electricity is furnished by nuclear, water, and counterpressure power. Nuclear power's share of electricity production was 41 percent last year, water power's share was 31 percent, and counterpressure power's share was 24 percent.

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ENERGY

FINLAND

GOVERNMENT URGED TO REACH EARLY DECISION ON NUCLEAR UNIT

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 9 Sep 85 p 2

[Editorial: "Stand on Nuclear Power Must Be Developed Soon"]

[Text] Already at the start of the 1980s the electric companies, supported by industry, hoped for a decision in principle on a new nuclear power plant. The Ministry of Trade and Industry, however, wanted to postpone the decision for a few years. Those few years have now elapsed, and industry has again turned to the government and made serious demands for swift solutions. In industry's view, the government is taking a big risk if it postpones the decision.

Industry's demand is based on growing figures of electricity consumption and on pressures aimed at raising the price of electricity. When these are combined with investment schemes on the table, new basic power will obviously be needed as early as the beginning of the 1990s. One thousand megawatts of nuclear power are on the list of wishes. The capacity corresponds on the average to the electricity needed by 10 new papermaking machines.

If no immediate rebounds take place in economic development, postponement of a decision on the nuclear power plant is a genuine risk. The 1990s are so close at hand that future production conditions can be forecast with considerable accuracy. The alternative is to compromise on economic growth, which is an idea clearly alien to most of society.

When the power-plant decision was postponed not that long ago, one legitimate reason was the desire to protect the new Parliament from arriving at a solution without a knowledge of energy economics. The years of apprenticeship are now far enough behind for one to assume that the Parliament has matured into a power-plant decisionmaker. Formally, the government still has the power to decide, but the point is to hear the Parliament out in the solution if the decision is to be made before the new nuclear energy law goes into effect.

Pressures on the government and Parliament are increasing rapidly. A standpoint in principle on nuclear power is needed without a moment's delay if we want to put even a little faith in the expertise of industry and electrical power plants.

Nor on the horizon are there any innovations in energy technology which would make the solution easier in the near future. For that reason as well we should no longer bury our heads, ostrichlike, in the sand. Industry needs to know what the energy-related conditions will be like in the 1990s--whether a new nuclear power plant is built or not.

ENERGY

FINLAND

OIL COMPANY OFFICIAL SEES LITTLE EFFECT FROM USSR PROBLEMS

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 13 Sep 85 p 37

[Article: "Fixed Amount of Finished Oil Products from Soviet Union"]

[Text] Porvoo--Difficulties with deliveries of the Soviet Union's crude oil do not affect the import of Finnish Petroleum's finished oil products. This year Finnish Petroleum will import stocks of oil products in accordance with long-term agreements.

In keeping with this year's quota, Finland will import at most 1.3 million tons of diesel oil and 1.4 million tons of heavy fuel oil. The total amount is at least 2.5 million tons.

Kyosti Tiainen, director of Teboil, says that deliveries of the early part of the year were adhered to in full. There are surpluses rather than shortages in the deliveries of the forepart of the year. "It is our opinion that the import of finished oil products is being managed in the manner provided by the agreements," believes Tiainen.

More finished oil products are imported into Finland than corresponding products are sold by Neste for export. Neste exported 2.2 million tons last year, and Finnish Petroleum imported 2.5 million tons. The import of refined oil products is managed by Finnish Petroleum, and the sister enterprise Teboil markets the products further.

There were difficulties with deliveries during the very cold weather last winter. Imports in January and February were slower than forecast, but the shortages were made up for during the spring and summer and even partly exceeded.

The Rotterdam price level has been applied for over 10 years in the deliveries of finished oil products. In practice, the price level is determined in accordance with the world market prices announced by the paper PLATT'S OILGRAM. On the other hand, they may fluctuate considerably in conformity with advance expectations; nor does the supply-and-demand situation need to have a direct impact on the price level.

A price-equalization system, in accordance with which the fluctuation in import prices is leveled off, was used in Finland up until the spring of last year. When the price of finished fuel oil imported into Finland was higher than Neste's refinery price, the difference was paid to Finnish Petroleum out of the import trade fund.

The system was abandoned last spring and, in keeping with the new agreement, Neste paid Finnish Petroleum, to some extent afterwards, 252 million marks as compensation. The price of heavy fuel oil was then at times higher than the domestic selling price. The domestic price level of heavy fuel oil has risen since then, and the world market price has dropped. This year the agreement between Neste, Finnish Petroleum, and the Ministry of Trade and Industry has rattled in the opposite direction.

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ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES

FINLAND

ACID RAIN BELIEVED RESPONSIBLE FOR GROUND WATERS' CONTAMINATION

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 12 Oct 85 p 10

[Article: "Ground Waters Worsening Due to Acidification"]

[Text] The vast majority of heavy metals found in ground water originate from the air and not from the soil. Because of the acidification of the environment, the quality of Finland's ground waters has already deteriorated even in clean areas.

So says Licentiate in Philosophy Jouko Soveri in his dissertation, which was examined on Friday at Turku University. The subject of the dissertation was the effect of the thaw on the quantity and quality of ground water.

The study is based on measurements which were conducted in 54 stations of the Water Administration in various parts of the country. The stations are located in areas found in their natural state. From them it is possible to obtain background data which can be compared with data obtained from polluted areas. Approximately 200,000 observations are accumulated in a year's time. The material in Soveri's study was accumulated primarily in the years 1975--1981. The material was supplemented with observations from the years 1982, 1983, and 1984.


Soveri's study is partially connected with the acidification project being accomplished by the Environmental Ministry. The study attempts to determine how much air pollution ends up in ground waters in connection with snow and the spring thaw of the frost. Approximately 15--40 percent of the precipitation in Finland comes in the form of snow.

The snow cover is a natural collector of sedimentation, in which impurities from the air become stratified, says Soveri. He has developed a procedure by which average monthly sedimentation rates are measured.

"The procedure is inexpensive and easy to use. In my opinion it would have even more extensive applications," says Soveri.

Soveri has also studied how the vast majority of rain water is transformed into ground water, how impurities penetrate the soil, and how many impurities are found in ground water.

According to Soveri, Finland's ground waters are disposed to acidification since there is very little lime in the bedrock, which contains considerable quantities of acidic types of rocks, and the ground's ability to act as a buffer is poor. Ground waters near the earth's surface are frequently also naturally acidic.



Average pH-values of snow in various parts of the country in the years 1976--1984. Darkened areas are the most acidic.

No pH-changes were yet observed in ground waters during the time of the study, but calcium, sulphate, and aluminum contents had clearly increased even in this short period of time. This, in Soveri's opinion, may also be a prediction of a reduction of pH in ground waters at the latest when alkali cations dissolved from the soil are no longer sufficient to compensate for alluvial hydrions coming along with the acidic thaw water and rain waters.

"The changes are slow according to the human eye, but they are alarmingly rapid according to the geological time table," said Soveri. All in all, the metal loading of humans also seems to be increasing via ground waters.

In the years 1976--1981 the average pH-value of water from melting snow was 4.6. Acidic water from melting snow accelerates the disintegration of the soil as well as transports products of this disintegration to the ground water. Tests indicate that disintegration products formed in the winter and substances freed by the action of dissolving in the summer and fall are primarily washed away in connection with the spring thaw.

The sulphate, copper, and lead contained in ground water or drainage water originated for the most part from sediments and the contents were greatest in coarse-grained types of soil. The calcium, magnesium, sodium, potassium, and

aluminum found in the ground water were, on the other hand, clearly of a geological origin.

Among the heavy metals contained in ground waters, copper, lead, manganese, and zinc are according to the study primarily from the air in their origin. Cadmium and mercury are not discussed in Soveri's study.

Help Even in the Search for Ore

An enrichment stratification procedure, by which searches for ores can also be accomplished according to Soveri, was used in the study. General Manager Kalevi Kauranne of the Geological Research Center has become familiar with the procedure and considers it to be interesting. "Indeed, a similar procedure was tried in the search for ore in the 1960s already, but with poor results. However, I do not doubt that it could be useful in certain areas. The biggest drawback in it is the expense since a large number of holes would have to be bored into the bedrock."

Waters from spring thaws affect ground waters the most in Northern and Central Finland. In southern areas, on the other hand, autumn rains have the greatest effect on the formation of ground water for a whole year.

In the sulphide-rich areas of the coastline and particularly Ostrobothnia the ground waters contain relatively more dissolved substances, such as iron, manganese, sulphates, and chlorides. They frequently limit the use of water or require special treatment before water can be made suitable for drinking.

In the weathered-rock granite areas of Southwest and Southeast Finland the fluoride contents of ground water exceed the limit of 1.5 milligrams per liter recommended by the Central Medical Board in many locations.

Communities and scattered residences have continuously increased the use of ground waters in the last few decades. Last year they used 0.5 million cubic meters of ground water in a 24-hour period, which is 49 percent of the consumption of water.

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